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THE WORLD TRADE CONSTITUTION
John 0. McGinnis" and Mark L. Movsesian**
Conventional wisdom holds that the World Trade Organization (WTO) necessarily poses
a threat to sovereignty and representative government within its member nations.
Professors McGinnis and Movsesian refute this view. They argue that the WTO can be
understood as a constitutive structure that, by reducing the power of protectionist
interest groups, can simultaneously promote international trade and domestic
democracy. Indeed, in promoting both free trade and accountable government, the WTO
reflects many of the insights that inform our own Madisonian Constitution. Professors
McGinnis and Movsesian reject recent proposals to grant the WTO regulatory authority,
endorsing instead the WTO's limited adjudicative power as the better means to resolve
the difficult problem of covert protectionism. They develop a series of procedure-
oriented tests that would permit WTO tribunals to invalidate covert protectionism
without supplanting national judgments on labor, environmental, health, and safety
policies. Finally, they demonstrate that the WTO's emerging approach to the problem of
covert protectionism largely comports with the democracy-reinforcing jurisprudence they
recommend, and they offer some suggestions for reforms that would help prevent the
organization from going astray in the future.
INTRODUCTION
Free trade policies, and the institutions that implement them, are at
a turning point. Once the concern of a handful of scholars and poli-
cymakers, trade institutions now draw mass public protests, such as
the ones that took place last fall in Seattle at a meeting of the World
Trade Organization (WTO). While the Seattle protesters had diverse
aims and sometimes radical political philosophies, most voiced a com-
plaint that one also hears from more mainstream critics: the WTO in
its current form poses a serious threat to sovereignty and representa-
tive democracy within its member nations.1 In a blinkered pursuit of
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* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law.
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I See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 348, 375 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2000) (describing the various protests in Seattle); Mark L.
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free trade, an unaccountable WTO will block important programs that
popularly elected national governments have adopted to promote the
public welfare.' Opponents voice particular concern about labor, envi-
ronmental, health, and safety regulations. 3 By invalidating these sorts
of measures, opponents contend, the WTO not only will interfere with
members' ability to govern themselves as they think best, but will also
place people around the world at serious risk.
4
Quite apart from the critics, some WTO members have made
statements that hint at a potentially substantial expansion of the or-
ganization's authority.5 At present, the WTO lacks authority to for-
mulate international regulations. It merely polices members' laws to
ensure that these laws do not discriminate against foreign trade in
violation of treaty obligations.6 In Seattle, however, the United States
and some European countries suggested that the WTO should begin to
develop international labor and environmental standards. 7  While
these members disclaimed any immediate intention of penalizing coun-
of Supreme Court Review, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 775, 779 & n.19, 793-94 (I999) (discussing these
critiques).
2 See, e.g., Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Fin., 103d Cong. 240 (i994) (statement of Ralph Nader) (suggesting that the world
trading system after the Uruguay Round would "undermine citizen control and chill the ability of
domestic democratic bodies to make decisions on a vast array of domestic policies from food safety
to communications and foreign investment policies"); Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the
Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 634-43 (1994) (arguing
that trade agreements have "significant implications for domestic policy-making" but are "neither
developed nor implemented in accordance with ... core democratic principles"); Robert F. Hous-
man, Democratizing International Trade Decision-making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 728-42
(1994) (asserting that the failure of international trade agreements to allow for democratic partici-
pation slows the spread of democracy and hinders the functioning of democratic governments);
Phillip R. Timble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sover-
eignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1944-46 0997) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK,
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)) (describing a "new sense of vulner-
ability throughout the [United States]").
3 Trimble, supra note 2, at 1945; Guy de Jonqui~res, Temperatures Likely to Rise: 'Green and
Blue' Issues Generate Divisive Arguments Both Inside and Outside the WTO, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
29, 1999, at4.
4 See Michael H. Shuman, GATTzilla v. Communities, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 527, 528 (I994);
see also de Jonqui~res, supra note 3 ("Opponents blame free trade for causing or contributing to
problems ranging from global warming, destruction of rain forests and harming endangered spe-
cies, to exploitative child labour and human rights abuse.").
5 See infra pp. 551-52.
6 See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving International Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in
the WTO: Lessons and Future Directions, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 81, 82 (2000) (noting that the
WTO allows nations to set food standards so long as these standards do not discriminate against
foreign goods); Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seattle, 17
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 257, 277-78 (2o0o) (noting that the WTO permits nations to set their
own environmental standards, but requires that they do so in a nondiscriminatory manner).
7 Evelyn Iritani, WTO: What's at Issue, L.A. TIMES, Dec. i, 1999, at AI8.
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tries that did not meet these standards, President Clinton indicated
that sanctions might be a long-term goal.8
We offer here a blueprint for the proper structure of the WTO. We
refute arguments that the WTO threatens members' sovereignty, and
we reject recent attempts to expand the organization's authority. In
our view, the WTO will present a danger to democracy within member
states only if attempts to grant it regulatory authority are successful.
If its powers remain properly limited, the WTO will promote the
power of national democratic majorities by constraining the influence
of protectionist interest groups. 9  Indeed, by facilitating jurisdictional
competition, the WTO, in conjunction with open capital markets, can
help reduce the power of interest groups generally. In this way, the
WTO can make national governments more responsive to their con-
stituents' priorities, tastes, and development goals.
In promoting both free trade and accountable democratic govern-
ment, the WTO reflects many of the principles that inform federalism
- the keystone of our own Constitution. One effect of our original
federal structure was to prevent discrimination against interstate trade
and thus restrain protectionist interest groups.' 0 This free trade re-
gime, in conjunction with an open national capital market, also re-
strained special interests more broadly, making it more difficult for
them to exact resources from state governments." In this way, feder-
alism reinforced the power of majorities within states while promoting
a continental economy.' 2  Our domestic trade constitution thus
achieved the goals James Madison set out for constitutionalism in gen-
eral: "[t]o secure the public good and private rights against the danger
of ... faction, and at the same time preserve the spirit and the form of
popular government ....
8 See Michael Paulson, Clinton Says He Will Support Trade Sanctions for Worker Abuse, SE-
ATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 1, I999, 1999 WL 6607255.
9 Interest groups are groups of individuals, corporations, or other organizations that can ac-
quire resources for themselves at the expense of the public through their substantial influence over
the political process. Protectionist interest groups are the subset of interest groups that acquire
such resources by securing tariffs or other laws that impede competition from foreign products.
See infra pp. 523-25 (discussing protectionist groups). Our definition of interest groups does not
include those groups, like environmental organizations, that do not seek resources for themselves
through the political process, but instead seek to change government policy by persuading the
public that their distinctive values should guide society. For discussion of this point, see below at
pp. 5 29-30.
10 Cf Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis of Law in a
New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. i315, 1322-24 0995) (describing how the Constitution established a
free trade regime among the states).
" See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Fed-
eralism and Economic Development, ii J.L. ECON. & ORG. r, 8 (1995) (discussing the manner in
which federalism constrained governing coalitions in the states).
12 For an elaboration of this point, see below at pp. 526-27.
13 THE FEDERALIST No. io, at 48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor 1999) (196I).
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The WTO can accomplish similar goals of Madisonian constitu-
tionalism on a global scale.1 4  Because of the declining costs of infor-
mation and transportation, trade among nations offers unparalleled
opportunities for economic growth.'5  Nonetheless, given the structure
of contemporary democratic governments, protectionist interest groups
within a country can often use the political process to pursue policies
that profit members of the group at the expense of the nation as a
whole.' 6 If carefully circumscribed, the WTO can protect opportuni-
ties for private exchange while also strengthening democratic govern-
ance. 7 Conversely, if the WTO is empowered to engage in substan-
tive regulation, it will give leverage to interest groups - this time on a
global scale - and thus restrict growth and undermine democratic
sovereignty.
Our argument proceeds as follows. Free trade and democratic
government face a common obstacle - the influence of concentrated
interest groups. Because free trade creates wealth for each nation, one
would expect national majorities to favor free trade policies over poli-
cies that benefit special interests at the majority's expense. Some in-
dustries within a nation, however, suffer because of free trade, and
owners and workers in those industries will agitate for protectionist
measures that restrict imports. Such protectionist interest groups
command disproportionate leverage in domestic politics, and their lob-
bies are often able to secure import restrictions, even though the over-
all citizenry suffers. "8
The WTO and the trade agreements it administers act to restrain
protectionist interest groups, thereby promoting both free trade and
democracy.' 9 Since 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) has served as a framework for several global negotiating
"rounds" in which signatories have agreed to substantial reciprocal
tariff reductions. 20 The regime of reciprocal tariff reductions has cre-
14 For a discussion of what Madisonian constitutionalism means in this context, see below at
pp. 526-27.
15 See Louis De Alessi, Form, Substance, and Welfare Comparisons in the Analysis of Institu-
tions, 146 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 5, 14 (i99o) (observing that mutually profit-
able exchanges become more available as information and transportation costs fall).
16 See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE. AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAG-
FLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 77-79 (1982) (describing the decline of growth-inducing gov-
ernmental policies in stable democracies such as Great Britain due to the increasing power of in-
terest groups).
17 See infra section I.D, pp. 544-49.
18 See infra pp. 523-25.
19 For the WTO Agreement and its attendant instruments, see Final Act Embodying the Re-
sults of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. I5, I994, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1 25 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act.
20 GATT appears as an annex to the WTO Agreement. General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
2000]
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ated incentives for exporters, who benefit from lower foreign tariffs, to
lobby their governments for free trade policies." This mobilization of
exporter interest groups serves to counteract the efforts of protectionist
groups. 22
GATT thus represents a familiar constitutional strategy for reduc-
ing agency costs. In such a strategy, a majority commits to political
institutions that make it more difficult for the majority's agents in the
legislative or executive branches to reward powerful interest groups
with policies that benefit the groups at the expense of society as a
whole.2 3 One measure of GATT's success in this regard is the decline
in average world tariffs from approximately 40% when the agreement
was adopted in 1947 to less than 5% at the beginning of the last dec-
ade.24
Reduced tariffs force protectionist interest groups to seek other im-
port barriers. One typical approach is to lobby for measures that pro-
tect domestic industry covertly - measures that are ostensibly de-
signed to serve labor, environmental, health, or safety goals, but that
are really intended to impede competition from abroad. 5 Covert pro-
tectionism presents a difficult dilemma: while interest groups should
not be permitted to impose costs on citizens by erecting protectionist
barriers in the guise of legitimate legislation, bona fide labor, environ-
mental, health, and safety regulations might be necessary to protect
against dangers that the market cannot address on its own. The WTO
has begun to address this dilemma through its new adjudicative dis-
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (I994) [hereinafter GATT 19941. For a discussion on negotiating
rounds, see below at pp. 544-45.
21 See infra pp. 545-46.
22 See infra p. 546.
23 See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Inter-
pretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 245 (1986) (discussing constitutional
mechanisms as a response to the high agency costs that citizens face in monitoring legislators). We
address strategies for reducing agency costs in both the domestic and world trade constitutions.
See infra p. 542.
24 Michael J. 'I)'ebilcock, On the Virtues of Dreaming Big but Thinking Small: Comments on the
World Trading System After the Uruguay Round, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 291, 292 (1990).
25 See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE
45 (1994) (noting that there is a "danger that environmental regulatory processes will be 'captured'
by protectionist interests, who will use environmental standards as a guise for erecting barriers to
imports"); see also Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the
Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2164-65 (1995) (discussing ways in which countries "may
abuse environmental trade measures for protectionist reasons"); Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protec-
tionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (i999) (discussing the dis-
tinction between legitimate regulatory measures and those that are designed to serve protectionist
objectives).
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pute settlement system, 26 one of the organization's most important and
controversial features.
We demonstrate how the WTO's approach to the problem of covert
protectionism - what we call the "antidiscrimination model" - can
reinforce democracy while advancing free trade. We endorse the
WTO's employment of an adjudicative system with limited authority
to resolve claims concerning discriminatory trade measures. 27  This
system has been questioned recently by politicians and academics who
would prefer that the WTO adopt what we call the "regulatory
model," which would authorize the formulation of global labor, envi-
ronmental, health, and safety standards.
28
Advocates have advanced various arguments in favor of the regula-
tory model. Some commentators believe the model would democratize
the WTO by allowing it to balance environmental, labor, health, and
safety values against free trade.29  Others argue that international
rulemaking is necessary to prevent "races to the bottom" in which
countries adopt suboptimal regulatory standards in order to attract
and retain business in the global economy.30 Finally, some argue that
global regulatory standards could help minimize covert protectionism
by preventing nations from establishing rules solely through their own
parochial processes. 3 1  These arguments have given rise to various
26 See infra pp. 531-32.
27 See infra pp. 566-69.
28 See infra section III.B, pp. 552--66 (discussing some of the dangers of the regulatory model).
29 See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 911-13 (1995) (discussing a "Trade Stakeholders
Model" in which nongovernmental organizations would help develop and enforce a "limited set of
globally defined, international trade-related labor, environmental, safety, and consumer norms"); cf.
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Resolving Trade-Environment Conflicts: The Case for Trading Institutions, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 607, 608, 614-22 0994) (arguing that GATT's flawed approach to environ-
mental issues suggests the need for a new forum). For further discussion of these arguments, see
below at pp. 534, 550-5 1.
30 In the international context, a "race to the bottom" is a continuing reduction in regulatory
standards accelerated by international competition. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, International
Trade and Social Welfare: The New Agenda, 17 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 338, 368 (1996) (noting race-to-
the-bottom pressures that exist in developing countries); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environ-
mental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1558-59 (1999) (discussing the need for international
environmental governance structures to prevent races to the bottom); cf. Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and
Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 168 (1999) (describing the lower levels of
consumer protection that can result from lowered regulatory standards); Richard L. Revesz, Reha-
bilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal En-
vironmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 12 10, 12 13-19 (1992) (discussing races to the bottom in
the context of domestic environmental regulation). Politicians have made similar points. See John
F. Kerry, Trade and the Environment: Charting a New Course, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 447, 452
(1994). For further discussion, see below at pp. 551-52.
31 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment:




proposals, such as the United States's position at the Seattle conference
that the WTO should become involved in setting global labor and en-
vironmental standards. 32
Unlike the antidiscrimination model, the regulatory model would
transform the WTO to the detriment of democratic sovereignty. By
encouraging uniform rules that ignore the differing views and devel-
opment levels of member states, centralized regulatory authority would
impede, rather than facilitate, the exercise of representative govern-
ment.33 Moreover, far from preventing races to the bottom, a regula-
tory function within the WTO would lead to less efficient regulation
because interest groups would capture the organization and skew
regulation in their favor.34 Indeed, because the WTO is even more
remote from popular control than national regulatory agencies, interest
groups would enjoy even more disproportionate leverage than they do
in the domestic context.35 Ironically, those politicians and commenta-
tors who believe that the way to reform the WTO is to give it a greater
role in formulating labor, environmental, health, and safety standards
would create the very sort of unaccountable, antidemocratic organiza-
tion that they oppose.
After defending the WTO's antidiscrimination model, we develop a
jurisprudence that would allow the organization to invalidate covert
protectionism without supplanting national judgments about labor,
environmental, health, and safety policies. We endorse a variety of
procedure-oriented tests that would screen for discrimination and, in
the process, reinforce domestic democracy.36 For instance, a require-
ment that domestic measures be transparent would limit interest
groups' ability to lobby for opaque legislation that confuses the elec-
torate. 37 A requirement that regulations affecting imports be consis-
tent with those affecting like domestic products would encourage do-
mestic industries to resist protectionist legislation because the burdens
imposed upon foreign producers might come back to haunt them.38
Thus, by making legislation more accessible and by mobilizing forces
to counteract protectionist interest groups, the tests we advocate would
32 Guy de Jonqui~res & Mark Suzman, Clinton Tries to Soothe Fears over Labour Rights, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at i. President Clinton startled delegates at the Seattle conference by ex-
pressing his support for a set of core labor and environmental standards that the WTO would
eventually enforce through trade sanctions. Id.
33 See infra section III.B.i, pp. 552-55.
34 See infra section III.B.2, pp. 556-58.
35 See infra pp. 557-5 8 .
36 See infra pp. 573-8o.
31 See infra pp. 574-75.
38 See infra pp. 575-76. We also endorse a requirement that regulations be based on some
modicum of objective evidence. See infra pp. 577-79.
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actually enhance the democratic accountability of national govern-
ments.
Having described our proposed jurisprudence, we compare it to the
WTO's emerging approach to the problem of covert protectionism.
The WTO has been moving toward a Madisonian jurisprudence in
certain key respects. Recent agreements, like those on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement)39 and on Technical Bar-
riers to Trade (the TBT Agreement), 40 expressly provide for procedure-
oriented tests, wisely cabining the authority of WTO tribunals to de-
vise their own approaches. 4 1 Moreover, the WTO has interpreted
GATT to apply democracy-reinforcing tests to ferret out disguised dis-
crimination. 42  At the same time, the WTO has -generally avoided
making intrusive judgments about the substance of members' labor,
environmental, health, and safety goals.
4 3
The WTO has departed from a Madisonian approach, however, by
suggesting that members have a duty to negotiate with affected coun-
tries before adopting environmental measures that restrict trade.
44
This position threatens to involve the WTO in the kind of substantive
standard-setting it should avoid if it is to promote free trade while re-
inforcing democratic governance. Judging whether, members have ful-
filled their duty to negotiate over environmental regulations would re-
quire the WTO to evaluate the wisdom of various proposals, thus
inexorably involving the WTO in the formulation of .domestic policy.
The WTO's adoption of a least restrictive means test also raises
some concern. 45  Under this test, members must employ regulations
that affect trade in the "least restrictive" manner. While the organiza-
tion has been relatively deferential in applying it, the least restrictive
means test could ultimately inject the WTO into national debates on
alternative approaches to important problems. Indeed, dicta in a re-
cent ruling suggest the potential for such a result.46 This development
would be unfortunate: the WTO must not allow the least restrictive
means test to become an excuse for second-guessing the substance of
national regulatory policy.
39 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. i5, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex iA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27
(i994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs-elegale/i5-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
40 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. i5, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex iA,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994), http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-e/legale/ 7-tbt.pdf [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
41 For a discussion of these agreements, see below at pp. 596-98.
42 See infra pp. 590-92.
41 See infra pp. 594, 599-600, 6o1-02.
41 See infra PP. 593-94.
45 For a discussion of the least restrictive means test, see below at pp. 589-90, 594-96, 598-99.
46 See infra pp. 594-95.
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The emerging duty to negotiate and the potential intrusiveness of
the least restrictive means test underscore the enduring threats to a
Madisonian world trade regime. Even if properly circumscribed by
optimal rules, institutions may not in the long term exercise the self-
restraint necessary to advance the goals of both democratic governance
and free trade. Bureaucratic agencies, and even courts, have a ten-
dency to overstep their proper bounds. We therefore close by offering
some thoughts on additional mechanisms that can prevent the WTO's
adjudicative system from going astray.
By clarifying its democratic potential, we hope to blunt pressures
for an imprudent expansion of the WTO's jurisdiction. The WTO's
agenda includes both complex and novel issues. The key to their suc-
cessful resolution lies in confining the organization's structure and ju-
risprudence to the important task at hand - keeping the avenues of
trade open by restraining the protectionist groups that obstruct both
economic growth and democracy.
Part I shows how protectionist interest groups pose common prob-
lems for free trade and domestic democracy. Part II describes the ba-
sic mechanisms that the WTO employs to blunt the influence of inter-
est groups. By way of example, it explores the ways in which
American political institutions - what we call the "domestic trade
constitution" - work to reduce those problems. Part II also begins to
address concerns that the WTO will compromise sovereignty and rep-
resentative government.
Part III considers in depth an essential component of the world
trade constitution - its mechanism for policing covert protectionism.
We defend the WTO's adoption of the antidiscrimination model as the
best way to address the problem in the context of the world trading
system. In doing so, we reject the regulatory model, demonstrating
that granting the WTO the power to establish global rules on labor,
the environment, health, and safety would detract from sovereignty
and lead to inefficient regulation. We further show why such a power
would not even be the optimal way to solve "spillover" problems - ex-
ternalities caused by activities in one country that have adverse effects
in another.
Part IV describes a jurisprudence of procedure-oriented tests that
the WTO should use to root out covert protectionism. It also shows
why members should not have general authority to regulate on behalf
of the public welfare outside their jurisdictions. Finally, Part V evalu-
ates the WTO's emerging approach to the problem of covert protec-
tionism and assesses the consistency of that approach with our pro-
posed jurisprudence. Part V also offers some suggestions for reforms
that will allow the WTO better to fulfill its potential for advancing
free trade and reinforcing domestic democracy.
[Vol. I14:5 11
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I. FREE TRADE, DEMOCRACY, AND THEIR COMMON
DISCONTENTS
A. Free Trade and Protectionist Interest Groups
Free trade creates wealth among nations. This proposition has
been well established since at least the beginning of the nineteenth
century, when David Ricardo first articulated the theory of compara-
tive advantage.4 ' According to that theory - perhaps the most widely
accepted in contemporary economics - nations should specialize in
the goods and services they can produce most efficiently.48 By pro-
ducing those goods and services and trading for others, nations opti-
mally deploy the various factors of production available to them.
49
Trade also facilitates growth by permitting the introduction of new
goods, which themselves encourage innovation and increase produc-
tivity. Experience as well as theory demonstrate the power of com-
parative advantage: the increase in international trade has been a key
factor in stimulating robust world economic growth since World War
11.50
A recent study confirms that the benefits of trade are not limited to
the developed world.5 1 While living standards in developing countries
generally lag behind those of the developed world, some developing
countries are catching up - namely, those that are open to trade. In-
deed, the more open developing countries are to trade, the faster their
standards of living converge with those of the developed world. For
47 See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE
91-93 (1996) (discussing the contributions of Ricardo and his contemporaries to the theory of com-
parative advantage).
48 Nations need only have a comparative advantage for specialization to confer benefits. Thus,
even if a nation is the best in the world at producing all goods and services, it still could profit by
specializing in those that it produces most efficiently by the greatest degree. See EDWIN MANS-
FIELD, ECONOMICS 357-58 (7th ed. 1992) (providing examples to differentiate comparative advan-
tage from absolute advantage).
49 See generally PETER H. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 15-39 (9th ed. 1991) (ex-
plaining Ricardo's original theory of comparative advantage and its subsequent modification using
increasing marginal costs and the Heckscher-Ohlin model to predict trade patterns based on spe-
cialization).
50 See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 5-9 (1988) (arguing that much global prosperity is
attributable to decreases in trade restrictions occasioned by GATT); ANNE 0. KRUEGER, PER-
SPECTIVES ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 2o6-12 (i99o) (using Turkey as an example to demon-
strate how world trade has created economic growth).
51 L. Alan Winters, Trade and Poverty: Is There a Connection?, in SPECIAL STUDIES 5: TRADE,
INCOME DISPARITY AND POVERTY 43, 43 (World "Tlrade Org. ed., 1999), http://www.wto.orgI
englishnewse/presoo.e/pov3_e.pdf; see also David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Growth Is Good for the
Poor (Mar. 2ooo) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/pdfiles/
growthgoodforpoor.pdf (citing a World Bank study that, using data from 8o countries over four
decades, confirms that openness to trade boosts economic growth and that the incomes of the poor
rise proportionately with overall growth).
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instance, thirty years ago, South Korea was as poor as Ghana. Today,
in large part because of trade liberalization, South Korea is as wealthy
as Portugal, with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) exceeding
$12,000.52 Countries as diverse as Nicaragua, Poland, and New Zea-
land have also benefited enormously from trade liberalization, 3
It is true that free trade does not make everyone within a nation
better off, at least in the short term. Free trade displaces workers and
owners in industries where the comparative advantage lies abroad, be-
cause it becomes cheaper for the nation to import the goods than to
produce them domestically.5 4 Workers often cannot change industries
easily because they have nontransferable skills. Owners' capital,
moreover, may not be mobile because the owners have invested it in
industry-specific assets. As a result, workers and owners in industries
that lack a comparative advantage stand to lose a significant portion
of their income.5 5
In the long run, free trade may make many of these workers and
owners better off, as open borders create higher-paying jobs and
higher returns to capital.5 6 But the workers and owners may discount
52 Dollar & Kraay, supra note 51; see also Press Release, World Trade Org., Free Trade Helps
Reduce Poverty, Says New WTO Secretariat Study (June 13, 2oo0), http://www.wto.org/english/
news.e/presooe/pri8i e.htm (highlighting the improving condition of South Korea).
53 In 199o, Nicaragua's average level of nominal protection in the form of tariffs was 43.2%; it
fell to 6.8% by January i, 1999. The I999 temporary import tariff ranged between 20% and 5%,
down from 3o% and 5% in June of 1997. By 1999, this tariff had been abolished for 83.8% of tariff
headings. In the 199os, Nicaragua passed a prohibition of nontariff restrictions on foreign trade,
abolished production and export subsidies and taxes, abolished price controls (except for fuel and
medicine), and enacted a copyright law and other intellectual property rights. A 1999 report by the
WTO credits such reforms - many undertaken in fulfillment of obligations under GATT and the
new WTO - with the resumption of economic growth and the decline of unemployment in the
country. The report forecasts 6% real GDP growth for Nicaragua in 1999, despite the hurdles as-
sociated with the nation's extreme poverty. Press Release, World Trade Org., Nicaragua: October
1999 (Oct. 18, 1999), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr-e/tpli8_e.htm.
The Polish economy has also improved dramatically as it has opened to the world. Growth
rates since the early 199os have raised real GDP to one quarter above pretransition levels. Since
1995, growth has averaged around 5% per year. Press Release, World Trade Org., Poland: June
2000 (June 26, 2o00), http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tpr-e/tpi36_e.htm.
A 1996 WTO Secretariat report on New Zealand showed that "[tirade liberalization and
structural reforms have helped to reduce unemployment from i i per cent in the mid-198os to 6 per
cent in 1996, to cut inflation in the last io years from 15 per cent to around 2 per cent and to
achieve average, annual economic growth rates of 4 per cent since 1993." Press Release, World
Trade Org., New Zealand: October 1996 (Oct. 15, 1996), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
tpr._e/tp43_e.htm.
54 See LINDERT, supra note 49, at 69-73 (explaining that the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts
that a nation, in the short run, will be divided into groups of winners and losers from free trade).
55 See id. at 70-71 (explaining that in the short run, production factors may be immobile,
causing losses in industries without a comparative advantage).
56 See Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the United States with
Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 539, 550
(1993) (arguing that in the long run "[pirotectionism raises prices, entrenches inefficiency, and de-
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these hopeful prospects. A well-known feature of human psychology
called the "matching principle" suggests that people have difficulty cal-
culating the current value of future benefits.5 7 As a result, many peo-
ple refuse to forgo a current benefit for future gain, even when the lat-
ter will be greater on a discounted basis. Thus, workers who fear the
adverse effects of free trade may give scant consideration to the possi-
bility of better jobs in the future, and owners scant consideration to
the chance that they will increase their profits in another business.
As a result of real monetary losses and the patterns of human psy-
chology, then, workers and owners in industries adversely affected by
free trade will try to persuade the government to erect protectionist
barriers.5 8 The realities of interest group politics suggest that they will
enjoy significant success.5 9 As concentrated groups, workers and own-
ers can obtain substantial benefits from government action.60  Conse-
quently, these groups have strong incentives to provide campaign con-
tributions and electoral support in return for protectionist policies.
In contrast, groups that benefit from free trade, such as consumers,
are diffuse, and their gains, though large in the aggregate, tend to be
stroys more jobs than it saves"); see also LINDERT, supra note 49, at 72-73 (explaining that in the
long run, factors are mobile and move to sectors with a comparative advantage).
57 For a description of the matching principle, see ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REA-
SON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 76-80 (1988). This psychological phenomenon
should be distinguished from risk aversion. Most individuals are risk averse, which means that
they prefer the certainty of a single outcome to the uncertainty of a range of outcomes, even if the
expected value of the average of the range is as high as the single outcome. Thus, workers may
well prefer a job in hand even to the strong possibility of better jobs in the offing. Risk aversion is
a matter of preference, whereas the matching principle is a flaw in calculation. Public policymak-
ers should accept risk aversion as a preference, but should be encouraged to devise mechanisms to
correct systematic calculation errors that lead to wealth reductions.
58 See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 238-42 (1989) (using the Stigler-Petzman the-
ory to predict that "industries with concentrated market structures and geographically concen-
trated production patterns [will] be more successful at gaining protection[]" from trade than will
consumers at lowering barriers to trade); see also ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LITAN,
SAVING FREE TRADE: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 23-24 (1986) (arguing that in times of economic
distress, interest groups pressure the legislature to pass protectionist measures).
59 Interest groups participate in and influence the political process in a variety of ways. First,
they are able to monitor what transpires in the political process; for example, what legislation is
considered and how it affects their interests. See, e.g., Michael A. Andrews, Tax Simplification, 47
SMU L. REV. 37, 42 (093). Second, because of their greater resources, interest groups are able to
conduct coordinated and coherent campaigns in the media to publicize their position. See J. Skelly
Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political
Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 623 (1982) (noting studies showing that "massive spending and
sophisticated media campaigns by special interest groups have swamped referenda that were ini-
tially favored by a majority of voters"). Finally, interest groups may exercise great leverage over
legislators through campaign contributions or independent political expenditures. See Daniel H.
Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784,
826-28 (1985).
60 See OLSON, supra note 16, at 34.
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small on an individual basis. 61 These groups have comparatively few
incentives to contribute time and money to lobby for free trade poli-
cies. Moreover, they face high agency costs in monitoring legislators to
determine whether their representatives are yielding to interest groups
at the expense of society as a whole.62 For these reasons, citizens may
choose to remain "rationally ignorant" of almost all trade policy is-
sues.
63
So far, this account is the relatively familiar story of interest group
politics. 64 But protectionist groups enjoy an additional advantage:
they can exploit nationalist sentiments. These sentiments, which are
often deeply rooted in a country's tradition and culture, can have a
positive impact on politics by encouraging the production of public
goods. For example, they facilitate the common defense and aid in
rallying opposition to totalitarian oppression, as in Eastern Europe at
the end of the Cold War.65  Unfortunately, these sentiments can also
61 See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 145 (1965) (detailing the difficulties that diffuse groups face in organizing).
62 See A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of
Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 447-48 (i999); see also
Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"? The Failure of the Contract Anal-
ogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1178-79 (1998) (discussing how collective
action problems pose difficulties for citizens' monitoring of legislative conduct).
63 Rational ignorance describes the systematic tendency of citizens to pay little attention to po-
litical information. The phenomenon occurs because acquiring information about politics is both
costly and unproductive. It is costly because, to acquire such information, individuals must invest
time that they could be using in other more lucrative or pleasurable enterprises. It is unproductive
because, although the principal instrumental use of such information is to guide voting, the vote of
any one individual is unlikely to influence the outcome of an election. See Movsesian, supra note
62, at II79. For further discussion of the roots of rational ignorance and its pervasive effects on
informational inputs in a democracy, see John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based
Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 123-26 (I996). For a discussion of the ex-
pressive value of voting, see below at note 396.
64 Of course, not all interest groups favor higher tariffs. Domestic businesses, for example,
want inexpensive factors of production, whether imported or not. But the strength of special inter-
ests that favor low tariffs is not likely to be equal to that of protectionist interests. First, an inex-
pensive foreign input is generally not as crucial to the profits of a business as an inexpensive im-
ported end product is dangerous to a domestic industry. Hence, protectionist interests have more
at stake and therefore will spend more on lobbying. Moreover, unions are structured such that the
political lobbying of workers is wholly protectionist, even if workers in particular industries would
benefit from cheap inputs. See Christopher T. Wonnell, The Influential Myth of a Generalized
Conflict of Interests Between Labor and Management, 8i GEO. L.J. 39, 83 & n.174 (992) (explain-
ing the "tendency of labor unions to back international protectionist schemes"). Finally, many
products are sold to individual consumers, not to businesses, and therefore generate no concen-
trated, countervailing interests in favor of lowering tariffs.
65 See Mark L. Movsesian, The Persistent Nation State and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. IO83, 1085 & n.I5 (1996) (noting scholarship on nationalism); see also
WILLIAM PFAFF, THE WRATH OF NATIONS 30 (1993) (discussing nationalism's role in the resis-
tance to fascism and communism). In fact, many authors argue that nationalism has natural roots
in our evolutionary heritage. For a discussion of the biological roots of ethnic solidarity and xeno-
phobia, see generally PIERRE L. VAN DER BERGHE, THE ETHNIC PHENOMENON (598i).
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provide cover for a variety of protectionist measures, like "Buy Ameri-
can" and domestic-content laws, that are designed to benefit interest
groups at the expense of the public. 66
The trade restrictions secured by protectionist interest groups are
particularly deleterious to social welfare. It is well established in eco-
nomic theory that the most effective way to increase the income of dis-
advantaged groups is through direct transfer payments. For instance,
direct transfer payments are preferable to rent control as a method of
improving housing for the poor because direct transfers lack the sub-
stantial deadweight loss that accompanies rent control.67  Instead, it is
better to provide the poor with housing vouchers. 68 Similarly, with the
wealth generated by free trade, society can provide transfers to people
with less income, including those for whom trade provides no advan-
tage or even a net disadvantage. 69 For example, instead of pressuring
the Japanese automobile industry to adopt voluntary export restraints
in the i980s, the United States could have paid cash compensation to
American autoworkers. This strategy would have cost far less than
the $3 billion that American consumers ultimately spent in higher car
prices.70
66 For a survey of state "Buy American" legislation, see James D. Southwick, Binding the
States: A Survey of State Law Conformance with the Standards of the GA7T Procurement Code, 13
U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 57, 73-76 (1992). Such legislation has generated substantial litigation. See,
e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Dep't of Water and Power, 80 Cal. Rptr. 8oo (Ct.
App. 1969) (considering the constitutionality of California's Buy American Act).
The capacity of nationalist sentiments to serve protectionist interests also can be gauged by
comparing antitrust law to antidumping law. Both antitrust and antidumping law fall under the
rubric of competition law. But antitrust law, which applies equally to domestic and foreign com-
panies under the jurisdiction of the United States, is designed to promote consumer welfare. In
contrast, antidumping law, which applies only to foreign companies, protects domestic competitors
at the expense of consumers. See Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Internationalizing Our Views Toward Re-
coupment and Market Power: Attacking the Antidumping/Antitrust Dichotomy Through
WTO-Consistent Global Welfare Theory, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 69, io6-io, 118-28 (1996)
(explaining that antitrust laws and antidumping laws have entirely different objectives).
67 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, i i i HARV. L. REV. 62 1, 652 n. i55 (998) (defining a deadweight loss as occurring
"whenever the costs of an individual's self-interested act exceed the individual's benefits from the
act").
68 See Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of
Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 900-13 (I99o) (discussing the economic advantages and
limitations of direct subsidies in place of public housing); see also R.S. Radford, Regulatory Takings
Law in the i99o's: The Death of Rent Control?, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. OI9, IO48-49 (1992). In the rent
control context, "deadweight loss" occurs when owners' direct costs exceed renters' direct benefits,
which is invariably the case. See Radford, supra, at 1049.
69 See Winters, supra note 51, at 43 (arguing that nations should seek to alleviate the hardships
caused by trade rather than abandon all attempts at reform). Moreover, recent studies suggest that
trade provides as many benefits for the poor as it does for those who are better off. See Dollar &
Kraay, supra note 5 1.
70 Jim Chen, Globalization and Its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157, 212 (2o0o).
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B. Democracy and Protectionist Interest Groups
In addition to interfering with international trade, protectionist
groups pose serious obstacles for democracy at home.71 Democracy, of
course, is a much disputed concept." We adopt the understanding of
the classical liberal tradition, which favors democracy because it pro-
vides the best mechanism for diffusing governmental power through-
out society.73 A central concern of this tradition is to prevent special
interests, whether they take the old forms of oligarchs and aristocrats
or the new form of concentrated pressure groups, from turning gov-
ernment to their private advantage.
7 4
Under this conception of democracy, institutional structures may be
crucial to reinforcing the power of the diffuse citizenry and to re-
straining special interests. Our own Madisonian Constitution, very
much a part of this liberal tradition, includes many institutional
mechanisms to restrain the undue influence of what The Federalist
called factions - groups united by common aims "adverse ... to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community. 7 5 For instance,
71 In noting these obstacles, we do not mean to imply that interest groups have no value in the
political process. They help measure the intensity of preferences. They may also bring to the pub-
lic attention useful policy information. See Dwight R. Lee, In Defense of Excessive Government,
65 S. ECON. J. 674, 68o-84, 688-go (i999) (noting that interest groups have incentives to produce
information relevant to the political process that individuals often lack). Nevertheless, interest
groups also cause welfare losses through rent-seeking. The effects of protectionist interest groups
in this regard are particularly unfortunate because they reduce the economic benefits of free trade.
As we demonstrate, the WTO's response to the welfare losses that protectionist groups im-
pose is to mobilize countervailing groups rather than to dissolve protectionist interest groups. See
infra pp. 545-46. Thus, protectionist groups will continue to act in the body politic, disseminating
information and registering preferences. The costs they impose, however, will be reduced.
72 See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 2 (2d ed. i996) ("The history of the idea of de-
mocracy is complex and is marked by conflicting conceptions.").
73 The classical liberal tradition sees democracy as a structure conducive to the pursuit of indi-
vidual goals. Id. at 40-43. , Under Professor Held's typology, the classical liberal tradition is la-
beled "protective democracy." Id. at 75. For a recent gloss on this idea, see MANCUR OLSON,
POWER AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS (2000),
showing that democracy, unlike autocracy, leads to a society governed by an "encompassing inter-
est." Id. at 14-17.
74 See HELD, supra note 72, at 89-94 (discussing concerns about factions in classical liberal or
"protective" democracy). For a recent discussion of the reasons why a political system dominated
by special interests is morally as well as economically undesirable, see John 0. McGinnis & Mi-
chael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
365 (iggg), arguing that political structures dominated by special interests create a "world of suspi-
cion and division as citizens are pitted directly against one another." Id. at 445.
75 THE FEDERALIST NO. 1o, supra note 13, at 46. Madison focused on "majority" factions -
groups that would unite around a common interest to suppress minority rights, particularly prop-
erty rights. Id. at 46-52. In the modern era, however, partly due to the same decline in the cost of
information and transportation that has made trade more profitable, interest groups have become
even more effective than majorities in gaining resources from the state. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328,
1337 0994).
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the large Republic described in The Federalist No. io decreased the
power of local factions by pitting them against one another in a more
extended polity.76 Other mechanisms, such as bicameralism and the
separation of powers, frustrated special interests by imposing stronger
barriers to rent-seeking legislation than would simple majoritarian
structures.77
Madison provided international trade as an example of the sort of
issue that would incite the formation of factions, and protectionist in-
terest groups are, in fact, a particular bane of democracy.78 Unlike
other factions, protectionist groups lack effective natural enemies in
the form of countervailing interest groups. 79 Consumers cannot easily
counteract protectionist groups, and foreign producers, the interest
group that would naturally benefit most from reduced domestic barri-
ers, are not represented in the polity. Without such counterbalancing,
protectionist groups often achieve results that most citizens would not
support.80
When protectionist groups do face strong countervailing interests,
democratic processes can yield policies more favorable to free trade.
This phenomenon is illustrated by so-called "drawback" rules in
United States tariff law. Despite the advantages of free trade, the
United States generally imposes import duties on foreign products.
The law relaxes tariffs, however, when a foreign good is incorporated
into a product that is subsequently exported from the United States.
76 THE FEDERALIST NO. Io, supra note 13, at 48-5I.
77 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 74, at 387-89 (describing the manner in which bi-
cameralism and the separation of powers constrain special interests).
78 THE FEDERALIST NO. io, supra note 13, at 48 ("Shall domestic manufacturers be encour-
aged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufacturers? are questions which would be
differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a
sole regard to justice and the public good."). Another way to understand the depth of the problem
is to analogize it to the lightly populated "pocket boroughs" (also known as "beggarly boroughs")
that certain British families and other groups, like universities, controlled until the electoral re-
forms of the nineteenth century. Because of the pocket boroughs, these families and groups had a
built-in advantage over the average subject in constructing legislative majorities. Protectionist
groups enjoy similar legislative advantages in achieving their aims. For a discussion of beggarly
boroughs, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at
170(1998).
79 For discussion of the few forces opposing protectionist groups, see above at note 64. The
theory of the large republic is that each faction should be counterbalanced by an opposing faction.
FEDERALIST No. Io, supra note 13, at 46-52.
80 The American historical experience supports this view. Before the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1934, which mobilized exporters to favor low domestic tariffs through the prospect of
lower foreign tariffs in return, Congress passed the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. See
Douglas A. Irwin & Randall S. Kroszner, Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy
Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization After Sinoot-Hawley, 42 J.L. & ECON.
643, 644-45 (1999) (discussing the manner in which the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934
encouraged export interests and thereby convinced Republicans to support free trade).
20001
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
In these circumstances, drawback rules permit recovery of 99% of the
duty.81
To be sure, workers and owners in the domestic industry injured by
the foreign good still lose money and presumably would want to retain
a tariff rate sufficient to block the imports. They are countered, how-
ever, by another interest group - the export industry - that benefits
from less expensive foreign imports that provide cheaper inputs for
their production. Thus, when concentrated groups appear on opposite
sides of a debate over tariffs, the legislative process can result in a
freer trade policy.
The fact that protectionist groups frustrate democracy as well as
free trade casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that international
trade regimes like the WTO pose a threat to representative govern-
ment in member states.8 2 Once one understands the problem of inter-
est groups, the threat seems greatly exaggerated. An international
body that acts to restrain protectionist groups can both promote free
trade and help domestic majorities to achieve their goals.8 3
The WTO's potential to improve domestic democracy also belies
another frequent criticism, namely that the organization inevitably will
encroach on members' sovereignty. Although some scholars have
questioned sovereignty's usefulness as an ordering principle in today's
"new medieval" world,8 4 the concept remains powerful, and for good
reason: at its core, sovereignty denotes the idea that a community
should be free to constitute itself as a political entity and make its own
81 CUSTOMS LAW & ADMINISTRATION § 17.1, at 15-16 (Lawrence J. Bogard ed., 3d ed. 1998);
see also Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 7 Ct. Cust. 97, iio (1916), aff'd, 249 U.S. 34 (1919) (defin-
ing drawback as the "repayment of moneys previously paid by the exporters upon goods previously
imported"). Customs regulations define a drawback as "the refund or remission, in whole or in
part, of a customs duty, fee or internal revenue tax which was imposed on imported merchandise
under Federal law because of its importation." 19 C.F.R. § 19 1.2(i) (1999).
82 See Movsesian, supra note i, at 779 & n.19, 793-94 (describing arguments that the WTO
poses a threat to sovereignty and representative democracy). For further discussion of these argu-
ments, see below at pp. 533-34.
83 Moreover, democratic WTO members agree to participate in the WTO by democratic means.
Thus, accession to the WTO, like other elements of constitutionalism, can be reconciled with de-
mocracy by understanding accession as a strategy, designed to reduce agency costs, by which ma-
jorities reduce the leverage of interest groups in the political process. For further discussion, see
below at p. 542.
84 The "New Medievalism" refers to:
[An approach to international relations that asserts "a secular reincarnation of the system
of overlapping or segmented authority that characterized" pre-Reformation Europe. As
the world has become increasingly integrated, it is argued, authority patterns have dis-
persed into a variety of overlapping layers, much like the overlapping medieval authori-
ties of emperor, pope, prince, and feudal lord.
Developments in the Law-The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. i68o, 1688-89 (1999) (foot-
notes omitted).
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laws.85 Sovereignty is important intrinsically, but also instrumentally.
As we discuss below, regulations are likely to be more efficient when
they derive from national, as opposed to international, institutions.8 6
National institutions, which are more familiar and accountable to the
average citizen, are more likely to reflect the tastes, traditions, and
economic realities of the people whom the regulations most affect.8 ,
In recent times, democracy has come to be seen as an important
element of legitimate sovereignty."8 Increasingly, international law
views governments as legitimate only to the extent that they can make
some plausible claim to popular support.8 9 An international trade re-
gime focused on restraining the influence of protectionist interest
groups can therefore actually reinforce, rather than weaken, an impor-
tant element of sovereignty.90 Of course, an international trade regime
with a roving jurisdiction to impose its judgments on the substance of
regulatory policy could make encroachments on sovereignty more
likely.91 We must not lose sight, however, of the WTO's democracy-
reinforcing potential.
It is important to note that our analysis concerns only groups
whose opposition to free trade is based on narrow economic interest.92
Value-driven groups, like environmentalists, also may lobby for poli-
cies that adversely affect trading opportunities. The jurisprudence we
recommend for the WTO is designed to raise hurdles only for protec-
tionists, not for groups that attempt to persuade their governments to
regulate their territories on the basis of values - whether those values
reflect the importance of the environment, human health, or something
85 JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 2 (1998) ("Sovereignty denotes independ-
ence. A sovereign state is one that acknowledges no superior power over its own government - or,
as the Declaration of Independence put it, with proper piety, no superior 'among the powers of the
Earth.'" (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. i (U.S. 1776))).
86 See infra section III.B, pp. 552-56.
87 Cf John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Im-
plementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 157, 16o (997) (ex-
plaining that most sovereignty objections derive from the belief that, "as a matter of good govern-
ment policy," power should remain at the national rather than international level).
88 Historically, sovereignty has been defined in terms of the ability of a nation's leaders for-
mally to enact their own laws and foreign policy - sometimes called Westphalian sovereignty -
as well as the ability to act independently in a de facto and a de jure sense. For a discussion of the
different strands of sovereignty, see STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOC-
RISY 10-25 (1999).
89 See Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46,
46 (1992) (arguing that democracy is on its "way to becoming a global entitlement").
90 The WTO does so without weakening other strands of Westphalian sovereignty. WTO
members remain free as a matter of domestic law to accept or reject the decisions of the WTO. See
infra p. 532. Moreover, even if an international trade regime does erode de facto economic inde-
pendence, such erosion would likely occur anyway, in light of the decreased costs of transportation
and information.
91 See infra pp. 552-53.
92 For a discussion of the nature of such groups, see above at p. 523.
20001
HARVARD LAWREVIEW
else.93 Indeed, one of the virtues of the model we support is that it
will help to distinguish between protectionist pressures and the influ-
ence of groups pursuing policies that redound to the good of their fel-
low citizens in general. 94
II. THE WORLD TRADE CONSTITUTION
A. The WTO and Its Critics - A Brief Introduction
In succeeding sections, we describe in detail how the WTO's struc-
ture and jurisprudence can help reinforce democracy and promote
economic growth within its member nations. 95  We begin by introduc-
ing the WTO and discussing some of its critics' main objections.
The Final Act of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations estab-
lished the WTO in 1994.96 The organization has 138 member states 97
and a variety of responsibilities. 98 The most important of these re-
sponsibilities is supervising the operation of several multilateral trade
agreements. These agreements include the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) - an agreement that dates from I94799 -
as well as two others that we discuss below, the Agreement on Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures' 0 0 and the Agreement on Technical
93 For example, an optimal international trade regime would limit tariffs by mobilizing exporter
interest groups to counterbalance protectionist interest groups. For discussion, see below at section
II.D, pp. 544-48.
94 See supra note 9 (defining interest groups).
95 See infra sections II.D.2, pp. 546-48, IV.A, pp. 573-83, V.A-B, pp. 59o-602.
96 Final Act, supra note I9. Although the Final Act was signed in April 1994, the WTO did not
actually come into existence until the following year. David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round In-
troduction to International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. i, 7
0995).
97 For a list of the WTO's membership, see World Trade Org., The Organization: Members and
Observers, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis.e/tif-e/org6_e.htm (Sept. 8, 2000).
98 A major responsibility relates to dispute settlement, a matter we discuss below. See infra pp.
53 1-32. The WTO's other responsibilities include providing a forum for multilateral trade nego-
tiations, administering a monitoring device called the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, and coop-
erating with other international economic organizations. See WTO Agreement, supra note 20, art.
1I; see also RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW § 4(c), at 16, § 6, at 48-49
(1998).
99 GATT has a complicated history. Adopted provisionally in 1947, GATT developed "by de-
fault" into an informal institution that "coordinated] national policies on international trade."
JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 295 (3d ed. i995). The Uruguay
Round appended GATT as an annex to the new WTO Charter. See GATT 1994, supra note 20.
As a result, WTO members are automatically bound to GATT. See Movsesian, supra note i, at
783 n.49. When we refer to "GATT" as an institution, we are referring to the informal institution
that developed before the establishment of the WTO.
100 SPS Agreement, supra note 39. For more on this agreement, see below at section V.B, pp.
596-602.
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Barriers to Trade. 10 1 These agreements are designed, broadly speak-
ing, to prevent discrimination against foreign products. 10 2 Other WTO
agreements address intellectual property rights,103 government pro-
curement, 10 4 and trade in services.
0 5
The WTO's most significant function is settling members' disputes
under these agreements. Disputes are bound to arise because protec-
tionist groups inevitably seek discriminatory legislation. 0 6 Before the
inauguration of the WTO, the parties to GATT settled disputes infor-
mally, influenced heavily by the relative power of the countries in-
volved.107 Now, however, disputes are resolved in the more formal ad-
judicative process established by the new Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), an annex to the WTO charter. 108 Under the
DSU, a panel of experts hears arguments when a WTO member
claims that another member has enacted a measure violating a WTO
agreement. The panel issues a report of its findings; if the panel be-
lieves that a member has violated an agreement, it usually recom-
mends that the member "withdraw[] the offending measure."'10 9
Parties can appeal a panel ruling to a seven-member Standing Ap-
pellate Body within the WTO."10 Members of the Appellate Body,
who are appointed by the WTO, serve four-year terms; each person
may be reappointed once."' Appellate Body members must be unaf-
filiated with any government and "broadly representative" of the
makeup of the WTO."t2
A final report, either of a panel (if unappealed) or of the Appellate
Body, binds the parties according to a "reverse consensus" rule: the re-
101 TBT Agreement, supra note 4o. For more on this agreement, see below at section V.B, pp.
596-602.
102 See infra pp. 596-98.
103 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex iC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33
I.L.M. I1197 (1994).
104 Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 4 (b),
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994), http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-e/legal-e/gpr-94.pdf.
105 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vols. 28-30,33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994).
106 See supra p. 523.
107 See Movsesian, supra note i, at 777 & n.9.
lO8 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
109 JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99, at 343.
110 DSU, supra note io8, art. i6, § 4, art. 17, § i. Three members serve on any one appeal,
which is limited to questions of law and "legal interpretations" developed in panel reports. Id. art.
17, §§ 1, 6.
111 Id. art. 17, § 2.
112 Id. § 3.
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port binds the parties unless a consensus develops against the report
among the membership of the WTO. 1 3  On the assumption that a
winning party will be unwilling to join any consensus against a ruling
in its favor, the reverse consensus requirement assures the automatic
adoption of final reports.
As a matter of domestic law, WTO rulings lack direct effect: mem-
bers so far have rejected the notion that they must change their laws to
comply with adverse rulings.' 14 As a result, WTO rulings do not bind
domestic courts in the way that United States Supreme Court rulings
bind state courts in the American system. Domestic courts can con-
tinue to apply domestic law, regardless of what the WTO holds with
respect to its legality." 5  If a member does not comply with a final re-
port by changing its law, however, it must consult with the injured
party and attempt to reach agreement on appropriate compensation."
6
If the parties cannot agree on compensation, the injured party may re-
taliate by suspending its own trade obligations to the offending
party. 117
In addition to its adjudicative function, the WTO also plays a very
limited policymaking role."18 The highest decisionmaking body in the
113 Id. art. i6, § 4, art. 17, § 14. "Consensus" is achieved if no member formally objects to the
decision being taken. Id. art. 2, § 4 n.i.
114 See Movsesian, supra note i, at 787-88 & n.89. The United States's implementing legisla-
tion, for example, denies effect to WTO rulings that are inconsistent with United States law. ig
U.S.C. § 3512(a)(i) (994). Whether members have an international legal obligation to change their
laws in response to adverse WTO rulings is a controversial question. Compare John H. Jackson,
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding - Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obliga-
tion, g AM. J. INT'L L. 6o, 6i, 63-64 (1997) (suggesting that WTO rulings are binding instruments
inasmuch as any international law can be binding), with Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, go AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 416-17 (I996) (arguing that com-
pliance with WTO rulings is entirely voluntary, though there are incentives for member states to
comply).
115 Movsesian, supra note i, at 788-89, 815.
116 DSU, supra note io8, art. 22, § 2.
117 Id.
11 See Jackson, supra note 87, at 173 (noting that "the decision-making procedures of the WTO
have been significantly circumscribed by negotiated treaty text"). For an argument that the
WTO's decisionmaking apparatus amounts to a "legislative assembly," see Philip M. Nichols,
Trade Without Values, go NW. U. L. REV. 658, 602 (1996). That view, however, is exaggerated.
The WTO lacks general governmental power: its authority is limited to facilitating the operation of
trade agreements. See Movsesian, supra note i, at 815-16; cf. Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555, 599 (i996) ("The WTO
... lacks significant strength in legislative ... functions."); Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protection-
ism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 35 (igg) (suggesting that the WTO
lacks legislative authority). Moreover, there are significant procedural limitations that cabin the
organization's discretion. See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations The-
ory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 85o (1995) (arguing that the
WTO's "'legislative' mechanisms ... are extremely cumbersome").
A number of commentators wish to expand the WTO to give it more of a regulatory role. We
discuss their arguments extensively and reject them. See infra pp. 55o-62.
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WTO is the Ministerial Conference, composed of representatives from
all WTO members.1 19 The Ministerial Conference meets relatively in-
frequently, however, and the day-to-day work of the organization is
carried out by the General Council, also composed of representatives
of all WTO members.1 20 A number of subsidiary councils and com-
mittees assist the General Council, including a Committee on Trade
and Development and a Committee on Trade and Environment.
1 2 1
When possible, the WTO decides policy by consensus.1 2 2  When
consensus is not possible, "ordinary" matters are decided by vote, with
each WTO member having one vote. 123 Supermajority requirements
and other procedural rules, however, help constrain the WTO's deci-
sionmaking authority on important matters. For example, only the
Ministerial Conference and the General Council have the authority to
adopt binding interpretations of multilateral agreements. 124 Any in-
terpretation must receive an affirmative vote of three-fourths of the
entire membership of the WTO - a formidable hurdle. 125 Similarly,
only the Ministerial Conference can adopt amendments to multilateral
agreements, usually by a two-thirds vote. 126 Certain amendments re-
quire unanimous approval.
1 27
The WTO has drawn substantial criticism from commentators who
view it as a threat to democratic sovereignty and representative gov-
ernment. 128 Critics deplore the fact that the WTO, a remote institu-
tion with few ties to the populations of its member states, has the
authority to displace the decisions of nationally elected legislatures.
1 29
119 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 98, § 4(d)(I), at 16-17; see also WTO Agreement, supra note
2o, art. IV(I).
120 The Ministerial Conference must "meet at least once every two years." WTO Agreement,
supra note 20, art. IV(,). There have been only three meetings since the founding of the organiza-
tion in 1995. See World Trade Org., Ministerial Conferences on the WTO Website, at http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto._e/minist.e/ministe.htm (last visited Nov. x, 2000) (listing three meetings).
On the General Council, see WTO Agreement, supra note 2o, art. IV(2). See also BHALA & KEN-
NEDY, supra note 98, § 4(d)(2), at 17-18.
121 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 98, § 4(dX2)(A), at i8, § 4 (d)(2)(B), at 18-19; see also World
Trade Org., The Organization: The Organization Chart, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2000).
122 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2o, art. IX(i); see also BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 98,
§ 4 (f), at 21 & n.48.
123 JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99, at 312.
124 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 98, § 4 (f)(I), at 21-22.
125 JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99, at 312; Jackson, supra note 87, at 174.
126 JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99, at 312.
127 Id. at 312-13.
128 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 87 (discussing the role that sovereignty arguments played in
debates on United States ratification of the WTO agreements).
129 See Sara Dillon, Fuji-Kodak, the WTO, and the Death of Domestic Political Constituencies,
8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 197, 201, 204-07 (i9g); see also Jeffrey Atik, Identifying Antidemo-
cratic Outcomes: Authenticity, Self-Sacrifice, and International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
229, 236-37 (1998) (describing democratic critiques of international trade regimes); Bello, supra
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As Phillip Trimble put it in an early essay, "the question comes down
to who will be primarily in charge of trade policy - elected officials
... who are responsive to the constituencies of their districts ... or
...international judges."13 °
Critics also decry what they perceive as a pro-trade bias on the
part of the WTO.131 By virtue of their training and office, critics as-
sert, the trade bureaucrats who serve on WTO tribunals have little
understanding of, or interest in, the nontrade values that inform much
domestic legislation. 32 As a result, the bureaucrats tend to discount
labor, environmental, health, or safety justifications that support
measures restricting trade. 33 This pro-trade bias slights the deeply
held convictions of national populations and may expose them to seri-
ous risks. 134 The DSU's provision for automatic adoption of WTO
rulings only heightens critics' concerns. 13 5
Critics also complain about the lack of transparency in WTO pro-
ceedings. 13 6  The deliberations of panels and the Appellate Body are
confidential. 137 Members of the public cannot attend hearings or re-
note 114, at 416 (describing nationalist arguments that the WTO threatens United States sover-
eignty).
130 Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Law", 83 MICH. L. REV. IoI6, 1029
(I985) (reviewing JOHN H. JACKSON, JEAN-VICTOR LOUIS & MITSUO MATSUSHITA, IMPLE-
MENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RULES ( 984)).
131 See Dillon, supra note 129, at 2o8-o9; Goldman, supra note 2, at 645.
132 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 347,
352-54 (1998); see also Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the
World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331, 334 (1996) (summarizing criticisms of
the WTO by environmental, labor, development, consumer, public interest, and farm groups).
133 See Dillon, supra note 129, at 2o8-15; Trimble, supra note 13o, at 1028-29.
134 See Shuman, supra note 4, at 528.
135 See, e.g., John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO - Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO
DSB Live Up to the Moniker "World Trade Court"?, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 739, 740-41,
743-46 (2o0) (expressing concern over the lack of democratic and procedural safeguards in the
WTO dispute resolution process); Lori Wallach, Transparency in WTO Dispute Resolution, 31 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L BUS. 773, 774 (2ooo) (same); cf Robert Howse, Managing the Interface between
International Trade Law and the Regulatory State: What Lessons Should.(and Should Not) Be
Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the United States Dormant Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY
BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 139, 144
(Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000) (noting that there exists "no higher level of
democratic community that is able to intervene to reinstate ... regulatory choices" after an adverse
WTO ruling).
136 See, e.g., Ragosta, supra note 135, at 749-54 (arguing that the WTO's lack of transparency
casts doubt on its legitimacy as a "court"); Wallach, supra note 135, at 777 (arguing that increased
procedural safeguards are needed to reduce the arbitrariness of the WTO's dispute resolution sys-
tem).
137 DSU, supra note io8, art. 14, § i (panels); id. art. i7, § io (Appellate Body); see also id. app.
3, §§ 2-3 (panels).
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ceive transcripts.13  Parties may disclose their own submissions to the
public, but must treat the submissions of opposing parties as confiden-
tial; 13 9 although parties must supply nonconfidential summaries of
their positions upon request, parties often do not meet this requirement
in a timely manner.1 40  The opinions of individual panelists and Ap-
pellate Body members remain anonymous.
41
Furthermore, although WTO rules seek to ensure the neutrality of
panelists and members of the Appellate Body, compliance is largely
voluntary.1 42 Panelists and Appellate Body members must avoid "di-
rect or indirect conflicts of interest," and must disclose information to
the WTO that "is likely to affect, or give rise to justifiable doubts as to
[their] independence or impartiality." 43  But this information is not
disclosed publicly. The rules provide vaguely for recusal or removal in
case of "material violations,"' 44 but provide no clear procedures. Crit-
ics have cited cases to show that the WTO does not take this require-
ment seriously. For example, some commentators point to the ap-
pointment in 1996 of Arthur Dunkel, the former head of GATT, to a
WTO panel considering a European Union challenge to the Helms-
Burton Act.145  At the time, Public Citizen's Lori Wallach writes,
Dunkel was chairing an "International Chamber of Commerce policy
group that had launched a campaign against the U.S. Helms-Burton
Act, arguing that it violated WTO rules.' 46 In -another dispute before
a WTO panel, a member of the Appellate Body apparently served as a
legal adviser to one of the parties, providing tips on litigation strategy
in the case.' 47 The member may well have intended to recuse himself
later, but advising a litigant in a case that is likely to come before one's
court is hardly "the behavior that one would expect of an objective
judge.' '1 48
138 Terence P. Stewart & Amy Ann Karpel, Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding:
Operation of Panels, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 593, 604- o 8 (2000) (describing the secrecy of
WTO panel proceedings).
139 DSU, supra note io8, art. 18, § 2.
140 Stewart & Karpel, supra note 138, at 607.
141 DSU,supra note io8, art. 14, § 3 (panels); id. art. 17, § ii (Appellate Body).
142 See WORLD TRADE ORG., RULES OF CONDUCT FOR THE UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND
PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, WT[DSB/RC/i (Dec. ii, io96),
http://www.wto.org/ddf/ep/A5/A5267e.wpf [hereinafter RULES OF CONDUCT]; see also Ragosta,
supra note 135, at 76o (noting that the WTO rules of conduct rely on "self-disclosure require-
ments"). For example, ex parte contacts are forbidden. DSU, supra note io8, art. i8, § 1.
143 RULES OF CONDUCT, supra note 142, art. II, § i, art. III, § i.
144 Id. art. VIII.
145 The Helms-Burton Act is the colloquial reference to the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 1 io Stat. 785 (i996).
146 Wallach, supra note 135, at 774.
147 Ragosta, supra note 135, at 761 (citing "several reliable sources").
148 Id. at 761 n.89.
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In answer to the WTO's critics, we argue that under the proper
theoretical and institutional framework, the organization can actually
reinforce democracy in member states. To the contention that the
WTO displaces national legislators, we respond that the WTO em-
bodies a strategy of reducing agency costs familiar to democratic theo-
rists. 149 In response to the objection that the WTO is biased in favor
of trade and thus undercuts national legislation based on other values,
we develop a jurisprudence in which WTO panels and the Appellate
Body would be constrained from substituting their substantive judg-
ments for those of national sovereigns.1 5 0 Finally, to address concerns
about transparency and conflicts of interest, we argue that the WTO
should model itself upon domestic institutions like the judiciary that
enforce provisions reducing agency costs, but that place a much
greater emphasis on transparency and conflict of interest rules.15 1 Im-
plementing our suggestions would require some reforms that we dis-
cuss below.
B. The Domestic Trade Constitution
The principal task of trade institutions like the WTO should be to
restrain protectionist interest groups and thereby promote both free
trade and representative democracy Our own political structure fur-
nishes an instructive example of how institutions can simultaneously
promote free trade and democratic governance. The original Constitu-
tion established mechanisms that restrict protectionist interest groups,
and subsequent generations have developed further structural limita-
tions. These constraints have made representative democracy more re-
flective of majority will, improved regulatory efficiency, and promoted
economic growth through trade. 5 2
Protectionist groups have the potential to cause problems at both
levels of our federal system. At the state level, such groups might try
to block the entry of competing products from sister states. At the
federal level, protectionist groups might lobby the government to block
imports from foreign countries. We survey the structures that our con-
stitutional system employs to prevent either scenario from occurring.
The Framers fully understood the dangers that interstate trade dis-
putes pose for national union.15 3 In the period between the end of the
Revolutionary War and the adoption of the Constitution, the Framers
149 See infra pp. 542-44.
150 See infra pp. 572-83.
151 See infra pp. 602-03.
152 For a brief description of Madison's constitutional objectives, see above at pp. 5 14, 526-27.
153 See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 235 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor 1999)
(1961) ("The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its sev-
eral members is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience.").
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feared that many of the former colonies were engaged in protectionist
tactics severe enough to threaten both the health of the economy and
the stability of the United States.15 4 Indeed, Hamilton argued in The
Federalist that separate commercial policies, with their attendant "dis-
tinctions, preferences, and exclusions," could lead to outright war
among the states. 55
To prevent economic losses and forestall political dissolution, the
Constitution created a free trade regime among the states. For in-
stance, Article IV requires the states to give citizens of other states all
the privileges and immunities they give their own citizens, facilitating
the operation of businesses by out-of-state residents.15 6 Article I grants
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce on the premise
that it use this power to keep open the avenues of commerce among
the states. 5 7  Finally, the Supreme Court's elaborate Commerce
154 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1114 (1986). Some scholars have argued that
although the Framers claimed to fear protectionist state legislation, there is actually little evidence
that state protectionism was a serious problem during the period governed by the Articles of Con-
federation. See Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation, the American Common Market and Public Choice,
6 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 121-22 (1982).
155 THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 30-34 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor i999)
(1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at I 12-13 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
Mentor 1999) (196I) (arguing that "the interfering and unneighborly regulations" of some states
threatened to become "serious sources of animosity and discord"); cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 42,
supra note 153, at 235-37 (drawing on comparisons with other nations to demonstrate the need for
a central authority regulating commerce). It might be possible to read into Hamilton's words an
endorsement of uniform regulations generally, on the theory that uniformity is conducive to busi-
ness. But this is not the only possible Federalist vision of state regulation. See infra note 159 (dis-
cussing the place of state regulations in Chief Justice Marshall's construction of the Commerce
Clause).
156 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. i ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). For evidence that the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause provides a comprehensive antiprotectionist principle, see Julian N. Eule, Laying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 446-48 (1982). But see Regan, supra note
154, at 1204 (suggesting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause only prohibits protectionism
caused by a regulation applying to out-of-state residents doing business in the state). This constitu-
tional clause has a rough equivalent in the requirement of national treatment for imports under
article III of GATT. See infra P. 547.
157 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 155, at 112 (observing
that "federal superintendence" over commerce is necessary to prevent "interfering and unneigh-
borly regulations"). The premise that Congress should use its authority to keep open the avenues
of commerce among the states is nowhere explicit in the Constitution, but it is implied textually
and is consistent with what we know of the Framers' beliefs about free markets. See Nelson
Lund, Comment, The Uniformity Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1193, 1212 (1984) (arguing that vari-
ous limitations on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause "are designed to prevent factions
from causing a specific substantive evil: regional favoritism that reduces unrestrained economic
competition"). Such restrictions on Congress include the Port Preference Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 6 ("No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports
of one State over those of another .... ), and the prohibition on requiring vessels to pay charges for
travelling to another state, id. ("[Nior shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter,
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Clause jurisprudence, established early on, expressly prevents states
from discriminating against out-of-state products or services.15
8
The free trade regime established by the Constitution reduces the
influence of protectionist groups within member states, thus promoting
both economic growth and accountable government. The creation of
an open national market encourages jurisdictional competition among
the states for businesses and capital, thereby improving the quality of
regulation in all states. 1 5 9  Finally, by reserving the power to enact
bona fide public welfare legislation to the states rather than to the na-
tional government, the original Constitution encouraged legislation
adapted to local tastes and conditions. 1
60
clear, or pay Duties in another."). See also infra note 163 (discussing the Export Clause as a provi-
sion preventing factions from interfering with the free market in foreign commerce).
158 For a discussion of the dormant commerce clause and its history, see Regan, supra note 154;
see also Chen & Gifford, supra note io, at 1324 (observing that the essential function of the dor-
mant commerce clause is to guarantee a free trade zone among the states); Richard A. Posner, The
Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 17 (1987) (suggesting that the
dormant commerce clause created a "charter of free trade").
159 The canonical exposition of the economic advantages of regulatory competition can be found
in Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). A good
summary of the optimal conditions for this competition appears in Robert P. Inman & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation
and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1228 (1997). "Decen-
tralized governments will be most efficient for those activities and regulations that can be effi-
ciently provided to small populations and that have no significant positive or negative spillovers
onto nonresidents." Id. Some have criticized regulatory competition for precipitating races to the
bottom in which necessary health, safety, environmental, and labor regulations are abandoned in
order to attract firms and capital. We address this critique extensively below at pp. 558-59. For
modern economic views on the relationship between free trade and jurisdictional competition, see
below at pp. 559-61.
The Framers' views on the efficiency of regulatory competition were not as clearly developed
as those of modern economic theory. But in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Chief
Justice John Marshall interpreted the Constitution in a manner broadly conforming to the ideal
economic division of power between the center and localities. He suggested that the federal gov-
ernment might exercise exclusive power over regulations that relate to commerce among the states,
but that states retain authority over regulations meant to protect health and safety. Chief Justice
Marshall stated that states have power over an "immense mass of legislation ... all [of] which can
be most advantageously exercised by the states themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws,
health laws of every description, as well as laws regulating internal commerce of a State, and those
which respect turnpike roads, ferries, etc., are component parts of this mass." Id. at 203.
160 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate Aspects of Interstate
Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. & YALE J. ON REG. (Symposium Issue) 149,
154 (1996) ("The essential insight of classic economic arguments for state variation ... is that com-
munities are different, and these differences are essential and reasonably impervious to efforts at
homogenization.").
The New Deal, however, weakened regulatory competition in the United States. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, ioi HARV. L. REV. 421, 505 (1987) (suggesting
that in the New Deal, the United States abandoned reliance on regulation at the local level and
relied on administrative agencies and the President for regulation at a national level). Despite this
shift, prohibitions on protectionism have survived.
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The Constitution also attempts to restrain the influence of interest
groups on foreign commerce. 16' National representatives are more
likely to rise above parochial interests than local representatives, who
may seek to protect particular local industries. As a consequence, the
Constitution gives Congress, rather than the states, -the authority to
regulate foreign trade. 16
2
Nevertheless, members of Congress are themselves susceptible to
interest group pressures against trade. Particular industries that lose
from trade may be concentrated in their districts. 163 Because impor-
tant legislative work is done in small committees, even a few relatively
influential members can frustrate free trade legislation. 164 In contrast,
161 We do not suggest that the Framers were single-mindedly committed to the idea of free trade.
Rather, competing strands in eighteenth-century political economy - both the nascent free trade
theories of Adam Smith and older mercantilist ideas - influenced them. Compare Deborah A.
Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the United States: Colonial
Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 553, 574 (1994) (noting that "[b]y the I79os, mercantilism had
been replaced with Smith's faith in growth and progress"), and Brian F. Havel, The Constitution in
an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV. 257, 330 (2000) (arguing that the Framers
"did not seek to orient the specific commercial policies of successive American governments toward
either protectionism or mercantilism"), with Regan, supra note 154, at I24 (arguing that the
Framers "envisaged a mercantilist foreign trade policy for the United States as a whole").
162 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Framers' experience under the Articles of Confederation
gave them cause to worry about inconsistent state regulation of foreign commerce. See THE FED-
ERALIST No. 22, supra note i55, at 111-13. Thus, the states are forbidden from levying tariffs and
duties. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1o, cl. 2 ("No State shall ... lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws .... ").
163 MUELLER, supra note 58, at 242 (citing three studies showing that congressmen are influ-
enced to vote for protectionist measures by campaign contributions from interest groups, especially
contributions from industries important to the locales they represent); see also Barry R. Weingast,
Kenneth A. Shepsle & Christopher Johnsen, The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neo-
classical Approach to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642, 650-51 (1981) (concluding that
the geographic structure of congressional representation leads to parochial, inefficient policies).
The Framers of the Constitution themselves addressed this danger by prohibiting Congress from
laying any taxes or duties on articles exported from any state. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. They
included this clause in the Constitution in large part to prevent parochial interests in the North
from raising revenues by taxing Southern exports. See Claire R. Kelly & Daniela Amzel, Does the
Commerce Clause Eclipse the Export Clause?: Making Sense of United States v. United States Shoe
Corp., 84 MINN. L. REV. 129, 145 n.79 (1999) (discussing the background of the Export Clause at
the Constitutional Convention). The clause probably applied to exports rather than imports be-
cause mercantilist theories of trade, popular in the late eighteenth century, stressed the importance
of exports alone as essential to economic well-being. See IRWIN, supra note 47, at 38-44.
164 A variety of procedural devices increase the influence of special interests over trade legisla-
tion. First, the committee system affords special interests greater power because the legislators
most focused on particular interests are disproportionately represented on the committees respon-
sible for legislation affecting these interests. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory
Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, iox YALE L.J. 31, 42 (199i) ("[The] committee structure
can exacerbate interest group influence."); Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the
Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 55-56 (1988). Second, the fili-
buster rule in the Senate allows forty-one senators to delay legislation indefinitely. See, e.g., Cath-
erine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. I85, 210 (1997). Thus, protec-
tionist interests may succeed in blocking legislation even while enjoying less than a legislative
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the President has a national constituency not tied to particular locali-
ties and their interest groups. 165  Moreover, his electoral fortunes are
more closely tied to national economic growth - one of the most im-
portant consequences of free trade. 166 The President, therefore, is
more likely than Congress to favor reductions in tariffs and the elimi-
nation of other trade barriers. 167
Accordingly, various mechanisms have evolved to give the Presi-
dent a leading role in setting trade policy. For instance, for most of the
past twenty-five years, Congress has granted the President so-called
"fast-track" authority. 68  Fast-track allows the President to submit
legislation implementing a trade agreement to Congress under proce-
dures that prohibit amendment, limit debate, and require automatic
discharge from committee. 169 These procedures deprive protectionist
groups of parliamentary devices that enable them to obtain concessions
and thus make it more difficult for such groups to unravel free trade
agreements. 70
Congress has also granted the President substantial discretionary
authority to raise tariffs when import surges threaten to decimate
majority. Because a state's representation in the Senate is not proportionate to its population, this
legislative minority may in turn represent an even smaller proportion of the population at large.
See Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 3
J.L. & POL. 21, 26-27 (1997) (showing that the Senate is very unrepresentative of the national
population).
165 Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV.
23, 98-99 (i995) (suggesting that the President can more easily surmount the interests of parochial
groups because of his national base).
166 See Ray C. Fair, Econometrics and Presidential Elections, io J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 89-go &
n.3 (1996) (concluding from a study of all American elections since 1916 that the growth of per
capita output in the year preceding the election was the most important factor in determining
whether the party of the incumbent President retained the presidency).
167 See Irwin & Kroszner, supra note 80, at 648.
168 E.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191, 2902 (1994). These grants have expired by their terms, and
President Clinton no longer has fast-track authority. See David A. Gantz, Failed Efforts to Initiate
the "Millennium Round" in Seattle: Lessons for Future Global Trade Negotiations, 17 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 349, 358 n.40 (2000) (noting that "[t]he Clinton Administration and the Congress
have been unable since 1994 to agree on legislation that would provide the president with 'fast-
track' negotiating authority to conclude trade agreements").
169 Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to Beyond, 29 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 687, 696 (1996) (discussing the manner in which fast-track authority
eliminates procedural mechanisms that can delay trade agreements).
170 See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 543, 548 (1992) (discussing how fast-track prevents ad hoc amendments to negotiated
trade agreements); cf. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, Positive Theories of Congressional Insti-
tutions, i9 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 149, 166-67 (1994) (discussing the benefits of access to legislative
mechanisms, including the ability to make durable deals regarding legislation, and thereby imply-
ing that the loss of access to those mechanisms can reduce redistributive and parochial legislation).
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American industries.17" ' Because of his institutional inclination to fa-
vor free trade, the President can be expected to deploy this authority
prudently to relieve dangerous domestic protectionist pressures.' 7 2
The President also has the authority to retaliate against the unfair
trade practices of other nations. 7 3 Once again, this authority can be
seen as a strategic safety valve for the President to use when the trade
practices of foreign nations threaten the popularity of free trade in the
United States.
Thus, over time the United States has developed a practical trade
constitution that departs from the ordinary legislative process in order
to promote prosperity and reflect the majority will. The Constitution
first granted authority over both interstate and foreign commerce to
the federal government rather than to the states. Mechanisms then
developed within the federal government that delegated responsibility
for foreign trade to the President, the actor with the greatest institu-
tional inclination to favor free trade.
Some commentators have criticized these mechanisms as undemo-
cratic. 7 4 These critics concede that members of Congress are tied
more closely than the President to local industries, but view such ac-
cessibility as reinforcing, rather than undermining, representative de-
mocracy. Critics emphasize that members of Congress can provide es-
sential democratic "inputs" for national policy precisely because they
are more accountable than the President to local constituents. 75
Similarly, state governments are often in the best position to decide
trade-related issues, such as licensing and government procurement
questions, that affect their citizens.'7 6 Giving the President increased
power thus undermines the legitimacy of American measures on inter-
national trade.
171 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 2251-2254 (1994 & Supp. I 1996) (providing the President with
the authority, in coordination with the United States International Trade Commission, to take all
appropriate action to combat illegitimate import competition).
172 Cf Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape
Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 282 (i99 I ) (arguing that the purpose
of safeguard authority is to permit officials to "escape" from tariff concessions when the "political
gains to officials in the importing country 'outweigh' the costs to the officials in the exporting
country").
173 i9 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994). This authority is not GATT-based, but rather a unilateral measure
used as retaliation against unfair trade practices that may not be covered by GATT. See Determi-
nation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Memorandum for the United States Trade Rep-
resentative, 45 Fed. Reg. 5 1, 173 (July 3 1, 198o).
174 See Atik, supra note 129, at 236-38; Goldman, supra note 2, at 633, 654-58; Housman, supra
note 2, at 730-41.
175 See Housman, supra note 2, at 730-31; see also Dillon, supra note 129, at 201, 204-06 (dis-
cussing how the WTO interferes with "democratic 'inputs'" for national legislation).
176 See Housman, supra note 2, at 741 (describing the NAFTA-prompted federal rule that "re-
moved from the states the traditional police power of using licensing requirements to ensure the
health and safety of citizens").
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Despite such criticism, the institutional constraints on national and
state legislatures that we have described can be reconciled with demo-
cratic principles by understanding these limitations as majoritarian
strategies to reduce agency costs - strategies in which a majority
binds itself to institutions that increase its effective future representa-
tion in the political process.' 77 Such strategies make it difficult for
politicians to pursue policies that favor concentrated groups at the ma-
jority's expense. 17 8 By cabining the power of protectionist groups, our
domestic trade constitution reduces the agency costs that impede the
majority from monitoring its legislators on trade issues. 17 9 It is hardly
undemocratic for the majority to create institutions that will muffle the
predictably powerful cries of special interests.
C. The Analogy to Federalism
Strategies to reduce agency costs can also explain the participation
of member nations in the WTO. The WTO reduces agency costs,
thereby preventing protectionist groups from gaining benefits at the
expense of national majorities. 180 Like the domestic institutions dis-
cussed above, the WTO can be reconciled with democratic theory:
1 8
'
in voting to join the organization, national majorities commit to an in-
stitution that can increase their political effectiveness.
82
177 Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce
Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 795-96 (1992) (noting that
precommitment theory can reconcile judicial review with majoritarianism).
178 See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic
Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. I I 1, 126-28 (1993) (dis-
cussing the manner in which precommitments can reduce agency costs).
179 Cf. Macey, supra note 23, at 242-50 (arguing that one purpose of the Constitution is to re-
strain interest groups by reducing agency costs).
180 Cf. Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade Organiza-
tion, i CHI. J. INT'L L. 49, 67 (2000) (arguing that the WTO, like United States constitutional
mechanisms, helps shift "the political consensus toward results that tend to benefit consumers").
181 Indeed, WTO rulings may pose less of a countermajoritarian difficulty than the constitu-
tional rulings of domestic courts because they are binding only as a matter of international law.
WTO rulings are not backed by force, and thus member nations can ultimately disregard them.
See Movsesian, supra note i, at 815-16. Nevertheless, because of nations' interests in abiding by
international rules to which they have agreed, WTO rulings do have some constraining effect. See
id. at 8i 7-18. For a discussion of nondemocratic members of the WTO, see below at section IV.C,
pp. 588-89.
182 Given the strength of protectionism, one may wonder how an international trade regime is
ever effectuated over the objections of special interests. But this is a question for all constitutional
structures that restrain interest groups. In general, the logic of interest group analysis suggests that
such structures arise when events increase the power of the diffuse majority, creating a window of
opportunity for the majority to work its will. For instance, a crisis may force the citizenry to pay
more attention, both reducing rational ignorance and the inertia that frequently blocks considera-
tion of innovative solutions. As Machiavelli understood, even beneficial innovations face political
obstacles because they have "as enemies all the people who were doing well under the old order,
and only halfhearted defenders in those who hope to profit from the new." NICCOLO MACHIA-
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Of course, the analogy to domestic constitutionalism is not exact.18 3
The differences between the domestic and international contexts, how-
ever, decrease the risk that the WTO will develop into a centralized
regulatory body that supplants national sovereignty. For example, in
the domestic context, the concept of citizenship creates stronger moral
claims to equality of treatment and opportunity.18 4  The need to ad-
dress such claims can require the creation of national bodies with
broad regulatory authority. Because claims of citizenship do not arise
in the WTO context, however, there is less need for a regulatory super-
structure.8 5 As we explain below, such a structure would threaten the
sovereignty of member states and be subject to capture by interest
groups. 186
In addition, nationalist sentiments may serve as a more enduring
check on the consolidation of power in the WTO than state attach-
ments did in the context of the United States government. As we dis-
cuss below, international consolidation of regulatory power would
benefit interest groups.1 87  Interest groups tend to erode constitutive
structures that constrain their rent-seeking 18 and often seek consolida-
tion of power in centralized structures that they can dominate. 18 9 Na-
VELLI, THE PRINCE 17 (Robert M. Adams ed. & trans., Norton i992) (1513). For the Framers,
threats to the prosperity and stability of the fledgling republic engendered such a crisis. See Jon
Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 37! (1995)
(suggesting that people at the time perceived a crisis). At least at the outset of GATT, the Cold War
threat may have offered geopolitical imperatives for structures that would facilitate Western pros-
perity. See Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law - Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority,
and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1571 (1999).
183 For a discussion of international federalism, see John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the West-
ern Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
903,913-I8 (1996).
184 Cf Alvin K. Klevorick, The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World
of Trade Policy, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. & YALE J. ON REG. (Symposium Issue) 177, 182 (1996)
(noting that concerns about egalitarianism may be stronger in the domestic context than in the in-
ternational context, "[g]iven a deeper sense of shared values among citizens of the same country").
185 Moreover, WTO opinions do not bind national courts in the way that Supreme Court opin-
ions bind state courts in the American system. See supra p. 532.
186 See infra section III.B.2, pp. 556-58.
187 See id.
188 This notion follows from the basic premises of public choice theory. Interest groups seek
rents. If they can gain higher rents through constitutional change, they will seek constitutional
change. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 178, at 113-15 (discussing the reasons why interest
groups seek constitutional change). For instance, studies of amendments subsequent to the Bill of
Rights suggest that interest groups played a key role in their enactment. See, e.g., Gary M. Ander-
son & Robert D. Tollison, Political Influence and the Ratification of the Income Tax Amendment,
13 INT'L. REV. L. & EcON. 259 (i993) (discussing interest group influence in the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment).
189 See Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth
Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 204-12
(1997) (arguing that interest groups sought passage of the Seventeenth Amendment to weaken fed-
eralism and to make rent-seeking easier); see also Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN.
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tionalism, however, gives citizens reasons of the heart to resist the
transfer of power to international bodies. In the past, to be sure, state
loyalties served a similar function in the domestic context.1 90  But
those loyalties have largely dissipated; 9 1 it is inconceivable today that
someone would say, as did Robert E. Lee, that he owed a greater alle-
giance to his state than to his country.192 The continuing strength of
national attachments, by contrast, will help members to resist potential
encroachments by the WTO.
1 93
D. The Basic Rules of the WTO in Constitutional Perspective
i. The Core of the WTO System: Reciprocal Tariff Reductions as a
Restraint on Interest Groups. - The core feature of the WTO system
has been periodic reductions in world tariffs. Even before the
inauguration of the WTO, GATT members met roughly every decade
in negotiating rounds that reduced tariffs on goods on a reciprocal
basis.194  These rounds reduced world tariffs dramatically. The ratio
of the value of duties collected to the value of imports fell from about
37% before the adoption of GATT to less than 5% in the early
i99os.19  The Uruguay Round, which established the WTO,
continued the pattern of reciprocal tariff reductions and expanded the
scope of the system by adopting new agreements on services,
L. REV. 317, 373-75 (1997) (discussing interest group politics favoring "federalization"). The claim
that these interest groups will be progressively successful over time at attacking a constitution that
constrains them follows directly from the insight that stable societies gradually generate more and
more interest groups by virtue of their very stability. See OLSON, supra note 16, at 4 '.
190 James Madison himself understood that individuals' attachments to states were essential to
protecting the autonomy of states and preventing consolidation. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at
262 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor 1999) (196 1) (stating that the ability of a state or
federal government to expand "at the expense of the other" will "depend on the sentiments and
sanction of their common constituents"). For a discussion of the implications of this insight for
modern federalism, see Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. I, 44-47, in which Young observes that attachments to states presuppose state
governments that have considerable power relevant to people's daily lives, a power that has been
eroded.
191 See Maurice J. Holland, Prospects for Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31, 37 (1982)
("The strong sense of cultural identity with one's state characteristic of nineteenth century Ameri-
cans is moribund, a permanent victim of social mobility and the pervasive influence of the national
media, among other factors.").
192 ALAN T. NOLAN, LEE CONSIDERED 38-39 (i991).
193 On the comparative strength of state and national attachments, see Mark C. Gordon, Differ-
ing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to Federalism in Congress and the
Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. & YALE J. ON REG. (Symposium Issue) 187, 218 (1996), which
notes that "the nation has replaced the states as the locus of attachment and loyalty." For further
discussion of nationalism, see above at pp. 524-25.
194 See JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99, at 314.
195 Ttebilcock, supra note 24, at 292.
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intellectual property, health and safety measures, and product
standards. 196
The engine of the WTO regime is reciprocity. Reciprocal tariff re-
ductions create pressure for free trade in each country. Producers that
enjoy a comparative advantage gain new markets when foreign coun-
tries reduce tariffs. This prospect creates incentives for such producers
to lobby for lower tariffs in their own countries: because of the reci-
procity requirement, only reduced domestic tariffs for foreign goods
can secure reduced foreign tariffs for exports. Thus, the WTO system
mobilizes the interest groups that stand to win - workers and owners
in industries that will prosper because of free trade - to counterbal-
ance the interest groups that stand to lose. 197
The expansion of the Uruguay Round to include trade in services
provides a dramatic example of the way in which reciprocity mobilizes
interest groups to push for free trade.198 Industries in developed coun-
tries that stood to gain from the export of services and the protection
of intellectual property pressed their governments to agree to reduce
tariffs on textiles and agricultural products. They did so because de-
veloping countries demanded such reductions in exchange for lowering
their own tariffs on services and for providing greater protections for
intellectual property rights. 199 The reciprocity regime thus created
196 John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes, Introduction and Overview, in IMPLEMENTING THE
URUGUAY ROUND 1, 4 (John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997); see also MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 141-47 (2d ed.
1999) (discussing the Uruguay Round agreements on health and safety measures).
197 Irwin and Kroszner argue that such a dynamic was present in the United States after passage
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 135 1-1354 (1994)). The RTAA, the prototype for much subsequent American trade
legislation, authorized the President to conclude international agreements "for the reciprocal reduc-
tion of tariffs" and, in connection with those agreements, to "proclaim" new tariff levels. JACKSON,
DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99, at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Irwin and Kroszner
explain:
The RTAA explicitly linked foreign tariff reductions that were beneficial to exporters to
lower tariff protection for import-competing producers. By directly tying lower foreign
tariffs to lower domestic tariffs, the RTAA may have fostered the development of export-
ers as an organized group opposing high tariffs and supporting international trade
agreements.
Irwin & Kroszner, supra note 80, at 649.
198 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Understanding Asia's Economic and Environmental Crisis, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265, 277 (1998) (reviewing ASIAN DRAGONS & GREEN TRADE:
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND LAW (Simon S.C. Tay & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1996)) (discuss-
ing the Uruguay Round's "grand bargain," in which developing countries made "concessions in
services and intellectual property" in return for "concessions in market access and textiles").
199 See JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99, at 1124; The Final Act of the Uruguay Round:
A Summary, GATT Focus (GATT Secretariat, Geneva, Switz.), Dec. 1993, at 5, 11-12 [hereinafter
Final Act Summary], reprinted in Jackson & Sykes, supra note 196, at 8, 16 ("Provisions to facili-
tate the increased participation of developing countries in world services trade envisage negotiated
commitments on ... the liberalization of market access in sectors ... of export interest.").
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momentum for an enormous and beneficial enlargement of world
trade o. 2 00
Reducing the influence of protectionist groups by committing to a
reciprocity regime reinforces domestic democracy at the same time that
it promotes free trade.20 1 Without the pressure of a reciprocity regime,
protectionist groups would have more leverage over trade policy than
consumers, even though consumers are far more numerous. 20 2  Protec-
tionist groups would have a greater ability to distort the political pro-
cess to achieve a result - higher tariffs - that the majority of voters
likely would not favor. The reciprocity regime thus reinforces the
voice of citizens in democratic deliberations.
2. The Basic Democracy-Reinforcing Rules of the WTO. - Tariff
reductions cannot by themselves ensure a free trade regime. Protec-
tionist groups can frustrate the effect of tariff reductions by persuading
national governments to impose nontariff barriers.203  Even if a mem-
ber complies with GATT-mandated tariff reductions on a given prod-
uct, for example, the member could offset the effect of these reductions
by imposing quotas on the number of imports allowed into the country.
Therefore, just as the United States Supreme Court has developed a
doctrine to prevent state nontariff discrimination against out-of-state
imports, the WTO has established a series of rules that prevent mem-
200 See supra note 53.
201 We recognize that not all members of the WTO are democratic. Nevertheless, membership
in the WTO may have beneficial political effects on these countries as well. See infra section IVC,
pp. 588-89.
202 For an explanation, see above at pp. 523-25.
203 While we focus in this Article on attempts to erect import barriers, other anti-trade strategies
can also benefit interest groups at the expense of the public. For example, failing domestic indus-
tries might pressure governments to grant subsidies to enable them to compete with imports. In
addition, exporter groups might lobby for subsidies that make it easier for their products to com-
pete abroad. By diverting the country's resources from more productive activities, such subsidies
would interfere with comparative advantage and work to the detriment of citizens as a whole. See
JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99, at 758.
Just as it limits the ability of domestic interest groups to erect import barriers, the WTO also
works to reduce the possibility of trade-distorting subsidies. Cf Alan 0. Sykes, Countervailing
Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 258 (1989) (noting how nations
might "establish international constraints" in order to "escape pressures to grant subsidies that re-
duce domestic economic welfare"). The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM Agreement), adopted at the Uruguay Round, prohibits members from granting certain kinds
of subsidies, including those that are contingent on export performance ("prohibited" subsidies) and
those that nullify or impair benefits accruing to other members under GATT ("actionable" subsi-
dies). Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, An-
nex iA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (994), http://www.
wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/24-scm.pdf; see also Final Act Summary, supra note 19q, reprinted
in JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99, at 770, 770-71.
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bers from adopting measures that negate the value of GATT tariff re-
ductions. 20
4
Many of these rules concentrate on the most obvious evasive tac-
tics. For example, article XI of GATT proscribes quantitative restric-
tions on imports.2 0 5 Article III prohibits members from imposing spe-
cial internal taxes on imports - sales taxes, for example - that exceed
taxes on "like domestic products." 20 6  Because members might impose
discriminatory internal regulations on imports, article III also requires
members to accord imports "treatment no less favorable than that ac-
corded like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regula-
tions and requirements affecting their internal sale,... purchase,
transportation, distribution or use. '20 7
These rules reinforce democracy by making trade restrictions more
obvious to average citizens.20 8  Transparency is crucial to restraining
interest groups in a modern democracy. We speak above of the ten-
dency of politicians to attempt to satisfy cohesive interest groups at the
expense of the diffuse public.20 9 Political success, however, depends
not only on satisfying members of a politician's coalition, but also on
disarming the potential opposition. 210  One important way of doing
this is to raise the information costs of potential opposition by dis-
guising the mechanisms of the legislation, hiding its effects, or even ob-
scuring its importance or existence.21' If two proposals accomplish the
same goal, but one can be defeated only if its opponents are willing to
204 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI(i), 61 Stat. A-3, A-32 to -
33, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 224-25 [hereinafter GATT 1947]; JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99,
at 294 (observing that GATT includes "some ... general protective clauses which would prevent
evasion of the tariff commitments").
205 Subject to limited exceptions, GATT article XI provides that "[n]o prohibitions or restric-
tions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or
export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained" on imports from other GATT
members. GATT 1947, supra note 204, art. XI(i).
206 Id. art. III(2).
207 Id. art. 111(4).
208 For a more complete discussion of how transparency reinforces democracy, see below at pp.
573-75-
209 See supra pp. 523-24.
210 See Phillip Nelson, Political Information, ig J.L. & ECON. 315, 323 (1976) (suggesting that
rent-seekers who lack a political majority need to take their gain "in a form where the issue can be
easily obscured"); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the
Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV.
1355, 1374-75 (1993) (arguing that "[u]nfunded mandates ... present legislators with the political
temptation to levy hidden municipal taxes" because constituents do not appreciate the link be-
tween their municipal tax bills in a later period and their legislators' adoption of unfunded man-
dates in an earlier period).
211 See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, The Bar Against Challenges to Employment Discrimination
Consent Decrees: A Public Choice Perspective, 54 LA. L. REV. 1507, 1530-31 (994) (observing this
phenomenon in the context of the collateral attack bar in employment discrimination and suggest-
ing that information costs are a general issue in the public choice analysis of legislation).
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expend significant resources on voter education, one would expect the
latter proposal to be the chosen vehicle of interest groups. 2 12 There-
fore, structures that block nontransparent legislative forms - that is,
structures that reduce information costs to the citizenry - reinforce
democratic governance.
A notable feature of GATT rules is that they effectively require in-
creased transparency in the trade-related legislation of member states.
As trade barriers go, tariffs are relatively transparent: they are visible
to consumers, who would like to pay less for imported products.2 1
3
The effects of quotas and discriminatory laws, by contrast, are less ap-
parent to consumers. 2 14 Thus, by "channel[ing] all 'border protection'
against imports into" tariffs, GATT requires nations to use precisely
those methods that are most likely to arouse consumers to resist the
machinations of protectionist interest groups.
2 15
Other features of GATT also aid transparency. For instance, one
rationale for article I's most favored nation (MFN) principle is that
"[f]rom the domestic-political viewpoint, the MFN commitment makes
for more straightforward and transparent policies." 21 6 As we explain
at greater length below, provisions of other WTO agreements that seek
to prevent discrimination against foreign products also impose trans-




213 Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATTWTO System at Fifty, i6 WiS. INT'L L.J. 421, 426-27 (998)
("Unlike import quotas and other non-tariff barriers to trade, tariffs are 'transparent,' that is, the
level of protection they afford can be readily and accurately determined.").
214 See, e.g., JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99, at 17 ("[lIt is sometimes argued that quo-
tas tend to conceal from the public the degree of protection being afforded domestic producers -
the price effect of tariffs is more obvious."). As Professor Hansen explains:
A five percent tariff on shoes transparently reveals the level of protection that is afforded
to domestic shoe producers. In contrast, it is virtually impossible to assess the level of
protection that is likely to result from a quota prohibiting imports of more than Io,ooo
pairs of shoes. The level of protection will depend on the number of shoes that would be
imported in the absence of the quota, which would vary from year to year.
Patricia Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Review, and the Use of Trade Measures to Pro-
tect the Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1059 (1999).
215 JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99, at 290.
216 MFN Commitment - Basis of the Trading System, GATT Focus (GATT Secretariat, Ge-
neva, Switz.), Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 3, 3. For a discussion of other GATT provisions that promote
transparency, see below at pp. 573-75.
217 See infra p. 597 (discussing the SPS and TBT Agreements).
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III. THE EMERGING ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND
REGULATORY MODELS OF THE WTO
A. An Introduction to the Problem
The WTO's success in lowering tariffs and prohibiting open dis-
crimination against imports creates pressure for concentrated interests
to adopt a more subtle strategy. Because protectionist groups cannot
successfully lobby their governments for measures that overtly dis-
criminate against imports, they are likely to make even greater efforts
to lobby for substitute measures that covertly accomplish the same
end.218 For example, because protecting the environment, health, and
safety is a public good that governments traditionally provide, meas-
ures ostensibly aimed at these objectives furnish a particularly useful
disguise for the imposition of burdens on competing imports.
219
For example, consider the effect of the Uruguay Round's reductions
in tariffs on agricultural products. 220 The United States has a com-
parative advantage over Europe with respect to most such products.221
As a result, the tariff reductions have increased competitive pressures
on European farmers. Because they cannot lobby their governments
for legislation that overtly discriminates against American products,
the farmers have incentives to find substitute measures that will hin-
der the competition. One possible strategy would be to restrict the sale
of American products on "safety" grounds.222 European farmers might
seize on the fact that American agricultural methods differ from Euro-
pean methods in some regard and claim that the difference creates
risks for human health. The United States and Europe have recently
argued over such issues. 2 3
218 For a general discussion of the manner in which concentrated interest groups will attempt to
substitute one kind of rent-seeking for another kind that is blocked by the political system, see
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 74, at 428-29.
219 Some environmentalists themselves have recognized this possibility. See ESTY, supra note
25, at 45 ("Thus, there is a danger that environmental regulatory processes will be 'captured' by
protectionist interests, who will use environmental standards as a guise for erecting barriers to im-
ports."); see also Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global
Commons: What We Can Learn From the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
I, 11, 112 (1999) (arguing that environment-based trade sanctions can be "abuse[d]" for protection-
ist ends).
220 See Kennedy, supra note 213, at 463-67 (noting that the Uruguay Round reduced agricultural
tariffs).
221 See id. at466.
222 See Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the United
States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 525, 540 (998) (noting the possi-
bility of "protectionism in the guise of a food safety measure").
223 See WTO Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS 4 8/AB/R (Jan. 6, 1998), http://www.wto.orglenglish/
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In light of the Uruguay Round's expansion of the world trading
system and its large-scale reductions in global tariffs, one can expect
the problem of covert protectionism to be increasingly important for
the WTO. 224  Unfortunately, covert protectionism raises issues of po-
litical economy that are far more complex than those raised by the re-
duction of tariffs and the elimination of overtly protectionist measures.
Although trade discrimination is socially undesirable, government
regulation is desirable when necessary to protect against dangers that
the market cannot address on its own. For instance, genuine environ-
mental, health, and safety regulations can increase the well-being of a
nation's citizens and go to the heart of a government's sovereign duties
to its people. 225
The possibility of covert protectionism thus necessarily forces the
WTO to address environmental, health, and safety issues. 226  The or-
ganization has done so by developing rules to distinguish between
those environmental, health, and safety regulations that are genuine
and those that are merely disguised attempts to discriminate against
foreign competition. Indeed, making such distinctions has been a fo-
cus of the WTO's dispute settlement system. But the WTO's ap-
proach - we call it the antidiscrimination model - is both controver-
sial and unsettled.
First, given that the WTO addresses environmental, health, and
safety regulations in any event, some commentators have suggested
that the organization should be more involved in setting global regula-
tory standards. 227  Indeed, some believe that trade law is already
tratop.e/dispu.e/hormab.pdf [hereinafter Hormones] (invalidating European regulations restrict-
ing meat products derived from cattle treated with particular growth hormones).
224 Hans van Houtte, Health and Safety Regulations in International Trade, in LEGAL ISSUES
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 128, 129 (Peter Sarcevic & Hans van Houtte eds., 199o).
225 Cf Paul Martin, Sovereignty and Food Safety in a NAFTA Context, 24 CAN.-U.S.L.J. 369,
369 (1998) (noting that WTO agreements "were carefully drafted to respect the sovereign right and
responsibility of governments to make regulatory decisions that ensure the safety of the food sup-
ply of their citizens").
226 See Howse, supra note 135, at 139 (asserting that WTO panels can no longer "avoid making
complex trade offs between free trade and other public values"). As we demonstrate in Part V,
GATT and the SPS and TBT Agreements all require the WTO to distinguish between genuine
regulation and disguised discrimination in the context of environmental, health, and safety mea-
sures. See infra pp. 589-602. WTO instruments, however, do not generally require the organiza-
tion to address labor regulations, see Raj Bhala, Clarifying the TRade-Labor Link, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. II, 12 (1998), and the WTO has therefore not had occasion to resolve disputes
about disguised discrimination in that context. See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization
and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 136 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Howse, Workers' Rights]. GATT does allow members to restrict importation of the products of
prison labor. GATT 1947, supra note 204, art. XX(e); see Howse, Workers' Rights, supra, at 135.
227 See Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 347, 382 (1994) (suggesting that international standards can be a useful strategy to avoid
protectionism); see also Schoenbaum, supra note 31, at 703, 723 (suggesting that international stan-
dards are needed for the sake of both free trade and environmental protection in light of different
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moving beyond the elimination of protectionism and is now designed
to eliminate "regulatory differences of all sorts that inhibit trade."
2 28
Under this more encompassing approach, the WTO could formulate
more rational and uniform standards than individual nations could,
thus promoting compliance by both firms and governments. Finally,
the organization could inject labor, environmental, health, and safety
values into regulatory calculations to prevent trade from trumping all
other concerns.
229
Other commentators and politicians advance even broader argu-
ments for adding a regulatory component to the WTO. Most impor-
tantly, they suggest that allowing individual nations to set different
standards will lead to races to the bottom in which nations will
weaken necessary health, labor, environmental, and safety standards in
a competitive effort to attract business investment. 230 The United
States's negotiating position in Seattle, for example, called for the
WTO to become involved in setting international labor and environ-
mental standards. 231  Although President Clinton disclaimed any no-
tion that the WTO would automatically apply labor standards to its
members, he did recommend that, in the long run, nations that did not
meet the standards should be subject to trade sanctions through the
and potentially discriminatory standards across nations); Mark J. Spaulding, Transparency of En-
vironmental Regulation and Public Participation in the Resolution of International Environ-
mental Disputes, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1127, 1142 (1995) (endorsing the view that interna-
tional environmental standards can prevent disguised discrimination). The European Commission
partially reflects this model. The Commission, an organ of the European Union (EU), sets many
health and safety standards that apply to all EU members. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the
Point of Regulation: The International Organization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking
on Trade and the Environment, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 491-92 (1995). For example, the Commis-
sion, not its member states, issued the EU's controversial ban on hormone-treated beef. See infra
pp. 599-6oo.
228 Friedman, supra note i89, at 376. For a discussion of how uniform regulations set by central
authorities can reduce firms' costs, see Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (but Only
from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y
F. 225, 252-53 (1997). Cf David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Har-
monization Claims, in i FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 41, 62 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E.
Hudec eds., 1996) (discussing the economies-of-scale argument for regulatory harmonization).
229 See Dunoff, supra note 29, at 623 (arguing for incorporation of environmental values); Daniel
C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmonization: Environmental
Protection in Regional Trade Agreements, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 329-3 1, 336 (1997) (sug-
gesting that the European Community's more centralized approach to environmental regulation
should serve as a model for the WTO); Andrew L. Strauss, From GA7Tzilla to the Green Giant:
Winning the Environmental Battle for the Soul of the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 769, 774 (1998) ("Given this need for global regulation, if we wish to have a just, open,
and peaceful international order, global regulatory regimes adapted from domestic democratic sys-
tems must be implemented.").
230 For a discussion of this argument, see below at section III.B. 3 , pp. 558-61.
231 De Jonqui~res & Suzman, supra note 32.
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WTO process. 232  Many understood the President's remarks to reflect
the agenda of key interest groups, like labor unions, that are the main-
stays of his political party.233
Given the ensuing opposition of many delegates at the Seattle con-
ference, a full-fledged health, safety, labor, and environmental regula-
tory program seems unlikely to emerge within the WTO anytime
soon. 23 4 Nevertheless, in light of its academic and political support,
the regulatory model will likely compete with the antidiscrimination
model in shaping the WTO of the future.
In this section, we therefore evaluate both the regulatory and anti-
discrimination models in terms of our Madisonian theory of the inter-
national trade regime. We reject the regulatory model, arguing that a
regulatory function within the WTO would lead to both reduced pub-
lic welfare and greater leverage for concentrated interest groups. In
contrast, as long as it is properly cabined, the antidiscrimination model
can fulfill the WTO's potential for reducing the power of interest
groups, thus simultaneously creating wealth and reinforcing domestic
democracy.2 35
B. The Dangers of the Regulatory Model
i. One Size Does Not Fit All. - Uniform health, labor, safety, and
environmental regulations are unlikely to be appropriate for all mem-
bers of the world trading community, as members of the WTO vary
232 See Telephone Interview with Michael Paulson of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer from San
Francisco, California, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2485, 2486 (Nov. 30, 1999) (remarks of
President Clinton).
233 See, e.g., Editorial, Clumsy Clinton, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 5, i999, at 33A (arguing that
President Clinton was motivated in his stance at the trade talks by the need to placate interest
groups); see also Susan Milligan, Clinton Speaks of His Coming Commuter Marriage, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1999, at A54 (reporting President Clinton's denial of this criticism).
234 See Guy de Jonqui~res & Frances Williams, A Goal Beyond Reach, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999,
at i8 (describing the turmoil at the WTO convention in Seattle and the resulting lack of support
for reform).
235 Before proceeding, it is useful to dispose briefly of one other possible approach to the prob-
lem of covert protectionism. One might argue that the WTO should not concern itself with covert
protectionism at all. This approach would have the benefit of affording nations substantial auton-
omy on important issues of labor, health, safety, and the environment. Nevertheless, such a hands-
off regime would also permit many protectionist measures to stand unchallenged. The magnitude
of the defect would depend on how many covertly protectionist measures nations are likely to en-
act.
It is tempting to think that because such legislation would impose costs on citizens, nations
would not adopt a significant amount of covertly protectionist legislation. As we have seen, how-
ever, concentrated interest groups can have substantial leverage in the political process. See supra
pp. 523-25. Therefore, one cannot expect countries to forgo disguised protectionist measures, re-
gardless of the fact that such regulations reduce citizens' wealth. Overtly protectionist measures
also reduce citizens' wealth, but this fact does not stop nations from adopting them. Just as a
world organization helps to prevent nations from enacting overtly discriminatory legislation, such
an organization helps to prevent nations from adopting covertly protectionist legislation as well.
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widely in their levels of development. 236 As a result, they will ration-
ally choose different regulatory standards.237  It is wrong to assume,
for example, that Indian and American regulations on water purity
should necessarily be the same. Indians may not be able to afford
American water safety standards, just as they unfortunately cannot af-
ford many other goods that Americans can.2 38  Forcing underdevel-
oped countries to achieve the standards of the industrialized world
would only provoke resentment toward the free trade regime and un-
dermine domestic sovereignty.
239
It may be argued that a central regulatory body could impose di-
verse standards appropriate to different nations of the world. But in
reality, as we discuss below, interest groups are likely to undercut this
possibility by pushing for regulations that are inappropriate for devel-
oping nations. 240 Moreover, good environmental, labor, health, and
safety regulations in one nation are not generally contingent on good
regulations in other countries. 24 1  Therefore, nations themselves are
236 It is not incongruous to favor uniform standards to facilitate free trade while permitting di-
verse standards for environmental, labor, health, and safety standards. As we discuss above, free
trade benefits all countries. See supra pp. 521-22. In contrast, as we show in this section, appro-
priate regulatory standards vary depending on the income levels and preferences of particular citi-
zens. Freer trade is rooted in universally applicable economic truths; appropriate regulations, in
contrast, require particularized information that is best gathered locally.
237 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade and the Environment, in WRITINGS ON INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 476, 481 (V.N. Balasubramanyam ed., 1997); see also HAKAN NORDSTROM & SCOTT
VAUGHAN, SPECIAL STUDIES 4: TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 3, 44 (igg), http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop.e/envir-e/environment.pdf [hereinafter TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT]; Bhala, supra
note 226, at 33-35.
238 Cf C. Ford Runge, Trade Protectionism and Environmental Regulations: The New Nontariff
Barriers, i i NW. J. LNT'L L. & BUS. 47, 52 (iggo) ("In low-income developing countries, while the
share of national resources devoted to food and agriculture remains large ... , environmental
quality and occupational health risks are widely perceived as concerns of the rich. Even if these
risks are acknowledged, the income levels of most developing countries do not permit a structure of
environmental regulation comparable to that in the [developed world].").
239 See Brown, supra note 227, at 376-77, 382 (arguing that developing countries perceive the
imposition of global environmental standards as a threat to their sovereignty). The EU has drawn
criticism for interfering with the sovereignty of its member states, see, e.g., Robert Graham, French
Split Reopens on Sovereignty, FIN. TIMES, Nov 25, 1998, LEXIS, News Library, FINTIME File,
even though it can derive support from historical traditions of European consolidation stretching
back to the Roman Empire and Charlemagne, and even though the European Commission is itself
accountable in some measure to a European Parliament elected directly by the people. See Koen
Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of the European Union, 21
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 746, 767 (I998) (noting that the European Parliament can force the European
Commission to resign). Lacking these historical advantages, an international regulatory regime
would stir even fiercer resentment.
240 See infra p. 557.
241 Proponents of the race-to-the-bottom theory suggest that appropriate regulatory standards in
one country are contingent on appropriate standards in another. We address this argument below
at section IIm.B.3, pp. 558-61.
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better suited than the WTO to choose regulations that reflect their
peoples' tastes and levels of development.2 42
Imposing the developed world's regulatory standards on developing
countries could also restrict the latter's growth and thus be counter-
productive for raising standards.2 43 Growth makes developing nations
richer, allowing them to raise their standards to those of the developed
world.2 44 Growth also allows governments to raise more revenues to
pay for public goods,, such as cleaning up the environment.2 45  Such
improvement is more than just a theoretical possibility - the so-called
Kuznets curve, which predicts the relationship between per capita in-
come and environmental degradation, indicates that development ul-
timately improves the environment, even if it initially degrades it.246
This prediction has been empirically verified for a number of pollut-
ants, though not all of them.2 47
242 In contrast, we have argued that lower tariffs in one nation are politically contingent on
lower tariffs in other nations. For discussion, see above at pp. 545-46. This relationship provides
a reason for establishing a trade regime at the international level.
243 See Runge, supra note 238, at 52-56 (noting that "environmental arbitrage" allows develop-
ing countries with lower environmental standards to attract industries from the developed world).
244 See Patrick Low, Trade and the Environment: What Worries the Developing Countries?, 23
ENVTL. L. 705, 706 (1993) (noting that "the demand for improved environmental quality tends to
rise with income"); see also Dan Ben-David, Trade, Growth, and Disparity Among Nations, in
SPECIAL STUDIES 5: TRADE, INCOME DISPARITY AND POVERTY, supra note 5i, at ix, 37-39,
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/presoo-e/pov2_e.pdf (suggesting that trade leads to upward
income convergence among nations).
245 Bhagwati, supra note 237, at 478; TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 237, at 4.
246 See Steve Charnovitz, World Trade and the Environment: A Review of the New WTO Report,
12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 523, 533-34 (2000) (describing the Kuznets curve in the environ-
mental context).
247 See M.A. Cole, A.J. Rayner & J.M. Bates, The Environmental Kuznets Curve: An Empirical
Analysis, 2 ENVTL. & DEV. ECON. 401, 411 (1997) ("Results suggest that meaningful [environ-
mental Kuznets curves] exist only for local air pollutants, whilst indicators with a more global, or
indirect, environmental impact either increase monotonically with income or else have high turn-
ing points with large standard errors."); Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth
and the Environment, xio Q.J. ECON. 353, 370 (1995) (finding that sufficiently high levels of
growth improve air and water quality); Ram6n L6pez, The Environment as a Factor of Produc-
tion: The Effects of Economic Growth and Trade Liberalization, 27 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
163, 182-83 (1994) (arguing that, given certain assumptions, growth improves environmental qual-
ity in the short and long run); Kenneth E. McConnell, Income and the Demand for Environmental
Quality, 2 ENVTL. & DEV. ECON. 383, 385-86 (1997) (noting that empirical evidence suggests the
existence of environmental Kuznets curves); Seth Norton, Property Rights, the Environment, and
Economic Well-Being, in WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 37, 5o-5I (Peter J. Hill & Roger E.
Meiners eds., 1998) (arguing that property rights and growth should be seen as favorable for envi-
ronmental protection in certain contexts); Thomas M. Selden & Daqing Song, Environmental
Quality and Development: Is There a Kuznets Curve for Air Pollution Emissions?, 27 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 147, 16x (1994) (finding "substantial support" for a Kuznets-like relationship be-
tween GDP and air pollutants).
Some commentators have suggested that when the pollutants are easy to externalize, like
carbon dioxide emissions, studies show "no tendency [on the part of these pollutants] to decrease
with higher per capita income." SIGRID STAGL, DELINKING ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM ENVI-
RONMENTAL DEGRADATION? A LITERATURE SURVEY ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS
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Of course, as a WTO report on the environment itself suggests, im-
provement in the environment does not happen automatically, but
rather through government action.248  Growth through trade, however,
facilitates government action to protect the environment. Communi-
ties tend to become more environmentally conscious as they become
wealthier;249 thus, wealthier nations with democratic governments are
better able to force firms to clean up the environment. 250 Moreover, as
we discuss below, the WTO can help make environmental regulation
more probable by rendering the domestic legislative process more
transparent. This greater transparency will help a more environmen-
tally conscious citizenry work its democratic will by enacting and en-
forcing environmental laws. Thus, the WTO, in the long run, is likely
to help secure the connection between growth and environmental pro-
tection through the channel of democracy 25
CURVE HYPOTHESIS 14 (Research Focus: Growth and Employment in Europe: Sustainability and
Competitiveness, Working Paper No. 6, 1999). The problem of externalities in the pollutants, as
Stagl recognizes, may require international cooperation. We suggest below that international co-
operation is inhibited because countries of widely varying development value the environment
radically differently. See infra p. 562. Growth is likely to facilitate a convergence of values. Thus,
for pollutants like carbon dioxide emissions, free trade should eventually help to turn the Kuznets
curve positive, but it will take relatively longer.
248 TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 237, at 52.
249 Marian Radetzki, Economic Growth and Environment, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 121, 129-34 (World Bank Discussion Papers No. 159, Patrick Low ed., 1992)
(suggesting that increases in economic growth lead to a more environmentally conscious society
because wealthy countries can afford to pay for environmental costs, and wealth increases the
likelihood of pro-environment technological advances); see also PETER HUBER, HARD GREEN:
SAVING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM THE ENVIRONMENTALISTS: A CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTO
151 (1999) (discussing the manner in which wealth makes people want to enjoy the environment
more). Huber also observes that development shrinks the "footprint" of man on the planet, because
new technology allows for more efficient growth of food and extraction of energy. See id. at 148-
53. Thus, the United States has been reforesting the land for much of this century. See id. at ioi.
250 Cf TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 237, at 40 (discussing the ability of wealthy, well-
educated communities to exert pressure on polluters). By increasing wealth, trade should prompt
governments to improve labor as well as environmental standards. Industrial history provides an
excellent example of the effects of increases in wealth on working conditions. "As the peoples in
the West and North grew richer, they could 'afford' more concern with the most appalling exam-
ples of labor standards abuses in the global marketplace." Henry H. Drummonds, Transnational
Small and Emerging Business in a World of Nikes and Microsofts, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.
L. 249, 283 (2o). That is, regulations to improve labor conditions are a kind of"normal good," in
that as income and wealth increase, demand rises as well. Id.
251 Some - including the President of the United States - have argued that the WTO should
set environmental and labor standards for the same reasons it currently sets certain minimum in-
tellectual property standards in connection with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights. See President's News Conference, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2537,
2543 (Dec. 8, 1999). Economically, however, there is a much stronger case for uniform intellectual
property standards than for uniform environmental and labor standards. First, weak intellectual
property standards discourage trade in goods because counterfeit goods decrease the demand for
real ones. Keith E. Maskus, Regulatory Standards in the WTO: Comparing Intellectual Property
Rights with Competition Policy, Environmental Protection, and Core Labor Standards (Jan. 2ooo)
(unpublished working paper of the Inst. for Internat'l Econ.), http://2o 7 .238.I52.36/catalogIWP/
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2. The Likelihood of Interest Group Capture. - Placing a regula-
tory function within the WTO would also give more leverage to con-
centrated interest groups, undermining the organization's goal of coun-
terbalancing protectionist groups. Such a function would require
substantial policymaking discretion because choices would have to be
made among competing regulatory programs. The structure best
suited to the undertaking would likely resemble a commission or ad-
ministrative agency.2 2  In short, the task of formulating coercive
global regulations would require a more powerful and intrusive gov-
ernance structure than the task of merely removing discriminatory
barriers to voluntary transactions among people of different nations.
A commission or agency charged with international regulation
would be particularly prone to capture by protectionist interest
groups.25 3 Consider the case in which the WTO attempts to formulate
an international environmental standard. In order to impose costs on
competitors in the developing world, industries and workers in the de-
veloped world would naturally be inclined to lobby for regulations that
impose higher environmental standards than developing nations would
rationally choose. 25 4
It is true that exporter interest groups in developing nations will
have incentives to lobby for lower standards. 55 But exporter interest
2000/Oo-I.htm. Second, weak standards encourage free riding on the creations of others and there-
fore lead to less worldwide innovation. Id.
We recognize that these arguments for international intellectual property standards may not
be strong enough to overcome the presumption in favor of setting regulations at the national level
rather than in distant international fora. Although WTO structures supporting trade liberalization
help all countries economically and reinforce democracy, it is not clear that the same can be said
for intellectual property standards. Countries that produce little intellectual property may be
harmed by such standards and may rationally choose to do without them. Thus, the decision
whether to include intellectual property standards in the WTO regime may present a difficult
tradeoff between economic benefits and democratic sovereignty. The sovereignty and economic
arguments, however, both militate against setting environmental and labor standards within the
WTO. Thus, the inclusion of intellectual property standards within the WTO system does not
provide a persuasive analogy for including other standards.
252 The literature on the rise of the American administrative state demonstrates the superior
ability of administrative over judicial institutions in making policy. See, e.g., BARRY M. MITNICK,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 28 (i98o) (discussing possible limitations of the judi-
cial process as a regulatory device).
253 See Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the "Un-
regulated" Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 958 (1g6) (acknowledging that as "power seeps
upwards [to international organizations], so does the attention of interest groups").
254 Cf Raj Bhala, MRS. WATU and International Trade Sanctions, 33 INT'L LAW. I, 21 (1999)
(discussing developing countries' fears that "the United States will drive up their production costs
by imposing its environmental regulations extraterritorially").
255 In contrast, exporters located in the developed world have little concern with the environ-
mental regulations affecting production in the developing world. It might be thought that some
multinational companies would have concerns with standards in the developing world because the
companies might decide to move some operations there. But these multinational companies have
many options regarding where to locate their business operations, and a particular environmental
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groups in one nation or set of nations cannot be relied upon to coun-
terbalance protectionist groups in another nation or set of nations. For
instance, the exporter groups of Bangladesh lack the wealth and so-
phistication of competing industries in the United States and thus will
exert much less influence on any structure within the WTO devoted to
international regulatory standards. Moreover, poorer nations like
Bangladesh often lack the resources and quality of representation nec-
essary to reflect adequately the wishes of their constituents at interna-
tional fora.256
Even apart from the danger that protectionist groups will infiltrate
a centralized commission to lobby for policies with protectionist ef-
fects, concentrated interest groups in general will be able to exercise
substantial influence to bring about policies that serve their interests,
rather than the public interest. 25 7  For instance, existing industries
around the world may prefer standards that make it harder for fledg-
ling competitors with new technology to succeed. Even in the domes-
tic context, agencies captured by interest groups often generate regula-
tions that are neither efficient nor the product of real democratic
consensus.
258
Moreover, in at least three respects, an international regulatory
commission is more likely than a domestic agency to issue inefficient
regulations that lack a popular consensus. First, an international
regulatory commission would be more susceptible to capture by inter-
est groups than domestic institutions.2 5 9 Even in the domestic context,
standard's adverse effect in one area of the world is unlikely to impel a company to oppose high
standards in another area of the world. Moreover, unions are likely to favor higher standards even
if such standards are not in the interests of their respective employers. See Wonnell, supra note 64,
at 83 (explaining the protectionist stance of the union movement). Thus, one cannot expect a very
substantial interest group lobby outside of the developing world for the less stringent standards
that developing countries favor.
256 Indeed, some developing nations lack the resources even to send delegates to these fora and
thus have resorted to using nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to represent their interests.
See, e.g., Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the
Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. (forthcoming Winter 2001) (manuscript at 99-ioo, on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary) (recounting how Sierra Leone attempted to give its seat at the WTO's Committee on Trade
and Environment to the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development in
return for reports on what transpired). The problem is that the NGOs are likely to be dominated
by Westerners and thus are unlikely to reflect the interests of developing nations. We discuss
NGOs more generally below at pp. 569-72.
257 See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. I, 38 (1998) (arguing that because citizens are often uninformed about regulatory
decisionmaking, interest groups are well positioned to seek rents from administrative agencies).
258 See Michael A. Fitts, Retaining the Rule of Law in a Chevron World, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
355, 358 (ggo) (offering the "standard" critique that New Deal federal agencies have become sub-
ject to interest group capture).
259 These interest groups would include not only the kind of concentrated interest groups we
described earlier, see supra p. 523, but also international technocratic elites. See ANNE-MARIE
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citizens often remain rationally ignorant about regulatory develop-
ments.2 60 Information about agency action is difficult to obtain, and
citizens have other projects to pursue.2 61  Average citizens would find
the workings of an international body even more remote and opaque
and would have even fewer opportunities for oversight.2 62 As a result,
interest groups would have a greater ability to skew regulations in
their favor.
Second, more is at stake in formulating harmonized rules for the
entire world than for a single nation. If an interest group succeeds in
obtaining a regulation that disadvantages competitors, it can gain mo-
nopoly profits on a global scale.2 63 Thus, the resources that an interest
group would be willing to invest to capture an international regulatory
body would be higher than in the domestic context.
Third, domestic agencies face at least some competitive pressure
from other jurisdictions. For instance, if a domestic agency bans a
useful technology at the behest of interest groups, capital may move
elsewhere.2 64 A WTO regulatory commission, by contrast, would face
much less discipline because its regulations would extend to almost all
relevant jurisdictions. 265
3. Beneficial Jurisdictional Competition Rather Than Races to the
Bottom. - Ironically, the most pervasive argument for international
regulatory standards attacks decentralization head on and argues that
centralized regulatory authority is necessary to prevent "races to the
bottom" that endanger labor conditions, health, safety, and the envi-
ronment.2 66 Races to the bottom, the argument goes, are the result of
SLAUGHTER, AGENCIES ON THE LOOSE? HOLDING GOVERNMENT NETWORKS ACCOUNTABLE I0
(Harvard L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. oo6, I999),
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=209319.
260 Croley, supra note 257, at 37 (discussing citizens' lack of incentives to seek information about
regulatory developments).
261 For further discussion of the roots of rational ignorance, see above at note 63.
262 See Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Le-
gitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 681, 699-702 (1996-i997) (explaining that citizens face higher
costs monitoring international rules than domestic rules).
263 Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Per-
spective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1337-38 (994) (noting that rent-seeking is more intense at the
federal than the state level because there are more rents to be had).
264 For more discussion of regulatory competition, see below at pp. 559-61.
265 Given the greater risks of regulatory capture in the international context, it is not inconsis-
tent to favor centralized regulatory authority in the United States and to oppose its international
extension.
266 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 3o, at 368; Esty, supra note 3o , at 1573 (arguing for global regu-
lation to prevent a race to the bottom with regard to environmental standards). Politicians have
made similar points. Kerry, supra note 30, at 452 (outlining the risk of an international "race to the
social bottom").
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jurisdictional competition. 267  Nations competing for business invest-
ment seek to attract firms by enacting suboptimal regulations that al-
low the firms to decrease production costs. The "winners" are those
jurisdictions with the least stringent standards - developing countries
at first, but over time some developed countries as well. 268  To avoid
this undesirable result, the argument continues, nations must cede
regulatory authority to international institutions that would be better
able to protect workers, health, safety, and the environment. 269
The race-to-the-bottom argument has both empirical and theoreti-
cal flaws. First, its empirical premise - that one nation's regulatory
regime has the capacity to undermine those of other nations - is open
to serious question. There is not much evidence, for example, that
polluting industries have been migrating from developed to developing
countries to take advantage of lax environmental standards. 270 The
cost of pollution control is relatively low in developed countries - "no
more than i per cent of production costs for the average industry" -
and besides, because most polluting firms are capital intensive, they
tend to cluster in developed countries where capital is readily avail-
able.271  Similarly, there is little empirical support for a link between
increased world trade and a decline in labor conditions.27 2 One study
has concluded that labor conditions in developing countries do not
have much of an effect on labor markets in the developed world. 273
Second, the theoretical premise of the argument - that centralized
regulatory authority will achieve a more efficient regulatory regime
than separate jurisdictions subject to international competition - is
also seriously flawed. As we have seen, centralized government struc-
267 See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is
It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 275 (1997) (sketching the basic race-to-the-bottom ar-
gument); Esty, supra note 30, at I56o (same); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To the Yukon and Be-
yond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 93, 95-98 (i999)
(describing the race-to-the-bottom argument in the context of labor conditions).
268 See Bhala, supra note 226, at 17-20 (discussing the argument that labor conditions in devel-
oping countries will have adverse effects on the labor market in the United States).
269 See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity Among Trading Nations,
in I FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 228, at 9, 32-34 (outlining how the race-to-
the-bottom argument leads to calls for international harmonization of regulatory standards).
270 TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 237, at 4-5; see also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Inter-
national Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 298 (1997) (noting that "cost differences in environmental standards play little
part in companies' location decisions").
271 TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 237, at 4.
272 See C. O'Neal Taylor, Linkage and Rule-Making: Observations on Trade and Investment,
and Trade and Labor, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 639, 65 7-58 (1998). But see Van Wezel Stone,
supra note 267, at 98 (discussing "considerable data" that "firms tend to move production to the
countries that offer lower labor costs, as well as lower levels of unionization").
273 Christopher L. Erickson & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, The American Experience with Labor Stan-
dards and Trade Agreements, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 41, 44-45, 85 (999).
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tures can be easily captured by concentrated groups and thus can pro-
duce results that reflect more the strength of particular private inter-
ests than the public interest.2 7 4  In contrast, recent economic models
confirm that when there are no substantial spillover effects (for in-
stance, in the case of environmental regulation, when jurisdictions do
not pollute beyond their bounds), jurisdictional competition is likely to
prove conducive to appropriate levels of regulation.'7 5 This is the case
even when nations are competing with one another to attract busi-
nesses. The essence of the argument is that such competition allows
the cost of regulations to be directly reflected in lost wages.2 7 6  The
connection between regulation and wages creates a dynamic in which
the movement of capital leads to the optimal level of regulation for
each individual jurisdiction: capital flows across borders to equalize
the marginal cost and marginal benefit of an additional unit of regula-
tion."7 In less technical terms, employees value public goods such as a
clean environment and will accept lower wages in jurisdictions that
provide them.2 78 The WTO reinforces this structure by making regu-
lations more transparent, thus making it easier for citizens to evaluate
the costs and benefits of regulation in the democratic process and to
come to the appropriate tradeoff.2 7 9
Some critics of jurisdictional competition argue that jurisdictions'
decisions to impose excessive taxes on capital will distort this effect by
274 For discussion, see above at section III.B.2, pp. 556-58.
275 For an excellent discussion of these models, see Revesz, supra note 30. Although Revesz ex-
amines the interstate case, his arguments apply to the international context as well because they do
not depend on the mobility of individuals between jurisdictions; they depend only on the mobility
of capital. Id. at 1234 n.76 (observing that the "Article proceeds on the assumption that individu-
als are immobile"); see also TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 237, at 41-44; Henry N. Butler
& Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Envi-
ronmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 23, 25 (1996) (arguing that environmental
regulatory authority should be allocated to areas affected by pollution rather than to areas that can
harmonize standards).
276 For a full discussion of this argument, see Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic
Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB.
ECON. 333 (1988). Oates and Schwab assume that individuals cannot move among jurisdictions.
Id. at 337.
277 Revesz, supra note 30, at 1240.
278 Even if races to the bottom posed real problems, international institutions might not be the
best way to address them. First, because of the public choice problems we have noted, an interna-
tional institution may well be captured by interest groups and thus choose an inadequate standard.
Second, the institutions needed to offset races to the bottom would infringe more upon sovereignty
and governmental accountability in the international context than they would in a domestic federal
system. Cf. Klevorick, supra note 184, at 178 (arguing that there is greater need to correct races to
the bottom in a federal system because members of different regulatory jurisdictions share citizen-
ship and identity).
279 For more on transparency, see above at pp. 534-35, 547-48, and below at pp. 573-75, 597.
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skewing the costs of regulation.2 0 But even if taxes are suboptimal, it
does not follow that centralized regulation - with its interest group
driven imperfections - is better than imperfect jurisdictional competi-
tion. 81 It seems odd to argue that we should do away with competi-
tive restraints on government regulation on the grounds that govern-
ments may act suboptimally in assessing taxes. In any event, open
global capital markets are creating economic conditions that are con-
ducive to regulatory competition by making it harder for countries to
impose distortionary taxes on capital.2 8 2 Thus, even if it were true
that distortionary taxes provide an argument against regulatory com-
petition, the argument is becoming increasingly less relevant.
One other argument for centralized regulation is that globally uni-
form standards will reduce the compliance costs of businesses.28 3 Al-
though uniformity does have its advantages, its benefits are given due
consideration under a system of jurisdictional competition. All else
being equal, a nation's adoption of widely used standards will make it
attractive to firms.28 4 But all else is typically not equal, and in juris-
dictional competition, uniformity is just one advantage to be traded off
against others in reaching a result that is efficient, given the prefer-
ences and resources of a nation's citizens. In our view, this approach
is the only way that uniformity can be properly valued in a system of
diverse, democratic nations.
4. Spillovers Do Not Call for Regulation by the WTO. - For all
the above reasons, jurisdictional competition is likely on balance to
improve regulation; nations should not cede regulatory authority to an
international body on a race-to-the-bottom rationale. There is one
280 A leading critic of jurisdictional competition argues that taxes on capital are too inefficient to
lead to optimal regulation. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 57o, 635 (i996). Professor Esty has been criticized for ignoring the problem of political
externalities that international environmental regulation itself would create. See Todd J. Zywicki,
Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental
Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 87 (1999).
281 See Revesz, supra note 30, at 1242.
282 For a discussion of the power of global markets to discipline governments' fiscal and mone-
tary policies, see STEVEN SOLOMON, THE CONFIDENCE GAME 39 (1995). Moreover, the latest
review of the effect of globalization on taxation suggests that taxes on capital are falling dramati-
cally because of the ease with which capital can exit a jurisdiction. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1573, 1577 (2ooo). Thus, the mobility of capital in open global markets strongly reinforces the
benefits of jurisdictional competition within the WTO system.
283 These arguments are perhaps as venerable as THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note i55,
which speaks of the inconveniences stemming from "conflicts of State regulations." Id. at 113.
Such arguments have been renewed in the modern era. See supra note 155.
284 For instance, the American states often adopt uniform proposals when it is efficient to do so.
See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobyashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws and Limited Liability
Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 947, 950 (1995) (arguing that the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws proposals are enacted into law when they are efficient).
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situation, however, in which jurisdictional competition may not gener-
ally yield optimal results. If pollution from industry in nation A spills
over into nation B, nation A is unlikely to take into account the costs
of the pollution in nation B when setting its environmental regulations
because pollution in nation B does not harm the citizens of nation A.
Such "spillovers" constitute a classic commons problem:28 5 because
each country does not pay the full cost of its pollution, each country
lacks the appropriate incentives to reduce pollution to a point that re-
flects its real costs and benefits. 28 6 One does not need to believe in the
potential for races to the bottom to see spillovers as a potentially im-
portant problem.287
Nevertheless, lodging regulatory authority in the WTO - even
authority limited to spillovers - is not the proper mechanism to ad-
dress this difficulty. International commons problems typically do not
admit of easy solutions. As discussed above, citizens in different coun-
tries, with widely varying incomes and preferences, may place widely
different values on environmental goods.2 88 A cooperative solution
will therefore be difficult to obtain: when benefits vary widely - that
is, when they are "heterogeneous" in economists' terms - it is hard to
reach agreement on the collective action necessary to solve a commons
problem. 28 9
Lack of common understanding may also impede agreement. For
instance, environmental organizations and the media have sensitized
Americans to environmental problems. It is not at all clear that citi-
zens in less developed countries, with fewer such organizations and
lower levels of media penetration, are as aware of these problems.
When problems are not well understood and well defined by all the ac-
tors, it is harder to trigger the collective action necessary to solve
them.290
285 See BARRY C. FIELD & NANCY D. OLEWILER, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 64-81 (I995)
(explaining the international tragedy of the commons in pollution).
286 Chang, supra note 25, at 2146 (describing spillovers as an instance of a commons problem).
287 Indeed, the "federalist matching principle" itself suggests that we should consider giving
regulatory authority to an entity large enough to encompass the areas affected by the common
pollution. See Butler & Macey, supra note 275, at 25.
288 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness,
102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2097 (1993) ("[A]s a practical matter many developing countries would not
agree, at least in the short to medium term, to adopt the same environmental standards as the
OECD nations. Nor would the latter agree to lower their existing standards.").
289 GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 22-23 (1989). For a discussion of
the implication of this problem for the Global Warming Treaty, see JOSEPH R. BIAL & GARY D.
LIBECAP, GLOBAL WARMING TREATY NEGOTIATION AND COMPLIANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 6-14 (Int'l Centre for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9/99, 1999).
290 BIAL & LIBECAP, supra note 289, at 6-14; cf. Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 159, at 1222-25
(explaining why governments may find it difficult to reach agreements on commons problems).
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Monitoring compliance may also pose difficulties. Nations will be
unlikely to enter into an agreement to solve a commons problem unless
some mechanism exists for policing compliance by other parties.
2 91
Such mechanisms would likely raise concerns about sovereignty that
could jeopardize the agreement. Finally, given the disparity of benefits
we mentioned above, some countries will have incentives to hold out
for unrelated "side payments" to induce them to join the agreement.2 92
At the very least, strategic demands for side payments would make
negotiations divisive, and agreement hard to obtain.2 93
For all these reasons, disputes about international spillover effects
are likely to be exceedingly contentious and protracted.2 94 Even for
experts, their resolution would be a daunting task. Of course, the
trade bureaucrats who work at the WTO are not experts in environ-
mental matters; there is little reason to think they would have the ca-
pacity to make sensitive judgments about them.2 95  Placing the resolu-
tion of spillover disputes in the WTO would only create tensions and
distract the organization from the more limited functions it can per-
form.
2 9 6
Moreover, the WTO would face a crisis of legitimacy if it were to
resolve difficult spillover problems on an ongoing basis. As we see
291 BIAL & LIBECAP, supra note 289, at 8-.
292 For instance, developing nations may require the United States to offer cash payments in
return for an agreement on global warming.
293 See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 159, at 1224 (noting that strategic considerations make it
difficult to agree on how to share the costs of agreement). Bial and Libecap note the problems
posed by holdouts and the need to use side payments to rope such nations into an agreement. BIAL
& LIBECAP, supra note 289, at io-i i.
294 The intractability of these issues is demonstrated by the failure of the WTO's Committee on
Trade and Environment, which has not achieved any concrete results despite years of meetings and
discussions. See Shaffer, supra note 256 (manuscript at 52-55).
295 See Daniel C. Esty, Linkages and Governance: NGOs at the World Trade Organization, 1g U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 709, 714 (1998) (arguing that the WTO "lacks the capacity to make decisions
on environmental issues and other non-trade subjects when dealing with problems that require
expertise"); see also supra p. 534 (discussing an alleged pro-trade bias on the part of WTO bureau-
crats). Esty does think that, in the absence of a global environmental organization, the WTO must
"by default" play a role in environmental regulation. Esty, supra, at 714.
One might argue that the WTO should make up for its lack of skill by expanding its staff to
include environmental experts who could advise panels on how best to address spillover questions.
Of course, this is just another way of saying that the WTO should add the resolution of environ-
mental spillovers to its docket, a contention we reject for the reasons discussed in the text.
296 One might argue that international trade and the global environment are inextricably linked,
and that by refusing to decide environmental questions the WTO necessarily tilts the scales against
environmental concerns. Cf Sara Dillon, Trade and the Environment: A Challenge to the
GATTIWTO Principle of "Ever-Freer Trade", II ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 351, 381-82
(1996) (arguing that GATT panels' failure to consider the complexity of trade's effects on the envi-
ronment and other nontrade concerns results in a bias in favor of free trade). But this argument
proves too much. International trade affects a multitude of nontrade issues, including public
health and national security. If nations began to grant the WTO authority to resolve disputes on
matters "linked" to world trade, they would sign away vast areas of governmental authority.
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from the United States Supreme Court's role under the dormant com-
merce clause, an institution can accomplish the modest task of policing
trade discrimination without itself having been popularly selected.2 97
In contrast, a structure providing substantial regulatory discretion on
issues like the environment will require continuing inputs from the po-
litical processes of member states.2 98
The experience of the European Union (EU) confirms this dy-
namic. As the EU has undertaken increasingly greater regulatory re-
sponsibilities on behalf of its member states, administrative action
through Brussels has become more important, providing a new locus
for the influence of interest groups.2 99 As the bureaucracy has grown,
so too have complaints about the EU's "democratic deficit."300 Ac-
cordingly, the EU faces an intractable dilemma. It can wield largely
unaccountable power from Brussels or make the elected European
Parliament more politically active. The former option is antidemo-
cratic. The latter has the disadvantage of displacing the authority of
the democratic processes of individual nations, which are more respon-
sive to the preferences and traditions of their respective polities.
If the WTO were to assume a regulatory function, its legitimacy
problem would be far more acute. Quite simply, there is no global
demos. 30 1 It is thus difficult to imagine global structures akin to the
European Parliament that could ensure representation of the diverse
citizenry subject to the WTO's decisions. 30 2
Our objection to regulatory standards within the WTO does not
imply a general opposition to multilateral approaches to spillovers.
When possible (that is, when the spillovers are not global in scope), na-
tions would be better advised to reach agreement on international
standards through regional rather than global fora. Because the citi-
297 For discussion of the dormant commerce clause, see above at pp. 536-38. For a discussion of
how trade discrimination can be policed in the WTO without substantially intruding on the sub-
stantive decisionmaking of member states, see below at section III.C, pp. 566-7 2.
298 See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 599 (igg) (suggesting that the issue of
legitimacy would arise if environmental regulation were transferred from the national to the inter-
national plane).
299 See Michelle Egan & Dieter Wolf, Regulation and Comitology: The EC Committee System in
Regulatory Perspective, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 499, 520 (1998) (finding that centralization of deci-
sionmaking in social and economic areas has led interest groups to seek influence at the European
Commission instead of with their respective domestic governments).
300 Bodansky, supra note 298, at 597 (noting the crisis of legitimacy in the European Union and
analogizing it to emerging and potential crises of confidence for international regulatory govern-
ance); see J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, too YALE L.J. 2403, 2472 (i991) (describ-
ing the democratic deficit as an impediment to the consolidation of the European Union).
301 Bodansky, supra note 298, at 6oo.
302 Some argue that providing more representation to NGOs may help cure a democratic deficit
in the WTO. We believe, however, that more power for NGOs would only exacerbate the problem
by giving undue leverage to special interests, for reasons we discuss below at pp. 5 71-72.
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zens of nations in a particular region are more likely to have similar
preferences, resources, political values, and economic systems, it may
be easier for them to reach effective and enforceable regional agree-
ments. 30 3 After nations have already formed such smaller compacts, it
may be easier for them to move to a global agreement.
304
Moreover, a global agreement that arises from such incremental
steps is more likely to contain efficient regulations, precisely because
the agreement emerged from a decentralized process subject to juris-
dictional competition. 30 5 The different regional regimes can be com-
paratively assessed for efficiency before a global regime is constructed.
Such a process sustains jurisdictions as laboratories for experimenta-
tion in the process of achieving a final resolution.
30 6
Nations can address substantial spillovers that are already global in
scope through separate multilateral agreements, 30 7 as they have al-
ready done in pacts like the Montreal Protocol on Ozone.3 08 The dis-
crete nature of these pacts and their institutional separation from the
WTO will help prevent them from becoming easy vehicles for protec-
tionism. 30 9 Of course, some might argue that using the already exist-
ing WTO would minimize the transaction costs associated with nego-
tiating discrete agreements. In light of the other substantial impedi-
ments to global multilateralism on spillovers, however, transaction
costs are not likely to be determinative factors in the conclusion of
such agreements.3 1
0
303 See Frederick M. Abbott, Regional Integration and the Environment: The Evolution of Legal
Regimes, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 173, 179 (1992) (suggesting that states with "common interests" are
"more likely to achieve an integrated environmental regime than will the global universe of
states"); Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA and WTO: Re-
gional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 232 (1997) (suggesting that the EU
has an advantage over multilateral organizations like the WTO in harmonizing policy because of
the relatively similar economic systems of the EU's members).
304 See Abbott, supra note 303, at 201 (suggesting that "regional arrangements may establish
effective models for global solutions to environmental problems"). Professor Abbott, however, also
favors trade-related environmental measures within the GATT. Id.
305 For discussion of the reasons jurisdictional competition is conducive to efficient regulations,
see above at pp. 559--6r.
306 For a discussion of this view of federalism, see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Lim-
ited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 777
(1995).
307 Cf Stewart, supra note 288, at 2o6i (suggesting that environmental "harmonization should
focus on the most significant externalities").
308 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 100-1o, I522 U.N.T.S. 3 (1987), amended and adjusted, 30 I.L.M. 537 (990).
309 Thus, the argument that the WTO would be an appropriate forum for resolving spillovers
because of its ability to enforce such agreements through authorizing trade sanctions is seriously
flawed. The protectionist pressures we discuss above at pp. 556-58 would undermine the neutral-
ity of these sanctions.
310 Indeed, in part because people in different nations are more likely to agree that specific pol-
lutants are a problem than to submit to general environmental regulation, "transboundary pollu-
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Thus, the regulatory model should be rejected. A regulatory com-
mission within the WTO would increase, rather than reduce, the lev-
erage of special interest groups and would detract from, rather than
reinforce, democracy.3 1 1 Indeed, just as the WTO's trade regime repli-
cates the positive features of American federalism, a trade institution
that moves toward a regulatory model risks incorporating the least de-
sirable elements of centralized government.3 1 2 Ironically, those who
argue that the WTO should have regulatory authority would create
the very sort of unaccountable institution, beholden to special interests,
that they vigorously oppose.
C. The Virtues of the Antidiscrimination Model
Having explained the defects of the regulatory model, we can now
appreciate the merits of the antidiscrimination model that the WTO
has chosen to address national regulations that potentially interfere
with free trade. As we have shown, the WTO has established an ad-
judicative system, complete with panels and appellate review, to re-
solve disputes among member states, including disputes about covert
protectionism. 3 13 Under this system, the WTO does not enact labor,
environmental, health, or safety regulations for its members. Rather, it
reviews members' laws to determine whether they constitute instances
of covert protectionism that violate WTO rules. Unlike the regulatory
model, the antidiscrimination model has the potential to reinforce do-
mestic democracy and to help generate sound regulatory regimes.
First, under the antidiscrimination mechanism, nations retain re-
sponsibility for promulgating their own labor, environmental, health,
and safety regulations. Although interest groups may capture domestic
tion is more likely to be addressed through bilateral and multilateral agreements designed to ad-
dress specific transboundary pollution problems than through global or regional regimes of [gen-
eral] liability or regulation." Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46
DUKE L.J. 931, 985 0997).
311 The influence of interest groups also poses problems for the antidiscrimination model we dis-
cuss in the next section. Because the jurisdiction of a regulatory commission is more open-ended,
however, interest groups are a more serious problem in that context. For further discussion, see
above at pp. 557-58.
312 In particular, the New Deal's success in undermining American federalism should serve as a
warning regarding the fragility of the WTO. Just as the New Deal weakened regulatory competi-
tion among the states by providing the national government with expanded regulatory authority,
see Sunstein, supra note 16o, at 504-05 (suggesting that in the New Deal, the United States aban-
doned localism and competition among the states), an international commission would weaken
regulatory competition among nation states. After the New Deal, interest groups gained a more
substantial capacity to influence the regulatory agenda because federal agencies afforded them
one-stop shopping and removed much of the restraint of jurisdictional competition. Similarly, an
international commission would give interest groups greater capacity to press for global standards
that favor them at the expense of the public welfare.
313 See supra pp. 531-32.
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institutions,314 these fora are both more familiar and more accountable
than international bodies. 315 As a result, the regulations they adopt
are less likely to abrade local nerves and generate animosity toward
the free trade regime than global standards formulated by an interna-
tional body. In addition, as we have shown, allowing nations to adapt
their own standards to local tastes and levels of development encour-
ages economic growth and jurisdictional competition that will ulti-
mately lead to better regulatory measures.
31 6
Second, the antidiscrimination model is less susceptible to capture
by interest groups, including protectionist interest groups, than an in-
ternational regulatory model would be. An antidiscrimination model
does not require an administrative agency or commission to formulate
regulations. It requires only a tribunal to determine the validity of
members' regulations under a series of substantially determinate rules
set forth in WTO instruments. 317  These rules limit the tribunal's dis-
cretion and make interest group lobbying less effective.
To be sure, no set of rules can remove all discretion from a tribu-
nal.3 18 Nevertheless, interest groups do not enjoy the same advantages
in reshaping legal rules to their benefit when they petition a tribunal
that they do in more open-ended commission processes resembling
those of a legislature or administrative agency. The marginal effec-
tiveness of additional expenditures on lobbying is lower at a tribunal
than at a policymaking commission, because a tribunal operates under
more constraints on its decisionmaking process and more barriers to
interest group influence. 319
The principal means of influencing a tribunal is a legal brief. Be-
yond a certain point, spending more resources on a brief provides lit-
tle, if any, return. At some point, more money cannot make a brief
314 See supra pp. 526-27.
315 See Stephan, supra note 262, at 699.
316 For these arguments, see above at pp. 559-60.
317 For a detailed discussion of such rules, see below at section IV.A, pp. 573-83.
318 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making,
75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 963 (1995); Robert P. George, One Hundred Years of Legal Philosophy, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1533, 1546-47 (1999).
319 While the DSU provides for essentially automatic adoption and enforcement of final rulings,
see supra pp. 531-32, one can conceive of less formal versions of a tribunal. Indeed, before adop-
tion of the DSU, rulings of GATT dispute settlement panels did not have automatic effect. Rulings
took effect only when the entire voting GATT membership approved of them; if they wished, los-
ing parties could block adoption of adverse panel reports. See Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine,
36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 396-97 (i996).
The DSU's move to "automaticity" has occasioned great controversy. See Movsesian, supra
note i, at 791-95 & n.io8. For our purposes, however, the most important distinction is not be-
tween more and less formal tribunals, but between a tribunal that reviews national laws and a cen-
tralized bureaucracy with the power to establish global regulatory standards.
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more persuasive.3 20  In contrast, a commission's more open-ended de-
cisionmaking process permits almost limitless avenues for interest
group influence. Contributions can become larger, and political pres-
sure can be brought to bear on both commissioners and those who ap-
point them.3 21 In such a system, promises and threats grow more ef-
fective in direct proportion to the power of the interest group making
them.3 22 Moreover, because political inputs are necessary to ensure the
legitimacy of policymaking bodies, a commission's personnel cannot be
insulated as effectively from political pressure as the members of a tri-
bunal. 323
In addition to blunting interest group pressure, the WTO's new ad-
judicative structure may have positive effects on members' compliance
with international trade obligations. 324 The consent of a losing party
is no longer required for adoption of a WTO ruling, as it was under
the old regime. Rather, a ruling takes effect automatically in the ab-
sence of a unanimous contrary vote by the entire WTO membership;
stalling is no longer an option.325 Appellate review further promotes
the regular application of determinate rules, which will in turn en-
courage members to live up to their trade obligations. 3 26
320 Cf Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All?, 21
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 226-27 (1997) (showing that a litigant faces diminishing marginal
returns from additional expenditures on lawyers).
321 See id. at 228.
322 Professor Merrill observes that the more an interest group spends, "the greater the expected
value of the legislative output." Id.
323 Therefore, scholars are wrong to suggest that the same arguments that support international
trade institutions also require international institutions that would set environmental standards.
For an example of such scholarship, see Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global
Economy, 83 VA. L. REV. 1283, 1318 (1997), asserting that "[t]he same kinds of imperfections
which suggest the need for legally protecting free trade ... also tend to support efforts to harmo-
nize or coordinate environmental regulations." Rules prohibiting protectionism can be laid down
largely in advance and can then be implemented by a tribunal. In contrast, determining the con-
tent of environmental rules requires an institution with substantial policymaking power. Once it
acquires such power, a policymaking institution requires continual political input to remain ac-
countable and legitimate. This political input will in turn, however, exacerbate the undue influ-
ence of interest groups. Thus, the case for international trade institutions is stronger than that for
international environmental institutions: basic juridical institutions can promote trade, but setting
international environmental standards requires policymaking institutions. For further discussion
of the need for political accountability to protect the legitimacy of policymaking bodies, see above
at pp. 563-64.
324 See Movsesian, supra note r, at 792. The WTO's potential to promote compliance has been
the subject of heated debate. See id. at 791-95. For a more complete description of the WTO's
adjudicative system, see above at pp. 531-32.
325 Of course, a unanimous contrary vote is extremely unlikely, given that the winning party
would have to disavow its own victory in order for opposition to be unanimous. See supra pp.
531-32.
326 See Movsesian, supra note i, at 791-92.
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Of course, members may choose to keep their laws, whatever the
WTO decides, and accept retaliation from their trading partners.
327
Indeed, one would expect members to resist compliance with adverse
rulings when the stakes are sufficiently high. 328 The existence of this
"escape hatch," however, constitutes an advantage of the WTO system.
A more coercive system would create greater friction with national
governments and might instigate a backlash against the trade regime.
In addition, the ability of members to retain their regulations despite
adverse rulings serves as a useful check against overreaching by the
WTO.
We also recognize that some have objected to the WTO's adjudica-
tive system because of its "democratic deficit."3 29 Critics decry the fact
that the WTO has authority to invalidate laws enacted by national
legislatures which, unlike WTO panelists, remain accountable to the
citizens who elect them. 330 One cannot, however, assess whether a sys-
tem reinforces democracy as a whole by simply summing up the de-
mocracy quotient of each of its constituent parts. The United States
constitutional system has rights, and procedures for enforcing those
rights, that are insulated from majority will. Yet, as John Hart Ely
has argued, such nonmajoritarian institutions ensure that American
democracy flourishes.331
Critics also suggest that to remedy this "democratic deficit," the
WTO should allow nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to partici-
pate in both policymaking and the dispute settlement process. 3 2 With
regard to policymaking, critics argue that the organization should al-
low NGOs to attend meetings of the General Council and working
committees; some even argue that the WTO should allow NGOs to sit
327 See supra p.532.
328 Movsesian, supra note i, at 817.
329 Esty, supra note 295, at 715 (quoting Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Committee on the Regions
and the Role of Regional Governments in the European Union, 2o HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 413, 420 (i997)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Atik, supra note 129, at 230, 236-39;
Dillon, supra note 129, at 248.
330 See Housman, supra note 2, at 730-31.
331 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18i
(i98o) (arguing that the United States Supreme Court is capable of democracy-reinforcing judicial
review).
332 Esty, supra note 295, at 715, 727-28 (quoting Roht-Arriaza, supra note 329, at 420) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Charnovitz, supra note 132, at 331 ("Nongovernmental organi-
zations ... should be given opportunities to participate in the work of the World Trade Organiza-
tion ... ."); Ragosta, supra note 135, at 751-52; Shell, supra note 29, at 907-25; G. Richard Shell,
The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organiza-
tion, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 359, 376 (1996) [hereinafter Shell, Trade Stakeholders Model];
Mark Edward Foster, Note, Trade and Environment: Making Room for Environmental Trade
Measures Within the GATT, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 393, 435-37 (998).
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in on multilateral trade negotiations. 333 With regard to dispute settle-
ment, they argue that the WTO should allow NGOs to file amicus
briefs as a matter of right, rather than at the discretion of a panel, as is
now the case. 334  Some would go even further, arguing that NGOs
should have "standing to initiate ... proceedings as complaining par-
ties."335
Critics believe that greater NGO participation would enhance the
legitimacy of the WTO by airing the views of people around the world
who care deeply about trade-related issues.336 Among these people are
environmentalists, consumer and human rights advocates, and mem-
bers of labor unions.337  For a variety of reasons, critics claim, gov-
ernments often fail to present these views to the WTO. 33 8 NGOs can
correct that error by ensuring that the organization hears from groups
that reflect the "richness and diversity of civil society. '3
39
Moreover, critics argue, NGO participation would foster trust in
the WTO because NGOs would educate their members about the or-
ganization. 340 Environmentalists, for example, are more likely to rely
on NGOs to explain the impact of WTO policies and rulings than on
government agencies or the WTO itself.34 1 Therefore, by excluding
NGOs, the WTO risks losing the public support that it desperately
needs to carry out its mission. 342
333 See Charnovitz, supra note 132, at 34o-48; Esty, supra note 295, at 727-29; see also Kevin C.
Kennedy, The Illegality of Unilateral Trade Measures to Resolve Trade-Environment Disputes, 22
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 375, 423-25 (1998) (discussing arguments regarding NGO
participation). The WTO already allows NGOs to attend plenary sessions of ministerial meetings.
Over 8oo NGOs attended the Seattle ministerial conference. See Stewart & Karpel, supra note
138, at 627. Still, WTO guidelines do not allow NGOs "to be directly involved in the work of the
WTO or its meetings." WORLD TRADE ORG., WTO GUIDELINES FOR ARRANGEMENTS ON RELA-
TIONS WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, WTJL/162 (July i8, 1996), http://www.
wto.org/english/forums.e/ngo-e/guide-e.htm.
334 See Ragosta, supra note 135, at 754-56. For more on the WTO's treatment of amicus briefs,
see Steve Charnovitz, The Globalization of Economic Human Rights, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 113,
123 (i999); Eric L. Richards & Martin A. McCrory, The Sea Turtle Dispute: Implications for Sover-
eignty, the Environment, and International Trade Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 295, 334-35 (2000);
and Stewart & Karpel, supra note 138, at 625-27.
335 Kennedy, supra note 333, at 424; see Shell, supra note 29, at 838.
336 See Esty, supra note 295, at 716-I9; see also Shell, Trade Stakeholders Model, supra note 332,
at 370, 377-78; cf Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in
International Decision-Making Institutions, 18 WASH. Q. 45, 46 0995) ("Bringing NGOs more
deeply into the fold of international institutions ... could enhance the legitimacy of those institu-
tions. .. ").
337 See Shell, supra note 29, at 838; Shell, Trade Stakeholders Model, supra note 332, at 376.
338 See Esty, supra note 295, at 718-i9; see also Charnovitz, supra note 132, at 352-54; Shell,
Trade Stakeholders Model, supra note 332, at 381.
339 Esty, supra note 295, at 718.
340 See Charnovitz, supra note 132, at 351; Esty, supra note 295, at 717.
341 Esty, supra note 295, at 717; cf Wallach, supra note 135, at 776 (describing the Clinton Ad-
ministration's positive "spin" on a WTO ruling that many environmentalists found objectionable).
342 Charnovitz, supra note 132, at 331, 35 1.
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Finally, critics believe that NGOs can help mitigate a pro-trade
bias that characterizes WTO decisionmaking. 343  By describing the
impact of trade on the environment, for example, NGOs can supply
panelists with a necessary context for their rulings.344 NGOs can ac-
complish this task more effectively than can government agencies,
critics claim, because of NGOs' often superior expertise and their free-
dom from bureaucratic constraints.
345
We do not agree that the WTO should allow NGOs a direct role in
the dispute settlement process. Such a role would give NGOs -
groups that are sometimes unaccountable even to their own member-
ships - too great a measure of influence. 346  Moreover, conferring
standing on NGOs would inevitably aggrandize the WTO's bureauc-
racy, which would acquire power to designate which of the many
NGOs with an interest in a dispute could appear.347 We are also skep-
tical of claims that NGOs should be able to file amicus briefs as a mat-
ter of right.348 Even in the United States Supreme Court, organiza-
tions that do not have the permission of the parties need leave of the
Court to file amicus briefs. 349 Furthermore, in the international con-
text, there is a risk that amicus briefs will overshadow the submissions
of developing countries, a problem that generally does not exist in the
domestic context.350
Similarly, permitting NGOs a role in policymaking would allow in-
terest groups, including protectionist groups, to distort the world trade
regime and exacerbate the power and access differentials between the
developed and developing worlds.3-' In short, providing NGOs with
special access would undermine the key benefits of a properly con-
343 See id. at 354-55 (arguing that NGOs should have the right to make presentations to panels
because of the WTO's lack of attention to environmental issues).
344 See id. at 355; see also Dillon, supra note 129, at 208 (arguing that the present dispute settle-
ment system "suppresses significant contextual issues surrounding the particular dispute").
345 See Esty, supra note 295, at 721-22.
346 See Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organization, 17 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 85 i, 870 (1996). On NGOs' lack of accountability to their memberships, see
Spiro, supra note 253, at 963.
347 For example, "hundreds, if not thousands," of international and national NGOs "deal with
environmental issues." Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization
Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 319 (1996). As Nichols
points out, however, WTO panels "cannot possibly hear from thousands of groups." Id. Someone
- presumably someone in the WTO - will need to decide which of these groups may appear in a
dispute involving an environmental question. The process of choosing among them "will involve
normative and evaluative decisions that will be, at best, judgmental and, at worst, arbitrary." Id.
348 Currently, NGOs may submit amicus briefs to WTO panels at the panels' discretion. See
supra p. 570.
349 SUP. CT. R. 37.3(b).
350 Cf. Ragosta, supra note 135, at 756 & n.69 (discussing developing countries' concerns about
this risk).
351 We discuss these power imbalances above at pp. 556-57.
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structed international trade regime - mechanisms that reduce the
power of interest groups in order to permit trade and democracy to
flourish.
IV. A JURISPRUDENCE OF COVERT PROTECTIONISM
Having demonstrated the advantages of the antidiscrimination
model, we now develop a jurisprudence that would allow the WTO to
distinguish between labor, environmental, health, and safety measures
that are genuine and those that are merely disguised attempts at im-
port discrimination. In our view, the WTO generally should employ a
series of procedure-oriented tests that screen for covert protectionism.
These tests would reveal whether an ostensibly neutral measure was
actually designed to place burdens on imports and would do so with-
out supplanting national judgments on labor, health, safety, and the
environment. In addition, the tests would improve domestic democ-
racy by limiting the power of interest groups to advance protectionist
measures that detract from the general welfare. 352
Although, as we shall see, the WTO has incorporated many of the
factors we recommend, no one has yet offered a theory justifying those
factors or discouraging the WTO from adopting others. Without a
comprehensive theory, it will be easy for the WTO to go astray in the
future, particularly given the pressure to adopt the regulatory model.
Before describing our theory, however, we need to define generally
the subset of labor, environmental, health, and safety regulations that
constitute covert protectionism. In our view, a measure qualifies as
covert protectionism if it has two characteristics. First, the measure
must be one that would not have been enacted but for the benefits it
gives domestic industries by restraining imports.35 3 Second, the meas-
ure must lack a public interest foundation.
35 4
352 As we discuss below at pp. 574-75, by increasing the transparency of nations' regulations,
our jurisprudence will have the useful by-product of restraining interest groups more generally.
353 For example, assume that European farmers, and only European farmers, employ an agricul-
tural method that the European Commission believes to endanger human health. Assume further
that the European Commission is incorrect; that is, that the method poses no risks to human
health. A European regulation banning the sale of crops grown with the method might not be
wise, but it would not constitute covert protectionism. As the regulation would affect only Euro-
pean farmers, one could hardly see it as directed at foreign competition.
354 Assume another set of facts; namely, that American farmers, and only American farmers,
employ an agricultural method that the European Commission believes to be dangerous. Assume
that the Commission is correct; that is, that the method does pose risks to human health. We
would not want the WTO to invalidate a European ban on the sale of crops grown with this
method, even if the Commission would not have banned their sale if European farmers also em-
ployed the method in question. Generally, the WTO should not invalidate good regulations simply
because they have bad motivations. That approach would invalidate useful legislation - a social
cost in itself - and also undermine support for free trade by targeting protections desired by a na-
tion's citizens.
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This second criterion may be subsumed as a practical matter by the
first. We shall see that governments often rely on "public interest" jus-
tifications to support measures that burden imports.35 5 When those
justifications are false, they raise an inference that the government's
real motive was to benefit domestic industry.356 If a government bans
the sale of foreign agricultural products on the ground that they are
dangerous, for example, and the products are in fact safe, the ban
might suggest that the government was really trying to protect domes-
tic farmers. However one employs the public interest requirement -
either as an independent criterion or as an indication of protectionist
motive - the WTO should avoid invalidating measures that serve
some bona fide public welfare function.
A. Rules for Identifying Covert Protectionism
Having defined the kind of regulations that the WTO should pro-
hibit, we now describe the tests that will best enable the organization
to identify those regulations in a manner that reinforces rather than
detracts from democratic accountability. To begin, the WTO should
require that labor, environmental, health, and safety regulations af-
fecting international trade be transparent and performance-oriented.
The transparency principle requires that domestic regulations provide
fair notice to affected firms. In other words, a government should of-
fer affected firms an opportunity to comment on regulations before
they take effect. In addition, a government should publicize the terms
of regulations in some accessible manner after they take effect. 357 Per-
formance orientation requires that labor, environmental, health, or
safety standards be expressed in terms of the objectives the standards
seek to accomplish rather than the production processes that the regu-
lated industries must employ.35 8
355 See Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures Against Foreign
Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 95, 136 (Jagdish Bhagwati &
Robert E. Hudec eds., '996) (noting that "this sort of disguise is frequently practiced by national
governments on behalf of domestic industries").
356 See Sykes, supra note 25, at 17.
357 See Catherine Curtiss & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, United States-Latin American Trade
Laws, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. II1, 117-18 (1995) ("Transparency means that measures
affecting trade must be known to those affected, through notice and publication of standards and
procedures."); Spaulding, supra note 227, at 1136-37 (defining transparency and "citizen rights-to-
know" similarly). Other commentators define transparency more broadly to include the require-
ment that regulations affecting foreign products be consistent in their objectives with regulations
that affect comparable domestic products. See Jonathan T. Fried, Two Paradigms for the Rule of
International Trade Law, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 39, 49 (994). We use the more limited definition here
and address the requirement of consistency separately. See infra pp. 575-76.
358 Cf Patti Goldman, The Legal Effect of Trade Agreements on Domestic Health and Environ-
mental Regulation, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 11, 13-14 (1992) (noting the decision of a GATT dis-
pute resolution panel that the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act violated GATT because it was
2o00
HARVARD LAWREVIEW
The requirements of transparency and performance orientation re-
duce the potential for covert protectionism by increasing the likelihood
that national regulations will affect domestic and foreign producers
equally, helping to ensure that both kinds of producers face similar
regulatory costs. 35 9 Foreign firms may have greater difficulty com-
plying with generally applicable regulations simply because the firms
are less familiar with the ways of domestic bureaucracy. Transparency
levels the playing field by ensuring that regulations are publicized and
the steps for compliance are clear.360 Similarly, because production
processes often differ from country to country, regulations framed in
terms of processes could easily discriminate against foreign producers.
Performance standards avoid this problem by focusing on a product's
use, which is likely to be the same at home and abroad.
3 61
The transparency and performance-orientation requirements also
reduce the likelihood of interest group capture of the legislative pro-
cess, thus facilitating representative democracy while advancing free
trade. Opaque legislation helps interest groups by raising the price
that the public must pay to understand the legislation's terms. 362 By
requiring clarity and accessibility, the transparency requirement would
impede this interest group strategy.363 Moreover, by giving importer
not based on product characteristics, but instead focused on the process by which the product was
harvested).
359 See Robert L. McGeorge, The Pollution Haven Problem in International Law: Can the In-
ternational Community Harmonize Liberal Trade, Environmental and Economic Development
Policies?, 12 WIS. INT'L L.J. 277, 341 (1994) ("If domestic and foreign producers of a particular
product would incur similar costs in producing goods satisfying the higher internal standards, the
higher standards would not adversely affect the competitive relationship between domestic and
foreign producers."). Of course, regulations rarely impose perfectly equal effects on regulated com-
panies. For instance, if, as is likely, foreign companies have lower sales volumes within a given
country than do that country's own domestic companies, the domestic companies may gain advan-
tages in the market through their greater economies of scale in complying with regulations. See
Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experience,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329, 1334 (1992). Nevertheless, a substantially equal incidence of regu-
lation on domestic industry gives one comfort that the regulation does not amount to covert protec-
tionism. If domestic industry pays costs as well, it gives foreign producers some virtual representa-
tion in the domestic political processes that lead to the regulation and provides some assurance that
the regulation is not discriminatory.
360 See Edward A. Laing, Equal Access/Non-Discrimination and Legitimate Discrimination in
International Economic Law, 14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 246, 296-97 (1996) (understanding the transpar-
ency requirement as a means of preventing discrimination against foreign products).
361 See Steve Charnovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and Their Application to En-
vironmental Trade Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 316-i9 (I994). Another advantage of per-
formance standards is that they encourage innovation by promoting industrial techniques that im-
prove performance. See Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less
Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547,573 (979).
362 See supra pp. 547-48.
363 Cf. Bello, supra note 114, at 418 (explaining that some interest groups oppose the WTO be-
cause the regime makes it harder for interest groups to hide the inefficiencies of their favored
regulations); Hansen, supra note 214, at lO63 (observing that "[i]n the case of environmental trade
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groups notice and allowing them to comment on regulations, the
transparency requirement would give virtual representation to diffuse
groups, such as consumers, who would benefit from low cost imports
but might otherwise not be well represented in the regulatory process.
The performance-orientation requirement would do likewise by en-
suring that legislation is structured in terms of goals rather than pro-
cesses: the public generally understands substantive goals more readily
than administrative processes. 364
In addition, the transparency and performance-orientation re-
quirements would not intrude on the substance of national decisions
about labor, the environment, health, or public safety because a nation
can make a regulation more transparent and performance-oriented
without changing its essential content. 365 Indeed, by promoting firms'
compliance, the transparency requirement could actually serve to ad-
vance a regulation's objectives.
The transparency and performance-orientation requirements, how-
ever, would not be sufficient to prevent all instances of covert protec-
tionism. In some circumstances, only foreign firms make a given
product. Thus, the weight of a regulation directed at that product,
even a transparent regulation expressed in terms of performance stan-
dards, would fall only on foreign firms. As we have seen, this ine-
quality of incidence offers the opportunity for disguised protectionism.
In these circumstances, the WTO should apply a consistency re-
quirement, examining whether the regulation is consistent with regula-
tions affecting comparable domestic products. 366 For example, if a
country bans the sale of certain food imports on the ground that they
pose a risk of cancer, the WTO should examine whether the country
also bans the sale of domestic food products that present similar risks.
If a country fails to apply neutral principles to similarly situated do-
measures, a measure that fails to reveal the specific level of environmental protection sought is far
more susceptible to political capture than a rule that transparently reveals the importing state's
specific environmental objective").
364 Cf. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J.
I, 30-31 (1992) (discussing agencies' incentives to increase regulatory complexity and thus become
less susceptible to public monitoring and control).
365 Cf Alan 0. Sykes, Externalities in Open Economy Antitrust and Their Implications for In-
ternational Competition Policy, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 95-96 (ig) (noting that substan-
tive differences are "permitted under an agreement that merely requires non-discrimination, trans-
parency, and due process").
366 See Warren H. Maruyama, A New Pillar of the WTO: Sound Science, 32 INT'L LAW. 65 1,
670-71 (1998) (discussing the consistency requirement under article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement);
Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-science Organization": Scien-
tific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 251, 269-70 (1998) (same); Michele D. Carter, Note, Selling Science Under the SPS
Agreement: Accommodating Consumer Preference in the Growth Hormones Controversy, 6 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 625, 647-48 (i997) (same).
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mestic products, the omission should raise an inference that the coun-
try is engaging in covert protectionism.
3 6 7
Like the transparency and performance-orientation requirements, a
consistency requirement would reduce the power of protectionist inter-
est groups. If regulations affecting foreign producers must comport
with regulations affecting similarly situated domestic producers, those
domestic producers gain an interest in preventing unduly burdensome
regulations on the foreign producers.3 68 The consistency requirement
would thus help reduce the ability of concentrated groups to secure
regulations for themselves at the expense of the public interest.
Of course, to assess the consistency of regulations, the WTO would
need to identify the public policies that the regulations serve.369 As a
result, the consistency requirement would intrude somewhat more on
the policymaking role of nation states than would the transparency
and performance-orientation requirements. Nevertheless, the WTO
would not need to assess the wisdom of public policy justifications. It
would take the public policy values as a given and decide whether
regulations on similar subjects consistently reflect those values.
Moreover, if the WTO did invalidate a regulation for inconsistency, the
nation could revise the regulation as long as it did so under a more
neutral and principled regulatory framework.
A jurisprudence composed of these three requirements - transpar-
ency, performance orientation, and consistency - should eliminate
most instances of covert protectionism. Nonetheless, other potentially
troubling scenarios remain. Suppose that only American farmers use a
given method in cultivating an agricultural product, and the European
Commission believes that the method introduces contaminants that
render the product harmful to human health. On this basis, the
Commission restricts the sale of all batches produced using the method
367 See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-
Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1422-25 (1994) (describing
instances of "spurious product" distinctions as indicative of protectionism, even when regulations
are facially neutral).
368 The United States Supreme Court has relied on a similar insight in dormant commerce
clause cases. In that context, the Court often asks whether legislation burdens "in-state economic
interests ... to a similar extent as out-of-state economic interests; where such parity exists, the
Court will be less likely to find impermissibly protectionist legislation." Richard H. Pildes, The
Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 16O5, 162o n.67 (1999). In these circumstances,
the Court believes that in-state groups have an incentive to lobby against abusive legislation. See
Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 1004-
05 (1998); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (ig8i) ("The ex-
istence of major in-state interests adversely affected by the Act is a powerful safeguard against
legislative abuse.").
369 Cf. Maruyama, supra note 366, at 671 (describing how the Appellate Body of the WTO relied
on an assessment of the European Community's motives for banning beef containing growth hor-
mones in order to decide whether the ban was a case of regulatory protectionism).
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in question. The restriction is transparent, performance-oriented, and
consistent with other European health regulations. Finally, suppose
that the Commission is wrong; that is, that the method in question
does not render the product dangerous for human consumption.
This scenario presents the WTO with a difficult dilemma. On the
one hand, the fact that the product is not actually harmful may suggest
that the restriction is a disguised attempt to protect European produc-
ers. On the other hand, evaluating the public interest bona fides of la-
bor, environmental, health, and safety regulations would create signifi-
cant friction with members' sovereign decisions on national welfare
and would require the WTO to make substantive decisions for which
it is not well suited.3 70
A procedure-oriented approach would help solve this dilemma.
The WTO could require members to support their contentions that
products cause harm to the environment or public health with some
modicum of objective evidence. 37 1  For example, the organization
could require that members justify trade restrictive measures with sci-
entific studies.3 7 2 The requirement should not be too stringent, how-
ever. For instance, members would not necessarily need to conduct
their own studies; they could rely on those carried out by other mem-
bers or by international bodies. Moreover, members would retain a
great deal of discretion in determining how best to respond to scientific
evidence regarding a particular trade restrictive measure. Studies on
the safety of a given product may support a variety of reasonable pol-
icy judgments, some more cautious than others.3 73 In any event, the
point would not be to second-guess members' policy judgments.3 7 4
The WTO would simply confirm that members had some objective
basis for their restrictions on imports. The organization would thus
verify that proffered public interest justifications were not merely dis-
guises for discrimination.
An objective evidence requirement, like the other procedure-
oriented tests we have discussed, would weaken the power of protec-
tionist interest groups, thereby reinforcing domestic democracy. First,
370 For discussion of the reasons why the WTO should refrain from making substantive regula-
tory decisions, see above at section IH.B., pp. 552-66.
371 Cf ESTY, supra note 25, at 117-21, 235 (arguing for a "legitimacy" test that turns on the sci-
entific basis for environmental measures).
372 See Sykes, supra note 25, at 17 (discussing the "sham principle" and scientific evidence); see
also Kennedy, supra note 213, at 456 (discussing the "scientific evidence" requirement under the
SPS Agreement); Maruyama, supra note 366, at 663 (same).
373 Scientific opinion may be divided, for example. Even when there is a clear majority opinion
among experts on a product's safety, the presence of dissenting views may justify the position that
prudence nevertheless requires restrictions on sale. For discussion of these matters see, for exam-
ple, Kennedy, supra note 2 13, at 456; and Walker, supra note 366, at 262-63.
374 See Howse, supra note 135, at 156.
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it would create incentives for nations to bring experts into their regula-
tory processes, thus offering some objective barrier to interest group
pressures. 37 5 Second, by requiring that members illuminate the factual
bases for their regulations, an objective evidence requirement would
make it more difficult for interest groups to mislead the general pub-
lic. 3 76
Once a nation provides reasonable support for its regulation, the
WTO should not engage in a further, searching inquiry into the bona
fides of the nation's public interest justifications. One way of ex-
plaining our choice of this deferential standard is in terms of what are
called "type I" and "type II" errors. A type I error is a false positive,
377
which occurs when a nation enacts a regulation that does not consti-
tute covert protectionism, but the WTO nonetheless invalidates the
measure. A type II error is a false negative, 378 in this context an im-
proper acquiescence in covert protectionism. Increasing the standard
of review would decrease type II errors but would increase type I er-
rors because the WTO would invalidate rules even with substantial
evidentiary support. The question whether to raise the standard of re-
view beyond a deferential one is as follows: does the more searching
inquiry reduce the costs of the sum of type I and type II errors after
subtracting for any increased administrative costs? This calculation in
turn depends on the frequency of type I and type II errors generated
by a deferential standard and the relative costs of each kind of error.
First, if we are right that the previous three tests - transparency,
performance orientation, and consistency - will succeed in ferreting
out most covert protectionism, type II errors should be relatively rare,
thus decreasing the marginal benefits of such an inquiry. Second, the
costs of a type I error will be quite high because, as a result of the er-
ror, the WTO would wrongly impugn a nation's regulatory deci-
375 Cf. Whitney Debevoise, Access to Documents and Panel and Appellate Body Sessions: Prac-
tice and Suggestions for Greater Transparency, 32 INT'L LANA. 817, 824 (r998) (arguing, in the con-
text of dispute settlement proceedings, that the use of "expert review groups" could counter interest
groups' submission of "misleading or... false information").
376 The "hard look" doctrine, which "require[s] that agencies offer detailed explanations for their
actions," serves a similar purpose in American administrative law. Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 491 (1997). By forcing agencies to publicize the reasons for
their decisions, the doctrine helps limit the power of interest groups to capture agency processes
and subvert them to their own ends. Id.; see Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect
Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 933 (1990);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 61-63 (985).
377 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477, 1504 (999) (defining a T ype I error).
378 See id. (defining a Type II error).
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sion3 9 Administrative costs would also rise because the parties and
the tribunal would have to expend more effort and hire more experts
to sift carefully through conflicting evidence. This requirement would
be particularly problematic for developing nations that lack the re-
sources for this kind of inquiry.. Thus, given this framework of analy-
sis, deference should go to the nation's own assessment of the risks.
As in administrative law generally, the actual language the tribunal
uses ("modicum.of evidence," "reasonable support," etc.) is less impor-
tant than the spirit of deference in which it conducts the inquiry.
38 0
For similar reasons, we believe that a "least restrictive means test"
might also be useful - but only if deployed with substantial deference
to members' regulatory choices. 38 1 A least restrictive means test would
allow the WTO to inquire whether there were other measures that
could have achieved the same policy goals but interfered with imports
to a lesser degree.382  If there were such alternatives, the WTO might
conclude that the member had chosen the more trade-restrictive option
because it benefited domestic producers.
For instance, consider this hypothetical. A member state requires
the manufacturers of a somewhat risky product to post a bond cover-
ing the costs of injury and refuses to allow importers to post the bond
in lieu of manufacturers. This restriction might well pass the four tests
we have established 38 3 and yet still be protectionist if manufacturers
from the developing world were unable to obtain bonds because of
their inefficient financial markets. A least restrictive means test would
condemn the regulation because the member state could accomplish its
objective - maintaining a fund for those injured - by imposing li-
ability on importers.
A least restrictive means requirement has some appeal. In many
cases, the fact that a nation had chosen a regulation that unnecessarily
restricted trade would suggest a protectionist purpose. Moreover, a
379 Cf. Howse, supra note 135, at 156 (arguing that trade tribunals should not second-guess the
judgments of nations in the context of SPS measures).
380 Cf Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a "Legislative History" of Agency
Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 291 (2000) (noting that courts show deference to an agency's own
interpretation of its regulations, despite varying formulations of the standard of review).
381 See Kennedy, supra note 213, at 459 (discussing the "'least trade restrictive' principle" under
GATT); Sykes, supra note 25, at 21-22 (discussing the least restrictive means requirement); cf
Schoenbaum, supra note 270, at 2 76-77 (arguing against the least restrictive means test in the con-
text of GATT article XX(b)).
382 Kennedy, supra note 213, at 458-59; see Maury D. Shenk, WTO Dispute Settlement Body -
Article XX Environmental Exceptions to GAT - National Treatment - Consistency with GATT
of U.S. Rules Regarding Imports of Reformulated Gasoline, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 669, 67 2-74 (1996).
383 The regulation in this example is transparent and focuses on the performance of the product.
The regulation could also satisfy the consistency requirement if it were consistent with regulations
that the nation applied to similar domestic risky products. It could satisfy the objective evidence
requirement if the product were indeed risky.
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least restrictive means requirement would entail only a limited exami-
nation of national programs. The WTO would not assess the value of
the public policy at issue and, assuming the nation had taken the least
trade-restrictive course, would permit the nation to pursue its desired
objectives. 3 4 A least restrictive means requirement would thus create
less friction than a straightforward cost-benefit analysis involving a di-
rect evaluation of national goals.385
Nonetheless, a least restrictive means requirement could still be de-
ployed in a manner that would provide too much discretion to the
WTO. 3 6 While not as intrusive as a cost-benefit analysis, an evalua-
tion of legislative alternatives - even "reasonably available" legisla-
tive alternatives - could involve sensitive judgments on the substance
of national regulatory agendas. Over time, a test that required the
WTO to assess the merits of competing regulatory proposals could en-
courage the development of a jurisprudence of "preferred" solutions to
labor, environmental, health, and safety issues. As we have shown,
this is just the sort of jurisprudence the organization should avoid.387
Thus, in employing the least restrictive means test, the WTO should
defer to the regulatory objectives of member states. It should deter-
mine that a less restrictive regulation is reasonably available only if the
regulation achieves essentially the same objective as the trade restric-
tive regulation while using essentially the same amount of resources
and not distorting any other objective.
The procedure-oriented jurisprudence we develop here would allow
the WTO to invalidate covertly protectionist measures without sup-
planting the substance of national regulatory policies. It could also
help shape emerging doctrine in other areas of WTO law. For exam-
ple, one perplexing question involves the standard of review that a
panel should apply to the factual determinations of national authori-
384 "A ... 'least trade-restrictive' test could work as an efficiency precept, forcing attention to
the means chosen to pursue environmental goals, without threatening the goals chosen." ESTY,
supra note 25, at48 n.1s; see also Sykes, supra note 25, at 22 (noting that the least restrictive means
principle allows governments to pursue their own chosen objectives).
385 See David A. Wirth, International Trade Agreements: Vehicles for Regulatory Reform?, 5997
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 331, 345 & n.42 (distinguishing between cost-benefit analysis and the least trade
restrictive requirement). For a proposal for a modified cost-benefit analysis with regard to envi-
ronmental measures, see ESTY, supra note 25, at 127-30.
386 See Howse, supra note 135, at 140 (noting that "[a] legal economist can always imagine a hy-
pothetical welfare-maximizing regulatory instrument that achieves a public purpose without resort
to trade restrictions").
387 Moreover, in some cases, the objectives of a least restrictive means requirement will be met
by the consistency requirement we discuss earlier. If a regulation burdens imports more than is
necessary to respond to some risk, the regulation will likely be inconsistent with regulations that
address similar risks created by domestic products.
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ties.3 8 8 The DSU provides that a panel should make "an objective as-
sessment of the facts of [a] case,"3 89 but it does not elaborate further,
and disputes have already arisen about the precise degree of deference
that a panel should give to the findings of national agencies.390 The
Appellate Body has so far failed to offer definitive guidance on the
question.39'
A procedure-oriented jurisprudence could be quite valuable in this
context. Rather than engage in a de novo review, a panel could in-
quire whether a national agency had employed transparent procedures
and considered all the evidence presented to it;392 the panel could also
apply a deferential "objective evidence" test of the sort we have dis-
cussed. The panel could thus assess the record in a case without dis-
paraging the factfinding ability (or veracity) of national authorities.
While its full development must await another occasion, such a proce-
dure-oriented approach to standard-of-review questions holds much
promise.
It is as important to understand what kinds of regulations our tests
would leave standing as to understand what kinds they would invali-
date. Our tests would permit nations to make their own trade-offs be-
tween labor, environmental, health, and safety goals on the one hand,
and economic growth on the other, so long as the nations do not dis-
criminate against imports. They would permit nations to accept scien-
tific judgments that other nations might reasonably believe are wrong
or ill-considered. In short, the tests would preserve space for autono-
mous democratic decisionmaking while insulating such decisionmaking
from the distortions of protectionist interest groups.
388 See generally Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of
Review, and Deference to National Governments, go AM. J. INT'L L. 193 (i996). Another sort of
standard-of-review question relates to the deference a panel should give to the legal determinations
of national bodies; for example, determinations that a measure comports with WTO rules. See
Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, i9 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1195,
1237 (1998). There seems to be little justification for deference to national legal determinations,
since that would inevitably lead to conflicting and self-serving interpretations that would under-
mine the integrity of the WTO's dispute settlement system. See id.
389 DSU, supra note io8, art. ii.
390 See Lichtenbaum, supra note 388, at 1237-42; Craig Thorn & Marinn Carlson, The Agree-
ment on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 841, 846-47 (2000).
391 Lichtenbaum, supra note 388, at 1243-44. One Appellate Body decision that attempts to
provide some guidance is Hormones, supra note 223. In that case, the Appellate Body noted that
an "objective assessment of the facts," id. 117 (quoting DSU, supra note io8, art. xi) (internal
quotation marks omitted), means neither de novo review nor "total deference," id. 17 (internal
quotation marks omitted), and added that a panel could not deliberately disregard, refuse to con-
sider, wilfully distort, or misrepresent the evidence put before it, id. 1 33. We discuss other as-
pects of the Hormones dispute below at pp. 599-600.
392 Cf Hormones, supra note 223, 133 (describing a similar test to determine whether a panel
has made an objective assessment of the facts of a case).
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Moreover, our tests would permit other measures that allow citi-
zens to express their concerns about nontrade values. For example, a
member could require-that imports bear marks of origin - familiar
declarations that goods are products of a foreign country.393 Similarly,
a member should be able to establish nondiscriminatory labeling re-
quirements that provide consumers with information about the charac-
teristics and environmental impact of products. 394  Finally, a member
could grant a subsidy directly to domestic producers, so long as it was
not targeted in a way that would impair benefits that other countries
legitimately expect from tariff concessions. 3 95
These sorts of measures would not raise as starkly the dangers of
interest group capture that we have identified. For example, while
origin marking and other labeling requirements might result in de-
creased market share for imports, they would do so only because they
help consumers exercise choice.3 96 If informed consumers prefer to
393 See GATT 1947, supra note 204, art. IX. A member could not discriminate among countries
in doing so, of course, and would also need to ensure that marking requirements do not "materi-
ally reduc[e]" the value of the foreign products. Id. art. IX(4 ). For discussions of some of the is-
sues raised by origin-marking requirements, see BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 98, § 3-i(a), at
267-69; and JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 99, at 535-37.
394 Labeling requirements would be subject to the provisions of two agreements we discuss at
length below, the TBT and SPS Agreements. The TBT Agreement provides that labeling re-
quirements must afford nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of other countries and must
not be "more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective," including the "protec-
tion of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment." TBT Agree-
ment, supra note 40, arts. 2.1-.2; see also id. Annex i(i) (defining "technical regulation" to include
labeling requirements). We have expressed concerns about too intrusive an application of the least
restrictive means requirement. See supra pp. 579-8o. The SPS Agreement, which applies to cer-
tain kinds of health and safety measures, requires nondiscriminatory treatment and that measures
be based on appropriate scientific evidence. SPS Agreement, supra note 39, arts. 2.2-3, 5.I; see
also id. Annex A(s) (defining SPS measures to include labeling requirements). For a discussion of
labeling under these various provisions, see Schoenbaum, supra note 27o, at 294-95; see also Ken-
nedy, supra note 6, at sos-o2.
395 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 98, § 1-4(e)(2), at IO3; Robert E. Hudec, A WTO Per-
spective on Private Anti-Competitive Behavior in World Markets, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 79, 90 &
n.16 (i999); Sykes, supra note 25, at 15. In some circumstances, subsidies may justify the imposi-
tion of countervailing duties by other countries. See id. at 15.
396 See Schoenbaum, supra note 270, at 295. Some have argued that labeling would be ineffec-
tive because of collective action problems. For example, even if an individual consumer would like
to pay more for a domestic product, his one purchase will have negligible impact unless other con-
sumers make the same choice. Because he cannot be sure what other consumers will do, he may
rationally decide to purchase the lower-priced import. See Howse, Workers' Rights, supra note
226, at 16o-6i (discussing labeling in the context of labor rights); see also Chang, supra note 25, at
2176-77 (discussing labeling in the context of environmental protection).
The decision to buy a domestic product rather than a lower-priced import, however, is in
most cases a low-cost one. It appears that low-cost decisions pose less of a collective action prob-
lem than higher-cost decisions in which there is more at stake. See John H. Aldrich, Rational
Choice and Turnout, 37 AM. J. POL. Sd. 246, 261 (1993) (observing that rational choice theory is
not suited to low-cost/low-benefit decisions). Indeed, the well-known paradox of voting suggests
that individuals may be willing to engage in low-cost acts to express themselves. See Dwight R.
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spend more money to "buy local," our model would not obstruct them;
our model seeks to prevent interest groups from imposing costs on con-
sumers by disguising protectionist legislation as legitimate regulation.
Similarly, although subsidies to domestic producers might serve protec-
tionist ends, they at least would have the advantage of being more
transparent than the subterfuges we address here. It is more difficult
for interest groups to hide direct transfers of cash than to mask the
protectionist goals of ostensibly neutral legislation. 397
Accordingly, the jurisprudence we recommend would be advanta-
geous for people both as consumers and as citizens. It would help en-
sure the availability of inexpensive products and would reduce the
power of concentrated groups to pursue their narrow, self-interested
agendas.
B. National Regulations and Extrajurisdictionality
Another important issue for the WTO is the nature of permissible
public interest justifications for regulations that adversely affect inter-
national trade. Our view is that nations must have authority to enact
regulations based on a broad variety of justifications, of which envi-
ronmental protection, labor, public health, and safety are only exam-
ples. The only restriction we would impose is that, with a few impor-
tant exceptions, public interest justifications must relate directly to the
welfare of the regulating nation itself and not the welfare of other na-
tions.
For example, assume a case involving two WTO members. The
first, presumably a developing country, exempts textile factories from
workplace safety regulations. The second, presumably a developed
country, has stringent workplace safety rules that do apply to textile
factories. After a campaign by labor and human rights advocates, the
second country enacts a measure banning the importation of textiles
from the first country; it argues that the ban is necessary to protect the
safety of textile workers in the first country. In our view, this ban
should not be permissible. Although WTO members should have- the
Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191, 192 (1988). For the
paradox of voting for the rational choice model, see MUELLER, supra note 58, at 349-50, which
explains that although individual votes have a negligible chance of affecting the outcome, millions
of people nevertheless vote. Thus, if consumers really have any substantial interest in expressing
themselves through their informed choice of products, it is not at all clear that collective action
problems would frustrate them. A failure to respond to labeling may simply demonstrate that con-
sumers are less offended by imports than environmental or other groups would like them to be.
397 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 469, 494 (2000) (explaining that a "subsidy makes explicit the actual cost of protection and thus
facilitates a conscious decision about whether the protection brings sufficient benefits to warrant
the costs and the redistributional consequences, whereas a total exclusion of competition places a
hidden cost on consumers in the form of higher prices").
20001
HARVARD LAWREVIEW
authority to take steps to protect their own citizens, they should not
have the authority to ban imports to protect citizens in the country of
export.
Both the breadth of permissible justifications and the jurisdictional
limit follow from our concern with promoting trade while reinforcing
democratic government. For reasons we have discussed, domestic
authorities can better determine the appropriate subject matter of
regulation than can international bodies.398 Domestic authorities are
more familiar with national tastes and traditions and, at least in demo-
cratic polities, more accountable to citizens than international bureauc-
racies.3 99 Moreover, as we have seen, allowing national authorities
discretion to shape regulatory policies will promote jurisdictional com-
petition that will ultimately improve the quality of regulations around
the globe. 4 ° °
Nevertheless, for some of the same reasons, nations should not gen-
erally be permitted to regulate on behalf of the welfare of people, or to
protect the environment, in places outside their jurisdictions. Domes-
tic authorities are not well positioned to assess the traditions and needs
of foreign citizens, nor are they easily accountable for the effects of
their decisions in foreign territory.40 1 Moreover, permitting a nation to
regulate to protect health, safety, workers, or the environment in an-
other jurisdiction would empower rather than restrain interest groups.
As-we have seen, nations that are at different levels of development
398 See supra section III.B.I-2, pp. 552-58. The advantages of allowing domestic institutions to
regulate domestic conduct often appear in connection with conflicts-of-laws issues. See, e.g., GARY
B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVILLITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 337 (3 d ed. 1996) (dis-
cussing conflicts of laws in the context of forum non conveniens doctrine).
399 See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 28o, 315 (1982) (noting the "principle of
territorial sovereignty," which allows one "to identify the governmental unit that is accountable to
its fellows for conduct carried on within its borders"); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmak-
ing: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2240
(1999) ("As a matter of accountability, when the government imposes rules of conduct on individu-
als, those rules ought to be made by members of the legislature who directly represent the people.").
We discuss the international trade regime and nondemocratic forms of government below at pp.
588-89.
400 See supra section III B.3, pp. 558-61.
401 According to one commentator:
[T]he legitimacy of applying a state's laws to conduct that occurs in another state's terri-
tory depends on whether such laws "would prevent [that] State from functioning as a
sovereign; that is, the extent to which such generally applicable laws would impede a
state government's responsibility to represent and be accountable to the citizens of the
State."
Developments in the Law-The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1687 (1999) (quoting
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992)); see also M.O. Chibundu, Making Customary
International Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
IO69, I 129 (1999) (noting that the concern for arbitrary actions by outsiders "renders the idea of
sovereignty a necessary legal concept in international law").
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will choose different levels of health, safety, labor, and environmental
protection. 40 2  As a result of these and other differences, some coun-
tries will be able to produce certain goods more efficiently than others.
Free trade allows all countries to take advantage of these differences
by importing goods from those countries that can produce them most
efficiently.40
3
Workers and owners in high-cost industries, however, would like
nothing better than to change the conditions that make foreign produc-
tion more efficient. 40 4 Extrajurisdictional justifications would allow
these groups to mask protectionist measures as legislation directed at
the welfare of foreign citizens. To be sure, some people are motivated
by genuine desires to better the lot of people around the world. But
altruism typically operates at shorter distances.405 We have reason to
suspect that citizens are more likely to protect their own interests than
those of foreigners, and that regulation that focuses only on the condi-
tion of foreigners is particularly likely to constitute covert protection-
ism.
40 6
Finally, permitting extrajurisdictional justifications would put the
WTO in an inescapable bind. If the WTO were to permit all such jus-
tifications, the international trade regime would unravel because
nothing would prevent interest groups from substituting "foreign wel-
fare" regulations for tariffs and overtly discriminatory legislation. If
the WTO were to attempt to choose among such justifications, it
would have to make sensitive judgments about the value of a justifica-
tion compared to its effect on free trade. Those substantive judgments
are precisely the kind that conflict with a democracy-reinforcing juris-
prudence. 407
Some scholars argue nonetheless that nations should be able to leg-
islate when citizens' "existence values" are injured by actions that take
place in other countries. 408 Existence values are the preferences people
402 Se-e supra pp. 552-53.
403 See supra pp. 521-22 (discussing the theory of comparative advantage).
404 For a discussion of the reasons why interest groups may achieve their goals, see above at pp.
523-25.
405 See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1510 (1987) (book review) (suggesting that the spirit of human benevolence operates
more surely at shorter distances).
406 Developing countries frequently raise this objection to linking trade and labor standards.
See Virginia A. Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GAT, ILO,
NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 355, at 177, 182.
407 See Howse, supra note 135, at 156 (arguing that international trade tribunals, which are "not
directly accountable to the democratic community in question," should not "second-guess[] the jus-
tification[si for regulatory outcomes").
408 Chang, supra note 25, at 266-7o. For a comprehensive, recently published survey of the
problems of existence values, see generally Donald Boudreaux, Roger E. Meiners & Todd J. Zy-
wicki, Talk is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765 (I9gg), which details the diffl-
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have for situations that do not immediately affect them.40 9 For exam-
ple, environmentalists in one country may derive a psychological bene-
fit from the knowledge that tropical forests exist in other countries, or
union activists from the knowledge that other countries protect labor
rights.410 If other countries deplete the forests to produce timber or
fail to protect workers in a given industry, these people suffer psycho-
logical injuries - even when the end products themselves are safe.411
Because these injuries occur at home, existence values do not qualify
as extrajurisdictional justifications. A nation that acts to protect exis-
tence values acts to protect the welfare of its own citizens, not those of
other countries. Indeed, one might view existence values as spillover
effects of a particularly elusive type. 412
In this context, existence values raise much the same concerns as
extrajurisdictional justifications. Indeed, as a practical matter, there
may be little difference between the two: a nation could recharacterize
any extrajurisdictional justification as a domestic existence value sim-
ply by arguing that a foreign practice offends its citizens. Even as-
suming that one could maintain a meaningful distinction, claims of in-
jured existence values should raise a great deal of suspicion in the
international context. People tend to care much more about their own
situations than others'. The danger that existence values are merely
serving as a disguise for something less admirable - protectionism -
is strong.
Prohibiting nations from restraining imports when conduct in other
countries injures existence values at home has analogs in domestic le-
gal traditions. In nuisance law, for example, one generally cannot sue
a neighbor for a practice one deems offensive unless the practice
causes tangible harm. 41 3 To permit psychological nuisance suits would
invite blackmail by allowing individuals to discover sensitivities and
trade their right not to have them offended for cash. To be sure, nui-
sance law does take account of psychological harm in some circum-
culty of measuring existence values and argues that their recognition in public policy leads to seri-
ous wealth losses.
409 Chang, supra note 25, at 2 166-67.
410 Id.
411 Regulations based on production processes raise other difficulties as well. Because produc-
tion processes often differ from country to country, regulations framed in terms of processes can
easily discriminate against foreign producers. We discuss these matters above at p. 574.
412 For a discussion of spillovers, see above at section III.B.4 , pp. 561-66.
413 See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBES, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 88, at 627-28 (5 th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND
KEETON]. Nuisance law allows persons to recover for interference with the use and enjoyment of
their land, but only when the interference is substantial and unreasonable. Id. at 626. Acts that
cause the plaintiff "mental annoyance" generally do not qualify as substantial and unreasonable
interference unless they "result[] in a depreciation in the market or rental value of the land." Id. at
627.
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stances. A plaintiff can bring a nuisance action for "personal discom-
fort" when "normal persons ... in the particular locality" would find a
practice seriously offensive or intolerable.4 14 But a "community stan-
dards" test breaks down in the international context, at least when it
comes to issues like the environment and labor. As we have seen,
countries have sharply divergent views on these subjects. 4 15
Of course, international "community standards" do exist with re-
gard to some subjects. Nations increasingly recognize some human
rights issues, including slavery, genocide, and war crimes, to be of
"universal concern." 4 16 Extrajurisdictional justifications that relate to
these sorts of issues would not raise the problems addressed here. By
definition, a trade ban that attacks a universally condemned practice
would not risk slighting the traditions or values of other nations.
Moreover, just as in domestic nuisance law, the existence of recognized
standards would provide a helpful check on the abuses of psychologi-
cal injury claims. Finally, while protectionist groups might use even
these justifications as a pretense for self-interested legislation, the con-
sequences would not be dire. Even if a trade ban did serve a paro-
chial interest in these circumstances, it would simultaneously advance
values on which the community of nations has agreed.
With an exception for globally recognized standards, then, we
would not allow nations to base trade restrictions on extrajurisdic-
tional justifications. Of course, refusing generally to recognize extraju-
risdictional justifications does not mean that the impulse behind such
measures is illegitimate. Nations would retain substantial authority to
take action to express the values of their citizens. For example, na-
tions can require domestic corporations to comply with national
health, safety, labor, and environmental regulations even when the
companies operate in foreign countries. 41 7  Moreover, citizens in any
nation can organize private boycotts of foreign products made using
methods that conflict with the citizens' values.4 18 Neither of these ap-
414 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 82 1 F cmt. D (i979); see also PROSSER AND KEETON,
supra note 413, § 88, at 627-28 (discussing the "normal persons" standard).
415 On the absence of an international consensus on environmental issues, see Winfried Lang, Is
the Protection of the Environment a Challenge to the International Trading System?, 7 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 473-75 0995); and Foster, supra note 332, at 407-10. On the absence of a
true consensus on labor issues, despite a recent International Labour Organisation (ILO) declara-
tion on "fundamental" labor rights, see Van Wezel Stone, supra note 267, at 107-08; and Erickson
& Mitchell, supra note 273, at 48-49.
416 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1986).
417 Bhagwati,supra note 237, at 482; see also Schoenbaum, supra note 270, at 279-80.
418 Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict?, in TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 159, 173 (Durwood Zaelke, Paul Orbuch & Robert F. Housman eds., 1993). Col-
lective action problems should not render boycotts ineffective. See supra note 396 (suggesting that
individuals will engage in low-cost behavior despite collective action problems).
2000]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
proaches would seriously frustrate the democracy and growth-
enhancing elements of the global trade regime.
C. The WTO and Nondemocratic Nations
We recognize that respecting the choices that each nation makes
within its jurisdiction would have the greatest moral force in a world
in which all governments were democratic. Of course, this world does
not yet exist. A growing number of countries are democratic, however
- certainly a majority of those nations currently participating in the
WTO. Even with respect to nations that are not presently democratic,
rules designed to advance an international trade regime can be justi-
fied in terms of democratic values because in the long run trade tends
to help democratize nations.4 19  The requirement of transparency, for
instance, makes regulations more visible to the public, thus facilitating
norms of greater government openness. 420 Moreover, authoritarian re-
gimes - communist China, for example - often depend on support
from interest groups like the military-industrial complex. 421 Structures
that limit the benefits these interest groups receive from protectionism
may thus help weaken authoritarian regimes.422
More generally, trade creates prosperity, and in the modern world
democracy and prosperity are highly correlated. 423 This correlation
may reflect an important political truth: as citizens become richer, they
increasingly demand more democracy and civil rights to protect their
wealth from the arbitrary actions of government. 424 Moreover, once a
nation has become democratic, economic growth clearly plays an im-
419 See Jim Chen, Globalization and Its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157, 170-71 (20o0).
420 See Spaulding, supra note 227, at I136-37.
421 Cf. Steven N.S. Cheung, Privatization vs. Special Interests: The Experience of China's Eco-
nomic Reforms, in ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 21, 30 (James A.
Dorn & Wang Xi eds., 199o) (discussing the manner in which interest groups with vested govern-
ment privileges impede reform).
422 See Chen, supra note 419, at 170.
423 See Robert J. Barro, Determinants of Democracy, 107 J. POL. ECON. S158, S158-6o, $163,
S182 (1999) (using regression analysis to demonstrate that prosperity is correlated with democracy);
see also TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 237, at 52 (noting that "democracy tends to be a
positive function of income"); John F. Helliwell, Empirical Links Between Democracy and Eco-
nomic Growth, 24 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 225, 233-35 (1994) (suggesting that increases in wealth
strengthen democracy). We must be careful not to make more of this correlation than the evidence
warrants. Some scholars, in fact, have suggested that dictatorships tend to become democracies
because of events unrelated to economic development. See Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez,
Jos6 Antonio Cheibub & Fernando Limongi, What Makes Democracies Endure?, in CONSOLI-
DATING THE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACIES: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 295, 296 (Larry Dia-
mond, Mark F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu & Hung-mao Tien eds., 1997). But to our knowledge, there
is no empirical evidence that economic growth retards the long-run development of democracy.
424 For an elaboration of the historical basis of this view, see generally John 0. McGinnis, A New
Agenda for International Human Rights: Economic Freedom, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1029 (1999).
[Vol. 114:511
THE WORLD TRADE CONSTITUTION
portant role in sustaining that form of government. 425 As a result, ap-
plying the rules of the international trade regime to nondemocratic and
democratic nations alike is consistent with the long-term goal of pro-
moting democratic sovereignty as well as economic growth.
426
V. THE WTO'S EARLY RECORD
This Part assesses the WTO's record in addressing covert protec-
tionism in the context of environmental, health, and safety regula-
tions. 427  We discuss three of the more important WTO instruments:
GATT, the SPS Agreement, and the TBT Agreement. Each of these
agreements establishes a framework for the WTO to use in deciding
whether particular environmental, health, and safety measures consti-
tute covert protectionism. Although the law is still at an early stage of
development - the WTO has decided only a handful of cases under
GATT and the SPS Agreement, and none at all under the TBT
Agreement - enough material exists to identify an emerging ap-
proach.
The WTO's approach largely comports with the democracy-
reinforcing jurisprudence we recommend. In attempting to uncover
protectionist motives for regulation, the WTO has relied on the proce-
dure-oriented factors we describe' in Part IV: transparency, the use of
performance rather than process standards, and consistency with other
environmental, health, and safety measures.4 28 In addition, the WTO
has employed a deferential version of the objective-evidence require-
ment. 429 Finally, the WTO has avoided making judgments about
members' environmental, health, or safety goals and has taken a dim
view of members' attempts to block imports in order to advance the
environment, health, or safety of other members. 430
The WTO may be departing from the Madisonian model, however,
by endorsing a least restrictive means requirement that does not give
sufficient deference to the policies of member states.431 As already
noted, a failure to defer to a country's choice of policies, including its
425 See Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi, supra note 423, at 296-97.
426 Free trade may also help democracy indirectly by helping to create the conditions for peace,
which in turn facilitates prosperity. See McGee, supra note 56, at 551 ("Countries that trade with
each other are less likely to go to war than are countries that erect trade barriers to prevent foreign
goods from crossing their borders.").
427 As we have discussed, the WTO's current agenda does not generally include labor issues.
See supra note 226.
428 See supra pp.573-76.
429 See infra p. 6oi.
430 See supra pp. 584-87.
431 See supra pp. 579-8o. The SPS and TBT Agreements expressly endorse this requirement,
and the WTO has applied it under the more general language of GATT as well. See infra pp. 594-
95, 598-99.
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allocation of resources, may undermine a democracy-reinforcing juris-
prudence by involving the WTO in assessing the wisdom of national
regulations. 432 In addition, the WTO has suggested that members may
be obligated to negotiate with affected countries and seek mutually ac-
ceptable solutions before adopting environmental measures that re-
strict trade. A duty to negotiate would involve the WTO in just the
sort of substantive standard-setting it should avoid. Judging whether
members have fulfilled their duty in this regard would require active
review of national environmental programs and could entangle the
WTO in the formation of domestic policy. Furthermore, a duty to ne-
gotiate would create incentives for stalling and holding out that would
ultimately undermine both global trade and environmental protection.
A. GATT
GATT generally prohibits member countries from banning im-
ports4 33 and in addition requires that members accord imports treat-
ment "no less favourable" than like domestic products once the imports
clear customs. 43 4 GATT's general exceptions clause, article XX, tem-
pers these restraints, however.435 For example, article XX(b) provides
an exception for measures "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health. '436 Article XX(g) provides a similar exception for
measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources. ' '437 Both of these exceptions are subject to an overarching re-
quirement set forth in the introductory clause of article XX, known as
the "chapeau":438 measures excused under subparagraphs (b) and (g)
may not be "applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade. " 439
The WTO has construed these articles in ways that generally com-
port with our Madisonian model. For example, the Shrimp-Turtles
case involved a set of American statutes and regulations, known col-
432 See supra pp. 579-80.
433 GATT 1947, supra note 204, art. XI.
434 Id. art. 111(4).
435 Id. art. XX. Other exceptions relate to measures necessary to protect public morals (art.
XX(a)), measures necessary to secure compliance with regulations that are not themselves inconsis-
tent with GATT (art. XX(d)), and measures relating to the products of prison labor (art. XX(e)).
Id. Article XXI provides exceptions necessary for the protection of members' essential security
interests. Id. art. XXI.
436 Id. art. XX(b).
437 Id. art. XX(g).
438 On the use of the term "chapeau" to refer to the "preambulatory conditions" of article XX,
see Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an "Aim and
Effects" Test, 32 INT'L LAW. 619, 637 (1998).
439 GATT 1947, supra note 204, art. XX.
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lectively as "section 609," that banned the importation of shrimp from
countries that did not protect sea turtles from incidental capture dur-
ing shrimp harvesting. 440 The ban allowed importation of shrimp only
from "certified" countries - countries that could demonstrate both
that they had adopted turtle-protective programs similar to those of
the United States and that their shrimp fishermen captured sea turtles
at a rate comparable to or less than that of the United States. 44'
The Appellate Body held that section 6og fell within article
XX(g)'s exception for conservation measures. 442 It took pains to note
that the species of sea turtles at issue are all found in United States
waters and that there was a "sufficient" jurisdictional "nexus" to sup-
port the American regulation. 443 The Appellate Body's focus may
have been a reaction to an earlier GATT panel decision, the Tuna-
Dolphin case, which had invalidated a similar American ban on tuna
imports because it attempted to regulate tuna with no connection to
United States waters.444 While the Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtles
expressly declined to say whether article XX(g) contemplates a juris-
440 WTO Appellate Body Report on United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 3, 1i1 n.76 (Oct. 12, 1998), http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/dispue/58abr.pdf [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtles].
441 Id. 4. Certification was also possible for "countries with a fishing environment which [did]
not pose a threat of the incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of shrimp harvesting." Id. 3.
442 Id. 125-145.
443 Id. 133. The United States did not claim that all populations of these species traversed
United States waters. Id. Conceivably, section 6og affected some sea turtles that never entered
United States jurisdiction. Id. One should not view Shrimp-Turtles as an endorsement of extraju-
risdictional justifications, however. The Appellate Body noted that none of the parties claimed
exclusive ownership of the sea turtles. Id. Thus, the Appellate Body implied that regulations are
not extrajurisdictional when the complaining party has no ownership of the regulated resources
and when the regulating party has some connection to them, however remote.
444 GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16,
1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (3 9th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I]. Tuna-Dolphin I con-
cerned the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat.
1027 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1 4 21h (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)), an environmental
measure that attempted to limit the incidental taking of dolphins by tuna fisherman in the Pacific
Ocean. Tuna-Dolphin I, supra, at 19i. This act required American tuna fishermen to use specified
techniques to reduce the incidental taking of dolphins and banned the import of tuna from coun-
tries that failed to protect dolphins in a "comparable" manner. Id. In order to gain access to the
United States market, an exporting country had to demonstrate that its tuna fleet took dolphins at
an average rate "not in excess of 1.25 times the average incidental taking rate of United States ves-
sels.., during the same period." Id.
In response to a complaint by Mexico, a GATT panel ruled that the MMPA constituted an
import ban in violation of article XL Id. at 205. The panel rejected the United States's argument
that the MMPA fell within article XX(b)'s exception for measures "necessary to protect ... animal
... life or health." Id. at 197-200 (quoting GATT 1947, supra note 204, art. XX(b)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). The panel held that the exception did not apply to measures like the MMPA
that purported to protect animals outside the jurisdiction of the enacting state. Id. at 198-200.
The panel decision was never adopted by the GATT membership. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES,
supra note 99, at 584.
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dictional limit, its opinion does reflect an uneasiness with extrajurisdic-
tional justifications. 445
The Appellate Body concluded, however, that section 6o9 failed to
satisfy the requirements of article XX's chapeau. 446 In practice, it ex-
plained, section 609 required that other countries adopt regulatory
programs that were "not merely comparable, but rather essentially the
same, as that applied to the United States shrimp trawl vessels."
447
This "single, rigid, and unbending" policy, one that took no account of
different conditions in other countries or alternative measures avail-
able to protect sea turtles, was both arbitrary and unjustifiable. 448  In
the Appellate Body's view, section 609 seemed to be concerned not so
much with protecting sea turtles, but with requiring other countries to
adopt the United States's favored method of protecting sea turtles.
The case thus reflects a preference for performance rather than process
standards.449
Shrimp-Turtles also recognizes a strong version of the transparency
requirement. The Appellate Body criticized the United States's proce-
dures for certifying countries that would be exempt from section
6o9.450 United States officials made certification decisions on an ex
parte basis, and countries applying for certification lacked formal op-
portunities to present their cases or to respond to arguments against
them.45 ' The American officials did not provide reasoned explanations
for their decisions and did not allow appeals.452  The absence of
"transparent, predictable certification" procedures, the Appellate Body
445 A second GATT panel decision involving the MMPA indicated that extrajurisdictional
measures could fall within the scope of article XX(g). See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United
States - Restrictions on the Imports of Tuna, DS29IR, 9 5.14-15 (May 20, 1994), 1994 WL
90762o. This second panel report also was never adopted, and the Appellate Body in Shrimp-
Turtles did not refer to it. For a general discussion of the Appellate Body's decision, see Jennifer
Warnken, Note, The Shrimp-Sea Turtle Case Before the World Trade Organization, 1998 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 27.
446 Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 440, I 184, 186.
447 Id. 163.
441 Id. 177. "[D]iscrimination results," the Appellate Body held, "not only when countries in
which the same conditions prevail are differently treated, but also when the application of the
measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory program
for the conditions prevailing in those exporting countries." Id. 165.
449 The first Tuna-Dolphin case also sheds light on this issue. In that case, the United States ar-
gued that its ban on Mexican tuna was permissible under article III as a neutral product regula-
tion. Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 444, at 161-62, r65-68. The panel disagreed, noting that
"[r]egulations governing the taking of dolphins incidental to the taking of tuna could not possibly
affect tuna as a product." Id. at 195. Tuna-Dolphin I thus stands for the proposition that members
cannot disguise process regulations as neutral product standards. For more on the panel's ruling,
see above at note 444.
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held, amounted to arbitrary discrimination for purposes of the cha-
peau.4 53
Shrimp-Turtles departs from a Madisonian jurisprudence, however,
in suggesting that members may be obligated to negotiate with other
countries before adopting environmental measures that restrict trade.
While the Appellate Body did not expressly announce a duty to nego-
tiate, it gave great weight to the United States's failure to engage "in
serious, across-the-board negotiations" with other countries before im-
posing its import ban.454 Although protecting migratory animals such
as sea turtles requires "concerted and cooperative efforts on the part of
... many countries,"4 55 it pointed out that the United States had not
"even seriously attempted" to conclude a comprehensive international
agreement on the subject.45 6
The Appellate Body's call for "serious, across-the-board negotia-
tions" suggests that it is interested in something more than mere for-
malities.457  A duty to negotiate, however, would constitute a signifi-
cant departure from the antidiscrimination model. First, the Appellate
Body could assure itself that members had negotiated "seriously" only
by evaluating the substance of proposals that members had made and
rejected in the course of their consultations. Otherwise, nations could
fulfill the duty to negotiate by offering proposals that no other nation
would accept. As a result, the duty would require the Appellate Body
to make sensitive judgments about the desirability of various regula-
tory options and thereby inexorably move it toward shaping interna-
tional standards.
Moreover, a duty to negotiate would encourage strategic delays. In
Shrimp-Turtles, for example, nonconservationist countries might delay
consultations - while continuing to deplete the sea turtle population
- until the United States offered side payments or agreed to impose
comparatively lax regulations. In addition, the widely differing values
453 Id. 11 i8o-I8I; see also id. 184. The Appellate Body recommended that the WTO ask the
United States to bring section 6og into conformity with the requirements of GATT. Id. 188.454 Id. 1 166.
455 Id. 168.
456 Id. 1 67. The Appellate Body noted that, in section 6o9 itself, Congress had "expressly rec-
ognized the importance of securing international agreements for the protection and conservation
of" sea turtles. Id. Moreover, the United States had concluded a regional agreement with five
Latin American countries, demonstrating that "consensual and multilateral procedures [were]
available and feasible" to preserve sea turtles. Id. 169-170.
457 Id. 66. If the Appellate Body's reference to the failure to negotiate is not a separate basis
for the holding, but simply an observation in an opinion that rests on the lack of transparency and
performance-oriented standards, it is less troubling. One indication that these remarks have en-
during significance, however, is Tuna-Dolphin I, in which a GATT panel similarly held that United
States regulations were defective because of a failure to negotiate with other countries about inter-
national standards. Tuna-Dolphin 1, supra note 444, at 199-200. For a more comprehensive dis-
cussion of Tuna-Dolphin I, see above at notes 444, 449.
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that countries place on environmental goods, and the differential ac-
cess that they have to information, would complicate the search for
consensus on any common policy, leading to frustration and dissension
among WTO members.
458
Accordingly, we believe that the duty to negotiate strand of
Shrimp-Turtles is not in accord with a democracy-reinforcing jurispru-
dence. It gives excessive power to centralized agencies and prevents a
nation's citizens from protecting against adverse effects in their own
environment.
As another example, the recently decided Asbestos case contributes
to a democracy-reinforcing jurisprudence by demonstrating the
WTO's reluctance to second-guess members' health and safety goals,
provided there is some objective evidence to support them.45 9 In As-
bestos, a panel upheld a French ban on the importation of asbestos
from Canada.4 60 Although the ban treated imports less favorably than
like domestic products - French asbestos substitutes - it fell within
article XX(b)'s exception for measures "necessary to protect human
... life or health. '46 1 The panel believed that the submissions of the
parties and the comments of experts the panel had consulted contained
"sufficient scientific evidence" to support France's claim that asbestos
posed risks to human health. 462 The panel rejected Canada's argu-
ment that controlled use of asbestos under international safety stan-
dards could reduce the risks to acceptable levels. 463  International
standards would not achieve the level of protection France had chosen,
and France had the right to choose the level of protection it saw fit.46 4
Asbestos also comports with our proposed jurisprudence by apply-
ing a relatively deferential version of the least restrictive means re-
quirement - though it also contains dicta at odds with our position.
458 See supra p. 562.
459 WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report on European Communities - Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DSI35/R (Sept. 18, 2000), http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop.e/dispue/distab_e.htm [hereinafter Asbestos]. We also discuss the objective evi-
dence requirement in connection with WTO rulings under the SPS Agreement. See infra pp. 599-
6oo, 6oI-O2.
460 Asbestos, supra note 459, 9 9.1.
461 GATT 1947, supra note 204, art. XX(b). For the panel's reasoning on the discrimination
point, see Asbestos, supra note 459, 99 8.10I-.58. For the panel's reasoning on article XX(b), see
id. 9 8.16o-.223. In light of Canada's failure to argue that France treated Canadian asbestos less
favorably than asbestos from other countries, the panel concluded that the ban did not violate arti-
cle XX's chapeau. Id. 8.227-229, 8.237, 8.240.
462 Asbestos, supra note 459, 99 8.i82-195. The panel stressed that it did "not intend to set it-
self up as an arbiter of the opinions expressed by the scientific community," id. 8.i81, and that it
was consulting experts only to help it "understand and evaluate the evidence submitted and the
arguments advanced by the parties," id. 8.182. The panel had appointed the experts "in consul-
tation with the parties." Id. 8.182 n.129.
463 Id. 99 8.2o4-.217.
464 Id. 918.21; see also id. 98.171, 8.179.
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Although GATT does not expressly contain such a requirement, a
number of reports, both before and after the Uruguay Round, have in-
terpreted article XX to provide one.465 In Asbestos, the panel stated
that France's ban could be considered "necessary" only if there were
no reasonably available alternative, less inconsistent with GATT, that
would allow France to achieve its public health goals. 466 In assessing
whether there was a reasonably available alternative, one would need
to consider the economic and administrative realities that France faced
and the resources that France could dedicate to the problem.467 As a
developed country, France could be expected "to deploy administrative
resources proportionate to its public health objectives and to be pre-
pared to incur the necessary expenditure." 468
Despite this language, however, the Asbestos panel's application of
the least restrictive means requirement was relatively respectful of na-
tional regulatory choices. The panel rejected Canada's argument that
controlled use of asbestos would provide a reasonable alternative to
France's ban.469 Given France's unreviewable decision to set a very
high level of protection, the panel explained, controlled use was not an
option. 470 The panel thus took France's public health goals as a given
and did not substitute its own safety analysis. 47 ' Moreover, its ruling
suggests that the WTO will not use the least restrictive means re-
quirement as an engine for regulatory uniformity. By recognizing that
a country's resources play a role in its choice of options, Asbestos sug-
gests there will be flexibility for developing countries that cannot af-
ford the regulatory programs of the developed world.4 12
Still, the least restrictive means requirement has the potential to en-
tangle the WTO in national regulatory choices. Deciding whether al-
ternatives were "reasonably available" could entail sensitive judgments
about national environmental and safety policies - particularly if fu-
465 Id. 11 8.198-.i99 & n.158. The panel cited two pre-Uruguay Round panel rulings, see
GATT Dispute Panel Report on Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 199o, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (i99i); GATT Dispute Panel Report
on United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193o, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (3 6th
Supp.) at 345 (i9o), and one post-Uruguay Round panel ruling, see WTO Dispute Settlement
Panel Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispue/gasoline.wp5.





471 The panel repeatedly characterized its role as deciding how a "decision-maker responsible for
developing public health measures" might reasonably act, given French safety objectives. Id.
8.2 17; see also id. 8.202, 8.209, 8.211, 8.214.
472 See id. 8.207. For a discussion of how a least restrictive means requirement might lead to a
jurisprudence of "preferred" regulatory options, see above at pp. 579-80. For a discussion of the
benefits of regulatory competition among jurisdictions, see above at section III.B.3, pp. 558-61.
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ture panels take seriously Asbestos's suggestion that developed coun-
tries should spend significant resources to avoid trade restrictions.
Under that approach, panelists would have the latitude to substitute
their own views on the trade-offs of regulatory approaches for the de-
terminations of national authorities. To avoid this problem, members
must make sure that the WTO applies the least restrictive means re-
quirement with substantial deference to national regulatory agendas.
B. The SPS and TBT Agreements
The SPS and TBT Agreements reflect our model's concern with
transparency, performance orientation, and consistency, as well as its
deference to national health and safety goals. The SPS Agreement ad-
dresses a category of health and safety regulations known as "sanitary
and phytosanitary measures" - measures that members adopt to pro-
tect the life or health of humans, animals, or plants within their terri-
tories from risks posed by pests, diseases, food additives, or contami-
nants.47 3 The TBT Agreement, in turn, relates primarily to other
"[t]echnical regulation[s]" that mandate "product characteristics" and
"related processes and production methods."47 4
473 SPS Agreement, supra note 39, Annex A(i). Article i.i of the SPS Agreement provides that
"[tihis Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, directly or indi-
rectly, affect international trade." Id. art. i.1. An annex to the SPS Agreement defines SPS mea-
sures as those applied:
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying
organisms or disease-causing organisms;
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods,
beverages or feedstuffs;
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks
arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, es-
tablishment or spread of pests; or
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the en-
try, establishment or spread of pests.
Id. Annex A(i). The annex gives several examples of SPS measures, such as testing and inspection
procedures, quarantine treatments, and packaging and labeling requirements. Id. To the extent
that the SPS Agreement applies, it preempts the more general requirements of article XX(b) of
GATT. Article 2.4 of the SPS Agreement specifically provides that measures in compliance with
the agreement shall be presumed to comply with article XX(b) of GATT as well. Id. art. 2.4; see
also Hudec, supra note 438, at 644 (noting the "usual understanding" in trade law "that the more
specific agreement ... prevails over the more general").
474 TBT Agreement, supra note 40, Annex i(i). The Agreement also relates to "[s]tandard[sI,"
defined as documents providing "guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and
production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory." Id. Annex 1(2).
The TBT Agreement does not apply to SPS measures, which fall within the scope of the SPS
Agreement. Id. art. 1.5. Whether the TBT Agreement preempts the more general GATT provi-
sions is not entirely clear. One would expect the TBT Agreement, as the more specific of the two,
to preempt GATT when it applies. Hudec, supra note 438, at 644. Yet one panel chose to decide a
case under GATT rather than the TBT Agreement even though the parties had argued the case
under both. See id. Another panel, however, recently suggested that when both the TBT Agree-
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Like GATT, the SPS and TBT Agreements contemplate an over-
arching nondiscrimination principle.47 5 The agreements improve on
GATT, however, in that they more clearly direct WTO tribunals to
apply procedure-oriented tests to root out covert discrimination. The
agreements also expressly endorse a least restrictive means require-
ment, but do not make clear the degree of deference that the WTO
should afford members' regulatory objectives.
Both agreements endorse transparency. The SPS and TBT Agree-
ments require members to publish measures "promptly" and in a man-
ner accessible to interested members. 476 Members must generally al-
low producers in affected countries time "to adapt their products and
methods of production" to the new requirements.
477
In addition, both the SPS and TBT Agreements are performance-
rather than process-oriented. For example, the TBT Agreement pro-
vides that "[w]herever appropriate, Members shall specify technical
regulations based on product requirements in terms of performance
rather than design or descriptive characteristics. '47 8 The SPS Agree-
ment is slightly less explicit, but its requirement that regulations be
evaluated in terms of risks and levels of protection 47 9 strongly suggests
that products can be regulated only on the basis of their effects, not
the processes by which they are made.480 The SPS Agreement also
specifically requires that WTO tribunals consider the consistency be-
tween regulatory standards that apply to foreign products and those
that apply to domestic products. 48 1 Finally, the SPS Agreement re-
ment and GATT apply to a technical regulation, the TBT Agreement governs because of its
greater detail and specificity. See Asbestos, supra note 459, 8.6-.17.
475 See SPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 2.3; TBT Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1. For in-
stance, members must ensure that their SPS measures do not "arbitrarily or unjustifiably discrimi-
nate" against other members and must not apply SPS measures "in a manner which would consti-
tute a disguised restriction on international trade." SPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 2.3.
476 SPS Agreement, supra note 39, Annex B(i); see TBT Agreement, supra note 40, arts. 2.11,
2.12, 5.6, 1o.i.
477 SPS Agreement, supra note 39, Annex B(2); see TBT Agreement, supra note 40, arts. 2.11,
2.12, 5.6, io.i. In addition, in response to "reasonable questions," members must provide docu-
ments regarding proposed or adopted SPS measures and any applicable risk assessment proce-
dures. SPS Agreement, supra note 39, Annex B(3). In some circumstances, members must grant
other countries an opportunity to comment on proposed SPS measures and must take those com-
ments "into account." Id. Annex B(5).
478 TBT Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.8.
479 For discussion of this requirement, see below at pp. 599-6oo.
480 See SPS Agreement, supra note 39, arts. 4-5.
481 Id. art. 5.5 ("[Elach member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels [of
protection it considers] to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.").
The WTO's Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures recently adopted a set of
nonbinding guidelines to help members implement article 5.5. COMM. ON SANITARY AND PHYTO-
SANITARY MEASURES, WORLD TRADE ORG., GUIDELINES TO FURTHER THE PRACTICAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 5.5, G/SPS/I5 (July 18, 2ooo), http://www.wto.org/ddf/ep/E2/
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quires that countries offer objective evidence to support their regula-
tory standards. Under the Agreement, members must base their SPS
measures on "sufficient scientific evidence, 48 2 including "appropriate"
assessments of the risks to human, animal, or plant life or health. 483
The SPS and TBT Agreements also expressly endorse a least re-
strictive means requirement. 48 4 Under article 5.6 of the SPS Agree-
ment, members must ensure that SPS measures "are not more trade-
restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of [SPS]
protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility."485
Similarly, the TBT Agreement provides that "technical regulations
shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create."48 6
The Appellate Body has not yet definitively interpreted these require-
ments. As discussed above, unless WTO tribunals apply these re-
E2955e.doc. These guidelines advance several of the principles we advocate. For example, in or-
der to improve transparency, the guidelines provide that a member "should indicate the level of
protection which it considers to be appropriate ... in a sufficiently clear manner so as to permit
examination of the extent to which" an SPS measure achieves that level. Id. § A.i. Similarly, the
guidelines provide that a member should "establish clear ... communication and information flows
within and between the authorities ... responsible for the selection and implementation of [SPS
measures]." Id. § B.i. The guidelines note that a member "may consider seeking expert advice on
the selection and implementation of [SPS measures]," id. § B.7, and make clear that, while a mem-
ber "may find it helpful to examine measures applied by other Members facing similar risks and
situations," it need not harmonize its regulations with those of other countries, id. § B.6.
482 SPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 2.2 ("Members shall ensure that any [SPS] measure is
... based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence ....").
483 Id. art. 5.1; see also id. Annex A( 4) (defining risk assessment). In assessing these risks, mem-
bers must take into account several factors, including available scientific evidence, relevant eco-
logical and environmental conditions, and "the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches
to limiting [the] isks." Id. arts. 5.2-.3.
484 Although GATT does not contain an explicit least restrictive means test, panels have inter-
preted the broad language of article XX to provide one. See supra p. 595.
485 SPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 5.6. "[A] measure is not more trade-restrictive than re-
quired" for these purposes "unless there is another measure, reasonably available taking into ac-
count technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of [SPS] protection and
is significantly less restrictive to trade." Id. art. 5.6 n.3. The Appellate Body discussed article 5.6
in its Salmon ruling. WTO Appellate Body Report on Australia - Measures Affecting Importa-
tion of Salmon, WT/DSi8/AB/R, 1-2 (Oct. 20, 1998), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispue/dsx8abr.doc [hereinafter Salmon]. The panel below had ruled that the import ban at issue
in that case was "more trade restrictive than required" to achieve Australia's appropriate level of
protection, and therefore that Australia had acted inconsistently with article 5.6. Id. I 179 (quot-
ing SPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 5.6) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Appellate
Body in Salmon emphasized once again the right of members to set their own levels of protection,
declaring that article 5.6 required "an examination of whether possible alternative SPS measures
meet the appropriate level of protection as determined by the Member concerned." Id. 204. Be-
cause of factual deficiencies in the record, however, the Appellate Body could not ascertain
whether measures other than the ban would have achieved the level of protection Australia estab-
lished. The Appellate Body ultimately reversed the panel's ruling on other grounds. Id. s13; see
Kennedy, supra note 6, at 97-98.
486 TBT Agreement, supra note 4o, art. 2.2.
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quirements with appropriate deference to the policy choices of member
states, the requirements could become a vehicle for centralized deter-
minations about the wisdom of particular regulations and thus prove
inconsistent with our Madisonian model.
4 87
Two recent Appellate Body reports elaborate on the provisions of
the SPS Agreement, demonstrating that the WTO does have the ca-
pacity for fashioning a Madisonian jurisprudence.4 88 The first is the
noted Hormones report, adopted in 1998.489 The Hormones case ad-
dressed a European ban on the sale of meat from cattle that had been
treated with certain growth hormones.490 An international body of ex-
perts had approved the use of the hormones in question, but the Euro-
pean Community (EC) asserted that they were carcinogenic. 491  While
the ban applied both to European and imported beef, European pro-
ducers had long been forbidden to administer growth hormones; there-
fore, the ban fell disproportionately on producers in countries like the
United States and Canada that permit the practice.
4 92
In a sweeping report, the Appellate Body concluded that the ban
was inconsistent with the EC's obligations under the SPS Agree-
ment.49 3 The Appellate Body affirmed the EC's right to disregard in-
ternational norms and adopt measures affording a higher standard of
protection. 494 The EC, however, needed to base its safety measures on
objectively valid risk assessments; 495 in this case, the Appellate Body
found that the EC had offered no risk assessment that reasonably sup-
ported the ban on hormone-treated meat. 496 While the EC had pro-
duced general studies on the carcinogenic potential of hormones, those
studies did not specifically address the administration of hormones to
cattle for growth promotion purposes. 497 On that question, all of the
submitted studies concluded that hormones were "safe" if administered
in accordance with good veterinary practice.
4 98
487 See supra pp. 579-80.
488 The WTO has yet to decide any cases under the TBT Agreement.
489 Hormones, supra note 223. For further discussion of the Hormones case, see generally Dale
E. McNiel, The First Case Under the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement: The Euro-
pean Union's Hormone Ban, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 89 (1998); and Walker, supra note 366.
490 Hormones, supra note 223, 11 2-5.
491 See McNiel, supra note 489, at 102, 107-08, 117; Walker, supra note 366, at 254.
492 Hormones, supra note 223, 244.
493 See id. 253-255.
494 Id. 172.
495 See id. 176-177. The Appellate Body explained that a "risk assessment must sufficiently
warrant - that is to say, reasonably support - the SPS measure at stake." Id. 1 193.
496 Id. 208.
497 Id. 199-2oo. For an interesting criticism of the Appellate Body on this issue, see Walker,
supra note 366, at 299-300.
498 Hormones, supra note 223, 197-198, 206-207. One scientist had expressed a contrary
opinion, but again, this finding did not stem from a specific analysis of the risks from hormones
administered to cattle. Id. 198 (discussing the opinion of Dr. Lucier). Although the Appellate
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The Appellate Body also discussed the SPS Agreement's consis-
tency requirement. It determined that the EC had drawn an unjustifi-
able distinction between the levels of protection it imposed with re-
spect to hormones and the levels of protection it imposed with respect
to certain other feed additives.499 In light of a legislative history re-
flecting legitimate and particularly intense concerns about drug-free
meat, however, the Appellate Body declined to conclude that this in-
consistency amounted to "discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade. '50 0
The Appellate Body again considered risk assessment and consis-
tency in the Salmon case, which addressed an Australian measure
banning the importation of certain uncooked salmon from Canada. 50 1
As in Hormones, the Appellate Body held that the ban was not based
on a valid risk assessment. 50 2 The government report supporting the
Australian ban had evaluated the probability of some adverse effects,
but contained only "general and vague statements of mere possibility"
with respect to others.5 0 3  Moreover, the report failed to evaluate the
relative effectiveness of alternative SPS measures in reducing the risk
of those adverse effects.50 4
The Appellate Body also held that the ban violated the consistency
requirement.50 5 In the Appellate Body's view, Australia had drawn
arbitrary and unjustifiable distinctions between standards addressing
comparable situations. Australia had applied less restrictive measures
Body left open the possibility that the ban might be valid if erected to screen hormones rendered
harmful by improper administration, the EC submitted no studies at all on the effects of abusive
veterinary practice. See id. 207-208.
499 Id. 91 226-235. The feed additives in question were carbadox and olaquindox, which are
administered to piglets. Id. 226. The EC had also established differing levels of protection for
other hormones, but the Appellate Body believed that these distinctions were explicable. Id.
9 2 18-225.
500 Id. j 218-225.
501 Salmon, supra note 485, J 1-2.
502 Id. 136.
503 Id. 9 12 7-129 (quoting WTO Panel Report on Australia - Measures Affecting Importation
of Salmon, WT/DSI8/R, 8.83 (June 12, 1998), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/
i8roo.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Appellate Body explained that while the likeli-
hood of adverse effects might be expressed in qualitative terms, id. I 124, more than "general and
vague statements of mere possibility" were required, id. 1 129.
504 The government report identified the alternative measures available, id. 132 n.84, but
failed to evaluate them sufficiently, id. 133-134.
It is important to note that the Appellate Body was not suggesting a least restrictive means
requirement here. Australia's failure fully to evaluate different options merely indicated that it had
not conducted a proper risk assessment to support its ban. The Appellate Body did consider the
SPS Agreement's least restrictive means requirement in another section of its ruling, but was un-
able to reach a conclusion because of insufficient factual findings by the panel. See id. I 179-213,
241-242; see also supra note 485 (discussing the Salmon case's treatment of the least restrictive
means requirement).
505 Salmon, supra note 485, t 140-141, 178, 240.
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to herring, for example, even though herring posed potentially greater
risks than salmon.5 0 6 The Appellate Body found that, under the cir-
cumstances, Australia's failure to treat comparable products consis-
tently suggested disguised restriction on international trade.5 07
We believe that these decisions are broadly consistent with a de-
mocracy-reinforcing jurisprudence. By relying on procedure-oriented
factors to root out covert protectionism, the Hormones and Salmon
rulings comport with our recommended approach. 50 8  By requiring
consistency between regulations that affect imports and those that af-
fect comparable domestic products, the decisions limit the power of
domestic interest groups to harm the broader citizenry through rent-
seeking regulations.
Moreover, the rulings reflect our recommended deference to the
substance of domestic judgments about public health and safety.50 9
Although the Appellate Body faulted the EC and Australia for failing
to base their regulations on appropriate risk assessments, it did not
presume to make independent judgments about the necessity for pro-
tective measures.5 10 It was not that national authorities had wrongly
assessed the risks, but rather that they had failed to make genuine at-
tempts to support their regulations with objective evidence.51l The
Appellate Body's insistence in the Hormones case that members have a
right to depart from international standards in determining their levels
of sanitary protection also confirms the regulatory autonomy of mem-
ber states.5 12 Thus, these aspects of WTO jurisprudence allow citizens
506 Id. 154-158.
507 See id. 159-177. The Appellate Body believed that several aspects of the Australian
regulation, "considered cumulatively, [led] to the conclusion that the distinctions in the levels of
protection imposed by Australia resulted] in a disguised restriction on international trade." Id.
177; see id. 11 237-240.
508 See supra section IV.A pp. 5 73-83.
509 See supra pp. 579-80.
510 In Hormones, indeed, the Appellate Body noted that scientific evidence may lead to a wide
range of scientific conclusions and consequent policies. See Hormones, supra note 223, 194; see
also id. 124 (noting that the SPS Agreement provisions "explicitly recognize the right of Members
to establish their own appropriate level of sanitary protection."). Interestingly, the EC argued in
Hormones that its ban was justified under the "'precautionary principle,' which counsels govern-
mental authorities to err on the side of protection in formulating public policy in contexts charac-
terized by conditions of scientific uncertainty." David A. Wirth, International Decisions, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 755, 758-59 (1998). The Appellate Body noted that the SPS Agreement reflects the prin-
ciple's concern with caution in the face of irreversible risks to human health, but nevertheless ruled
that the precautionary principle did not override the agreement's basic risk assessment require-
ments. Hormones, supra note 223, 120-125.
511 The Appellate Body made clear in the Hormones case that it is not necessary that a member
carry out its own risk assessment, and that a member could rely on assessments carried out by
other members or international organizations. Hormones, supra note 223, 190.
512 Id. 172. Although the European ban in the Hormones case was inconsistent with the de-
termination of an international body of experts that had approved the use of the hormones in ques-
tion, in the view of the Appellate Body that inconsistency in itself did not preclude the EC from
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to choose the level of protection that suits their preferences and tradi-
tions, and to confront any threat that can be established with some sci-
entific validity.
C. Recommendations for Reform
We close this Part with some brief recommendations. Our goals
are to curb the aggrandizing tendencies we have observed in the
WTO's jurisprudence - such as the duty to negotiate and the poten-
tially intrusive least restrictive means requirement - and, in addition,
to reduce opportunities for special interest machinations. We submit
two types of proposals: structural changes in the dispute resolution
process and substantive changes in the agreements that this process
enforces.
First, the Dispute Settlement Understanding's provisions regarding
the tenure of Appellate Body members should be reformed. We do not
object to relatively short terms for Appellate Body members. 51 3 Long
terms, let alone life tenure, would encourage judicial activism as mem-
bers gained experience and prestige and came to think of themselves
as something more than humble arbiters of legal disputes.514 The cur-
rent provision for reappointment, however, is troubling. It creates in-
centives for members of the Appellate Body to take excessively broad
views of their authority and generally aggrandize the role of the WTO;
presumably the WTO, the reappointing authority, would look favora-
bly upon such readings. Thus, the reappointment provision gives
structural encouragement to doctrines, like the duty to negotiate, that
we have found inconsistent with a democracy-reinforcing jurispru-
dence.515  We would therefore eliminate the possibility of
reappointment.
Second, the WTO must more effectively police conflicts of interest
on panels and in the Appellate Body. Tribunals can restrain special
interests only if their members are not beholden to those interests.
Thus, strong conflict of interest rules are essential to a democracy-
reinforcing jurisprudence. Unfortunately, critics of the WTO have
shown that panelists and Appellate Body members have not always
met such standards, in large part because the WTO rules are vague
and depend entirely on self-policing.5 16
choosing a more cautious approach. Id.; see also Walker, supra note 366, at 268, 271 ("Selecting the
appropriate level of protection is an act of sovereignty .... ").
513 The current term is four years. DSU, supra note io8, art. 17, § 2.
514 For a discussion of this problem in the context of Supreme Court Justices, see John 0.
McGinnis, Justice Without Justices, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 54 I , 542-44 (999).
515 For discussion of the duty to negotiate, see above at pp. 593-94.
516 For criticism of conflict of interest problems in the WTO, see above at p. 535.
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A template for more effective conflict of interest rules can be found
in the United States, where tribunals also play an important role in a
democracy-reinforcing jurisprudence. In the United States, federal
judges are required to fill out financial disclosure forms, which are
now publicized on the Internet.517 A statute clearly establishes specific
circumstances in which judges may not sit due to conflicts of inter-
est.5 18 These standards are not completely self-policing; an appellate
court reviews a federal trial judge's refusal to disqualify himself under
an abuse of discretion standard.51 9 Although conflict of interest re-
quirements need not be as rigorous as the American rules, some com-
bination of mandatory public disclosure and independent policing
would go a long way toward making the WTO's adjudicative struc-
ture a more legitimate component of a democracy-reinforcing system.
Third, the WTO should adopt procedures that ensure greater
transparency in dispute settlement. While a process that began as an
aspect of diplomacy understandably exhibits lingering remnants of the
secrecy inherent in diplomatic proceedings, the WTO dispute resolu-
tion process has become increasingly adjudicative and rule-oriented. 520
With this change should come the attributes of transparency associated
with proper adjudication, such as the public dissemination of all
documents essential to the proceedings and public admission to the
proceedings themselves. Of course, any matters relating to national
security may still need to be closely held. Moreover, we must be sensi-
tive to the concerns of nations that are not quite as ebullient as the
United States in their regard for "[s]unlight" as "the best of disinfec-
tants. ' '52 1 But if the decisions of the WTO adjudicative system are to
enjoy public confidence, the process must be as transparent to the
public as possible.
Finally, WTO members should amend GATT to more expressly
adopt a jurisprudence centered around the procedure-oriented tests we
have identified. As we have noted, the SPS and TBT Agreements al-
ready embrace some of these tests explicitly.522 GATT should follow
their example for two reasons: First, although recent WTO rulings in-
517 See Richard Carelli, Judges' Financial Reports Hit Web, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 22, 2000,
2000 WL 23358974.
518 28 U.S.C. § 455 (I994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994) (requiring a judge, upon "a timely and
sufficient affidavit" from a litigant, "to proceed no further" if he "has a personal bias or prejudice"
against the litigant or "in favor of any adverse party").
519 See, e.g., United States v. Mizell, 88 F3d 288, 299 (I996).
520 See Ragosta, supra note 135, at 750 (discussing the transformation of GATT from a diplo-
matic arrangement to more of a judicial dispute settlement system).
521 The origins of the phrase are found in LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND
HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (1933).
522 See supra pp. 597-98. We believe that these agreements could be improved by making clear




corporate some elements of a democracy-reinforcing jurisprudence, the
organization has not clearly embraced them all. Writing these ele-
ments into GATT would help to entrench them against the vagaries of
future decisions. Second, as GATT becomes more like a code than a
general statement of principles, it will become more difficult for panels
and the Appellate Body to justify adverse innovations that aggrandize
the WTO's power at the expense of the appropriate regulatory agen-
cies of member states.5 23
CONCLUSION
Free trade and democracy both promote human happiness. Unfor-
tunately, critics often view international structures that facilitate free
trade as incompatible with democratic government. This bit of con-
ventional wisdom is false. International free trade and domestic de-
mocracy share a common enemy - protectionist interest groups.
Therefore, constitutive structures that restrain such groups can simul-
taneously reinforce both trade and democracy. This is as true of the
emerging world trade constitution as it is of our venerable domestic
trade constitution.
Indeed, the task facing the world trade constitution resembles that
facing all constitutions: to encourage the production of public goods -
in this case, free trade and improved democracy - while resisting the
attempts of politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups to hijack gov-
ernment for their own purposes. This struggle will be constant, be-
cause there is a sad dilemma at the heart of all constitutions: the more
wealth a regime creates, the greater the incentives for interest groups
to distort the system to their advantage.5 24 The United States gov-
ernment, for example, has become more centralized, and its structural
limitations on special interest legislation less effective, in part because
of interest group pressures.5 2
5
The WTO may yet avoid this fate. With neither an elected legisla-
ture nor an executive to enforce its judgments, the WTO currently
lacks some of the structures that interest groups have traditionally
turned to their advantage. Moreover, nationalism, even more than
state pride within the American system, may serve as an effective
check against overreaching by the organization in the future. Still,
given the interest group pressures that the WTO has already begun to
face, it is not too early for policymakers and academics to persuade the
523 Recall that in Shrimp-Turtles, the Appellate Body seized on the vague nondiscrimination
principle of article XX's chapeau to imply the troubling duty to negotiate. See supra pp. 592, 593-
54. We would recommend that this holding be expressly disavowed.
524 See John 0. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Its Decline: A Public Choice Perspec-
tive, 2 1 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 2o8 (997) (discussing this dilemma).
525 See id. at 204-o8.
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public that the WTO's limitations make possible its substantial contri-
butions. The organization must remain focused on its important, and
importantly circumscribed, role: restraining interest groups in the
service of a simultaneously more prosperous and more democratic
world.
